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Case No. 20110428-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
StateofUtah, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
Jamis M. Johnson, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant Johnson appeals an Order and Judgment revoking probation 
following a conviction for one count of securities fraud. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2011). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Should Defendant's brief be disregarded because it is inadequate? 
Standard of Review. "Briefs that do not comply with rule 24 'may be 
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court.' Utah R. App. P. 
24(j)." State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 8,1 P.3d 1108. 
2. Did the trial court have jurisdiction to revoke Defendant's probation? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews jurisdictional questions as a matter of 
law. See State v. Kragh, 2011 UT App 108, t 9,255 P.3d 685. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3. Did the trial court clearly err when it found that Defendant had violated 
probation by failing to report to Adult Probation and Parole and by committing a 
federal crime? 
Standard of Review. An appellate court reviews the " evidence of a probation 
violation in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings," and substitutes its 
own judgment "only if the evidence is so deficient as to render the court's action an 
abuse of discretion." State v. Maestas, 2000 UT App 22, \ 12, 997 P.2d 314 -
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. Section .77-18-1(11) & (12) (West 2007) is attached as 
addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A jury convicted Defendant of one count of securities fraud (R1451). On June 
6,2007, Defendant was sentenced to one-to-fifteen years in prison (Rl677-80). The 
sentence was suspended and Defendant was placed on probation for 36 months 
based on certain conditions, including that he be supervised by Adult Probation & 
Parole (AP&P), that he have no new violations of the law, and that he report to the 
court whenever ordered to do so. Id. Defendant was also ordered to pay $125,000 
in restitution, jointly and severally with his co-defendant, Paul Schwenke (R1677-
80). Defendant's conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal, but remanded 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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for further proceedings to determine restitution. State v. Johnson, 2009 UT App 382, 
224 P.3d 720 (addendum B). 
Defendant signed a probation agreement, in which he agreed to " [r]eport as 
directed by the Department of Corrections/' to "[ojbey all state, federal and 
municipal laws/' and to "report to the court whenever ordered to do so/' (R2184-
85, addendum C). 
Numerous probation progress/violation reports and orders to show cause 
were subsequently filed. Relevant to this appeal, on October 10,2007, Defendant's 
probation was revoked and reinstated for 36 months.1 
Additional probation violation reports were filed, and hearings were held, but 
apparently none of the conditions of probation were changed again until August 30, 
2010. At an evidentiary hearing on August 30, 2010, the trial court found that 
Defendant had violated his probation by not maintaining verifiable full-time, 
employment (R2550:49; R2395-96; 2435-36). The court again revoked and reinstated 
probation for 36 months with the additional condition that Defendant serve 60 days 
in jail (R2435; R2550:52, addendum D). Defendant timely appealed that order 
1
 Defendant failed to provide the entire record on appeal Only volumes 10 
and 11 of the court file in case no. 051700056 were sent to the Court of Appeals. 
However, Defendant concedes that probation was revoked and reinstated for 36 
months on October 10,2007 (Aplt. br. at 4). In addition, the court docket in case no. 
051700056 shows when probation progress/violation reports were filed, and the 
hearings that followed. 
3 
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(R2414). A certificate of probable cause and order of release was signed November 
3, 2010 (R2468-2469, addendum E). The sentence was stayed pending appeal and 
Defendant was released from jail (R2470-72, addendum F). The district court's 
decision was affirmed on appeal. State v. Johnson, 2012 UT App 118, P.3d 
(addendum G). 
From November 12, 2010 through March 29, 2011, numerous additional 
probation violation reports were filed (see docket). A probation violation report 
filed on March 29, 2011 alleged that Defendant had violated probation by not 
reporting to AP&P (R2567, addendum H). It also alleged that Defendant had 
violated probation based on criminal convictions in federal court. Id. at 2568. 
Following an evidentiary hearing on April 27,2011, Defendant was found to 
have violated probation by failing to report to AP&P as required (R2974:43, 
addendum I; see also R2627-28, addendum J). Following an evidentiary hearing on 
May 17, 2011, Defendant was found to have violated probation based on federal 
criminal convictions (R2975:65-66, addendum K). The trial court revoked probation 
and imposed the original sentence of one to fifteen years in the Utah State prison 
(R2975:72, addendum K and see R2909, addendum L). 
Defendant timely appealed the April 27 and May 17th rulings by filing notices 
of appeal on May 17,2011 and May 20,2011 (R2629,2642). But on June 17,2011, the 
trial court entered an Order purporting to amend its order revoking probation 
4 
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(R2896-2900, addendum M). The State filed a motion to vacate, arguing that the 
court lacked jurisdiction because the case was on appeal (2904-06,2927-2934). On 
July 27,2011, the court entered a memorandum decision, but did not grant or deny 
the State's motion (R2964-2967). The decision states that the "court is inclined to 
grant" the State's motion, but then questions whether it has jurisdiction to do so, 
since it lost jurisdiction when Defendant appealed. Id. Although Defendant refers 
to them, these decisions and issues are not specifically part of this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
The Underlying Criminal Case. In the summer of 2000, two dairymen held a 
family dairy farm as the sole members of a limited liability company. Johnson, 2009 
UT App 382 f 2 (addendum B). The dairymen had a series of meetings with 
Defendant and his co-defendant Schwenke to discuss a proposed investment in 
American-Dairy.com, a company that Schwenke had recently incorporated. Id. at 
f f 2-3. Schwenke said that he would obtain financing by selling stock in a public 
offering. Defendant explained how stocks would work in the public offering. Id. at 
f^ f 3-4. But Defendant did not disclose that he was the subject of ongoing 
disciplinary proceedings by the Utah State Bar for misappropriating client funds, 
that he was subject to three tax liens totaling $1,669,562.89, or that he had a Small 
Business Administration judgment against him. Defendant also did not tell the 
dairymen that Schwenke was an attorney who had been disbarred for 
5 
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misappropriating client funds or that he was pursuing legal action against 
Schwenke over a failed business deal. Johnson, 2009 UT App 382, f 2. 
The dairymen signed an agreement transferring all of the farm's assets to 
American-Dairy, in exchange for stock in the company. Id. at f 5. But no other 
stocks were ever issued, making the two dairymen the sole shareholders. Id. at f 6. 
The dairymen never received any financing out of the transaction (R1999:152, 
178,231). And, having transferred their deed to American-Dairy, they were no 
longer able to get financing from a bank (Rl999:173). Within months of the 
transaction, creditors foreclosed, the dairymen lost their farm and farm equipment, 
and forfeited a $70,000 certificate of deposit, which had previously been used as 
collateral for a loan to purchase cattle. Johnson, 2009 UT App 382 f 8. 
The Probation Revocation Proceedings. On June 18, 2007, Defendant signed a 
probation agreement, in which he agreed to "[r]eport as directed by the Department 
of Corrections/7 to "[o]bey all state, federal and municipal laws/' to "report to the 
court whenever ordered to do so/' and "to abide by all conditions of probation as 
ordered by the court." (R2184-85, addendum C). 
Evidentiary hearing on April 27,2011. The evidentiary hearing on April 27, 
2011 was held on an order to show cause against Defendant alleging violations of 
his probation (R2974:4, addendum I). Several violations were alleged, including 
that Defendant had been convicted of federal crimes and had failed to report to 
6 
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AP&P as required. Id. at 7. The issue concerning federal convictions was continued 
to a hearing in May. So the April hearing specifically addressed the issue of 
Defendant failing to report to AP&P. 
At the hearing, AP&P agent Troy Staker testified that Defendant was under 
his personal supervision (R2974:10-ll, addendum I). Agent Staker testified that he 
received an e-mail from the jail saying that Defendant was going to be released on 
October 13,2010. So Agent Staker called the home telephone number provided by 
Defendant, but Defendant's home number had been disconnected (R2974:12-13). 
Agent Staker then called Defendant's mobile phone and left a message, letting 
him know that he was aware that Defendant was going to be released from jail. Id. 
His message reminded Defendant that he needed to report in person to AP&P the 
next business day following his release from jail. Id. at 14. But Defendant did not 
report to AP&P and did not call or leave a message as to why he did not report. Id. 
Defendant's previous schedule required him to report to Agent Staker on the 
third Thursday of every month. Id. at 14-15. But Defendant also did not report on 
October 21st, the third Thursday of October, and did not call or leave a message as 
to why he did not report. Id. 
Defendant testified that he received Agent Staker's telephone message, but he 
did not respond to Agent Staker. Id. at 26-27,29. In response to the phone message, 
7 
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Defendant said he instead called his attorney and checked the court docket. Id. at 
27,29. 
Prior to the April evidentiary hearing, Defendant's probation had been 
revoked and then reinstated with the additional condition that he serve 60 days in 
jail (R2435; 2550-52, addendum D). Defendant did not serve all of the jail time 
because a certificate of probable cause and order of release was signed pending 
appeal (R2468-69, addendum E). The certificate of probable cause required 
Defendant to "continue^ to report on a regular basis to the Court by the 15th day of 
each month/' Id. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Defendant testified that it was his understanding 
that probation had been shifted to the court during the appeal. Id. at 29. He 
testified that the remedy he had asked for in his motion to stay was that his 
probation be converted to court probation and that the sentence of probation also be 
stayed pending appeal. Id. at 30. Defendant testified that the advice of his counsel 
was that it was unnecessary for him to report to AP&P, but that he had to report to 
the court. Id. at 30-31. 
Defense counsel acknowledged that the certificate of probable cause was 
dated November 3, 2010 (R2974:37, and see addenda E and F), but he argued that 
the order should be considered nunc pro tunc, dating back to October 13, 2010 
(R2974:37). Defendant's position was that after October 13,2010, he did not have to 
8 
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report to AP&P, but only had to report to the court. Defense counsel also argued 
that it could not be said that Defendant willfully violated probation when he was 
relying on the advice of counsel and the certificate of probable cause saying that he 
was to report to the court. Id. at 38. 
But the prosecutor pointed out that the certificate of probable cause and the 
court's order did not say that Defendant could stop reporting to AP&P. Id, at 40. 
The prosecutor also asked the court to take judicial notice of its own record, to find 
that Defendant had also failed to report to the court. Id. at 33-34. 
The court determined that Defendant had violated probation by failing to 
report: 
I don't believe I ever ruled from the Bench that his probation had 
terminated. I think that's an assumption that he arrived at either on his 
own or with the help of counsel, but having been contacted by 
probation and being told that he needed to report, he then made the 
decision to walk the tight rope of not reporting and relying upon his 
belief that probation may have been terminated by my oral statements 
from the Bench. 
In the order that was prepared based on those oral statements it 
also does not say that he's relieved from probation or that his 
probation is terminated. 
(R2974:46-47, addendum I). 
The court also stated that he had "not laid eyes on Mr. Johnson since our 
October meeting. And I do not know that he's reported on the 15th of each month 
even under that order." Id. at 42-43. 
9 
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The court concluded that Defendant was under the jurisdiction of AP&P, and 
was still controlled by the terms and conditions of his probation agreement. Id. The 
Court then found that Defendant willingly violated probation by not reporting to 
AP&P. Id. at 43. Discussions about sanctions for the violation were postponed until 
May 17,2011. Id. 
The Court also warned that from that point forward, Defendant was to report 
and abide by the terms of the AP&P agreement. Id. at 49. The Court noted that 
Defendant "had that responsibility since [he] began that agreement and that it has 
not terminated as of today/'54-55. 
The Court also noted that it had "issued a stay on [Defendant's] jail term and 
the imposition of the sanction that was issued by Judge Eyre pending an appeal and 
outcome, but I have not terminated his probation/' Id. at 50. "The stay was not 
addressing probation." It was addressing the sentence and that was stayed. Id. at 
55. The Court also pointed out that "simply the filing of the order to show cause 
tolls the probationary period." Id. at 51,53.2 
2
 On appeal, Johnson argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke 
his probation. This issue was never specifically raised below. However, in his 
application for certificate of probable cause and motion for a stay pending appeal, 
Johnson did argue that the probationary period could not toll under Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1 if probation had been revoked (R2660, 2777). 
10 
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Evidentiary hearing on May 17, 2011: One of the purposes of the May 
evidentiary hearing was to address the allegations that Defendant had "been 
convicted of a crime in federal court in violation of a term of his probation." 
(R2975:3, addendum K). Copies of the indictment and verdict form from federal 
case no. 2:09-CR-00133 CW were provided. Id. 
Defendant was charged in federal court with ten counts of mail fraud (1-10), 
twelve counts of wire fraud (11-22), one count of conspiracy (23), and fourteen 
counts of money laundering (24-37) (R2858-2876, addendum N). He was convicted 
of counts 1-2,4-7,9,11-16,18-19,21,23,27-33,35, and 37-38 (R2877-2878, addendum 
O).3 
Defendant argued that all of the federal crimes for which he had been 
convicted occurred before he was placed on probation in State court (R2975:13-14, 
addendum K). Defendant pointed out that although counts 10 and 22 included 
allegations for dates after imposition of probation, both those counts had been 
dismissed. Id. Defendant argued that crimes committed before imposition of 
probation could not be the basis for a probation violation. Id. 
The prosecutor responded that some of the criminal activity was committed 
after the State conviction. Id. at 15. The conspiracy charge (count 23) of which 
3
 From the documents provided in this case, it unclear why the federal 
indictment only has 37 charges, but the verdict form includes count 38. 
11 
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Defendant was convicted, alleged that the crime of conspiracy was committed 
"beginning in or about mid 2005 to around August 2007," which was after 
probation was imposed and Defendant signed the probation agreement (R2975:44, 
addendum K; R2872-73, addendum N). 
The court noted that Defendant had been sentenced on June 6, 2007, and it 
would be 'Very hesitant to find any actions taken by the defendant prior to June 6th 
to be violations of probation (R2975:18, addendum K). But the court noted that it 
appeared that Defendant "may have been involved in a series of conduct over a 
period of several years interrupted by his conviction in this court, but in which he 
continued to participate even following his conviction." Id. at 47. The court then 
found that Defendant violated his probation as shown by his federal convictions of 
aiding and abetting or willfully causing another to commit a crime; the trial court 
specifically referred to the convictions on counts 18,19,21,23,27 and 28. Id. at 65-
66. The court also specifically found that Defendant was "in violation of probation 
by having a conviction of conspiracy which, again, is Count 23." Id. at 66. 
In deciding what sanction to impose, the Court said: "it appears the defendant 
was involved in a continuing, ongoing criminal process that took a number of years 
to commit various frauds. In the middle of which he was convicted in state court... 
And yet that didn't have an impact on his behavior." Id. 71. "He didn't cease. He 
didn't stop. He didn't try to undue [sic]. He took the benefit of and continued to 
12 
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encourage others to take the benefit of his criminal activities. Some of those 
activities occurred before he was sentenced, some occurred before he was on 
probation, some after/7 Id. 
Finally, the court addressed its previous finding at the April hearing that 
Defendant had violated probation by not reporting to AP&P, and said: "I also don't 
believe that he was on court probation, but if he understood it that way, he didn't 
comply/7 Id. at 70. 
The Court revoked Defendant's probation and executed the original statutory 
prison term. Id. at 72. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Inadequate brief. Defendant's brief should disregarded because it is 
inadequate. 
The trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the alleged probation violations. 
Defendant's probation was revoked and reinstated for 36 months on August 30, 
2010, which meant that his probation would not expire until August 30,2013. This 
decision was affirmed on appeal. State v. Johnson, 2012 UP App 118 (addendum G). 
The trial court thus clearly had jurisdiction to rule on any alleged probation 
violations. 
13 
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The certificate of probable cause issued while Defendant's prior appeal was 
pending, did not excuse Defendant from reporting to AP&P. Defendant was 
found to have violated probation by failing to report to AP&P as required. He 
argues that the certificate of probable cause the trial court issued while he appealed 
this finding excused him from reporting to AP&P because it required him to report 
to the court. But his probation agreement clearly stated that he was to report to 
AP&P and "report to the court whenever ordered to do so/' (R2184-85, addendum 
C). The fact that the certificate of probable cause required him to report to the court 
did not excuse him from reporting to AP&P. And, even if Defendant were excused 
from reporting to AP&P, he still violated probation by not reporting to the trial 
court. 
Defendant was convicted of a federal crime that he committed after he was 
placed on probation. Defendant alleges that his federal convictions could not have 
constituted a violation of probation because they were all based on conduct 
committed before sentencing and imposition of probation. But Defendant is 
mistaken. He was found guilty of conspiracy, "[beginning in or about mid 2005 to 
around August 2007/' (R2872-73,2878, addenda N & O). He was sentenced on June 
6, 2007. Defendant's federal conviction for conspiracy thus alleged conduct that 
took place after he was placed on probation. 
14 
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ARGUMENT 
I-
THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS 
BECAUSE HIS BRIEF IS IN ADEQUATE AND BECAUSE HE DOES 
NOT MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
A. Defendant's brief fails to follow the requirements of Rule 24. 
Rule 24(a)(5)(A), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that for each 
issue, an appellant must include a "citation to the record showing that the issue was 
preserved/' Section (a)(7) requires an appellant to include a statement of the facts, 
supported by citations to the record. Defendant fails to cite to the record, showing 
where his issues were preserved. See Aplt. br. at 2-3. He also fails to include a 
statement of the facts. Although some of the facts are included in his "CASE 
STATEMENT/7 he includes no record citations. Defendant also fails to include a 
summary of arguments, as required by section (a)(8). See Aplt. br. at 9. 
Rule 24 (a)(9) also requires an appellant to include his "contentions and 
reasons . . . with respect to the issues presented," including "citations to the 
authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on." in arguments 11 and III of his 
brief, Defendant includes no citations to any authorities, statutes, or the record. See 
Aplt. br. at 14-17, 
This Court has repeatedly declined to address inadequately briefed issues. 
See State v. Gomez, 2002 UT120\ \29, 63 P.3d 72 (refusing to consider inadequately 
15 
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briefed argument); MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941,947-48 (Utah 1998) (same); State 
v. Wareham, 772 R2d 960,966 (Utah 1989) (same). '"A reviewing court is entitled to 
have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited/" State v. Snyder, 932 
P.2d 120,130 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988)), 
see also Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966 (holding that brief "must contain some support for 
each contention"). Because Defendant has not adequately briefed any of his claims, 
this Court should simply affirm. 
B. Defendant's brief fails to marshal all the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings. 
Defendant also fails to marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings that he violated probation. It is well-settled that although a court of 
appeals will review the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, it will disturb 
findings of fact only if they are "clearly erroneous." State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 
295 (Utah 1992). A court's findings are "clearly erroneous only if they 'are against 
the clear weight of the evidence'" or if the reviewing court "'reaches a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" Id. (quoting State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987). The appellant has the burden to marshal all the evidence 
that supports the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that the marshaled 
evidence does not support those findings. State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 460-61 
(Utah 1994). 
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When an appellant fails "to properly marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings of fact, we do not consider those findings properly challenged 
and, therefore, assume the evidence supports them/' Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, % 
3,100 P.3d 1177. Because Defendant has not marshaled the evidence, this Court 
may, and should, "accept the trial court's findings as stated in its ruling." State v. 
Benvenuto, 983 R2d 556,558 (Utah 1999). 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO REVOKE 
DEFENDANT'S PROBATION 
As explained, Defendant's probation was revoked and reinstated on October 
10,2007, for 36 months. Defendant argues that his probation expired on October 10, 
2010, and that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain any allegations of 
probation violations filed after that date. (Aplt. br. at 6). 
Defendant acknowledges that before that date his probation was again 
revoked and reinstated for 36 months on August 30, 2010, which meant that his 
probation would not expire until August 30, 2013. He argues, however, that 
because he appealed that decision, and because the trial court granted a certificate of 
probable cause and his motion to stay pending appeal, that the August 30, 2010 
findings did not extend the term of probation (Aplt. br. at 5-6). 
But Defendant also asserts that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to 
entertain allegations of probation violations " after October 10,2010, unless and until 
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[his] appeal of the August 30,2010 findings fails and the stay is lifted/' (Aplt. br. at 
6). Defendant's appeal has failed. On April 19, 2012, this Court affirmed the trial 
court's decision to revoke and reinstate probation. State v. Johnson, 2012 UT App 118 
(addendum G). Therefore, Defendant's argument that the trial court did not have 
jurisdiction to entertain the allegations of probation violations fails.4 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CLEARLY ERR IN FINDING THAT 
DEFENDANT HAD VIOLATED PROBATION AND DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION WHEN IT REVOKED PROBATION 
Even if this Court excuses Defendant's failures to adequately brief his claims 
and marshal the evidence, Defendant's claims fail on their merits/Probation may 
not be revoked or modified except upon a hearing in court, unless waived by the 
defendant. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12)(a) (Addendum A). If a defendant denies 
an alleged violation, evidence is presented at a hearing. The defendant may call 
witnesses and present evidence in his own behalf. After the hearing, the court 
makes findings of fact. Id. 
4
 Even if this Court had not yet issued it decision, Defendant's jurisdiction 
claim would still fail. The fact that the trial court granted a certificate of probable 
cause, ordered a stay of the sentence, and released Defendant from jail pending 
appeal, does not mean that the August 30,2010 decision did not extend probation. 
The order revoking and reinstating probation remained valid unless overturned on 
appeal. Therefore, Defendant's term of probation was extended until August 30, 
2013, and the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on any alleged probation violations 
filed before that date. 
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That is exactly what happened in this case. Hearings were held on April 27th 
and May 17,2011 (addenda I & K). The prosecution presented evidence and then 
Defendant presented evidence, including testifying in his own behalf. Only then 
did the Court find that Defendant had violated probation (R2974:43 & 2975:66). 
"[I]n the trial court, the State must prove to the satisfaction of the trial judge 
that it is more likely than not, i.e., by a preponderance, that defendant violated his 
probation." State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208 n.4 (Utah App. 1991)(emphasis in 
original, referring to State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 278 (Utah App. 1990)). An 
appellate court then applies "a clearly erroneous standard of review to the trial 
court's factual findings." State v. On, 2005 UT 92, f 8,127 P.3d 1213 (addressing 
probation extensions). 
A "'finding of fact by a trial court is 'clearly erroneous' only if it is against the 
clear weight of the evidence.'" Martinez, 811 P.2d at 209, quoting Turnbaugh v. 
Anderson, 793 P.2d 989, 941 (Utah App. 1990)). In determining whether a fact 
finding is clearly erroneous, the appellate court reviews the "evidence of a probation 
violation in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings." State v. Maestas, 2000 
UT App 22, If 12, 997 P.2d 314. 
"'The first step in a revocation decision . . . involves a wholly retrospective 
factual question: whether the [probationer or] parolee has in fact acted in violation 
of one or more of the conditions of his [probation or] parole.'" Gagnon v. Scaiyelli, 
19 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
411 U.S. 778, 784 (1973) (addressing probation revocations) (quoting Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,479-80 (1972) (addressing parole revocations)). A review of the 
transcripts of the evidentiary hearings establishes that Defendant did in fact violate 
the conditions of his probation. 
A, The trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant 
violated his probation by failing to report 
1. The probable cause certificate did not excuse Defendant from 
the requirement that he report to AP&P. 
The trial court found that Defendant violated probation when he failed to 
report to AP&P as required by his probation agreement (R2974:43). Defendant 
argues that the trial court erred in finding that he had violated probation by failing 
to report to AP&P, because the certificate of probable cause required only that he 
report to the court. He thus argues that the probable cause certificate excused him 
from reporting to AP&P (Aplt.br. at 7,14). 
It is true that the certificate of probable cause states that the Defendant was to 
"continue^ to report on a regular basis to the Court by the 15th day of each month/7 
(R2469, addendum E). But neither the certificate of probable cause nor the Court's 
Order said that Defendant no longer had to report to AP&P. 
Indeed, at the evidentiary hearing, the Court said: "I don't believe I ever 
ruled from the Bench that his probation had terminated ." R2974:46, addendum I). 
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The Court also noted that the order /'does not say that he's relieved from probation 
or that his probation is terminated." Id. 
In addition, Defendant's probation agreement clearly states that he is to report 
to AP&P and "to the court whenever ordered to do so." (addendum C) (emphasis 
added). The fact that the certificate of probable cause required Defendant to report 
to the court did not excuse him from reporting to AP&P, either implicitly or 
explicitly. 
2. The certificate of probable cause was not signed until 
November 3,2010. 
Even if the certificate of probable cause excused Defendant from reporting to 
AP&P, the certificate of probable cause and the trial court's order were not signed 
until November 3, 2010, more than two weeks after October 13, 2010, when 
Defendant was released from jail (R2974:12, addenda E, F, and I). Plus, the 
telephone message from his AP&P agent advised Defendant that he needed to 
report in person to AP&P the day after his release (R2974:14). But Defendant did 
not report the day after his release. Id. Nor did he report on his next regular date 
for reporting to AP&P - the third Thursday of every month, which would have been 
October 21,2010. Id. at 14-15. 
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Because Defendant was not excused from reporting to AP&P until the 
certificate of probable cause was signed on November 3,2010, Defendant violated 
the terms of his probation by not reporting to AP&P in October as required. 
3. Even if Defendant were excused from reporting to AP&P, he 
still violated probation by failing to report to the trial court 
But even if Defendant were excused from reporting to AP&P, he still violated 
probation by failing to report directly to the trial court. As stated, Defendant's 
probation agreement required him to "report to the court whenever ordered to do 
so/7 (R2185, addendum C). The certificate of probable cause ordered Defendant to 
report to the court by the 15th of each month (R2464, addendum E). There is no 
testimony or evidence in the record that Defendant reported to the court on October 
15, 2010. Indeed, the trial court found otherwise. The trial court said: Defendant 
"claims that he reported to the Court on a monthly basis. And I appreciate the 
argument, but it's not persuasive. I don't believe I ever met with Mr. Johnson. I 
don't think he's ever provided me any information regarding his housing, his 
employment, his income, his opportunities or his efforts to make restitution. . . . I 
also don't believe that he was on court probation, but if he understood it that way, 
he didn't comply." (R2975:70, addendum K). 
In sum, Defendant has not established that the trial court's finding that he 
violated probation by failing to report was "against the clear weight of the 
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evidence/' Martinez, 811 P.2d at 209. When viewed in the light most favorable to 
the trial court's findings, the finding was not clearly erroneous, and should therefore 
be upheld. See Maestas, 2000 UT App 22 at \ 12. 
B. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that Defendant had 
violated probation by committing further law violations. 
As stated, Defendant was sentenced and probation was imposed on June 6, 
2007. As one of the terms of his probation agreement, Defendant agreed to "[o]bey 
all state, federal and municipal laws/' (R2184-85, addendum C). The trial court 
found that Defendant had violated his probation based on his federal criminal 
convictions (R2975:66). 
Defendant argues that all his federal convictions were based on conduct he 
committed before he was sentenced and placed on probation. Defendant is 
mistaken. It is true that many of the federal convictions were crimes alleged to have 
been committed before the order of probation. But not all of them were. As the trial 
court said: "Some of those activities occurred before he was sentenced, some 
occurred before he was on probation, some after." R2975:72, addendum K). 
Most specifically, count 23 of the federal indictment charged Defendant with 
conspiracy "[bjeginning in or about mid 2005 to around August 2007/' (R2872-73, 
addendum N). Therefore, the conspiracy was alleged to have continued even after 
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probation was imposed in June of 2007. Defendant was convicted of the conspiracy 
charge in count 23 (R2878, addendum O). 
In ruling on whether Defendant had violated probation based on his 
convictions in federal court, the trial court specifically found that Defendant was "in 
violation of probation by having a conviction of conspiracy which, again, is Count 
23." (R2975:66, addendum K). 
Defendant has failed to establish that the trial court's determination that he 
violated probation based on his federal conviction was clearly erroneous. The trial 
court decision should therefore be affirmed.5 
5
 Although not entirely clear from his brief, Defendant may be attempting to 
argue that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous based on the trial court's 
subsequent attempt to amend its decision on June 17,2011 (R2896-2900, addendum 
M). There are several problems with this argument. First, it is inadequately briefed. 
Second, because Defendant had already filed his notice of appeal, the trial 
court had no jurisdiction to amend its decision and the June 17, 2011 order is 
therefore without affect. A trial court is divested of jurisdiction while a case is 
under advisement on appeal. See Williams v. Bench, 2008 UT App 306, |16,193 P.3d 
640; Wltite v. State, 795 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah 1990). 
Third, the trial court states in its June 17, 2011 order that its previous 
conclusion that Defendant had violated probation was made in error, because "the 
dates of these offenses predate Defendant's sentencing in the present case." (R2897, 
addendum M). But that conclusion is erroneous. As addressed above, probation 
was imposed on June 7, 2007, and Defendant was convicted of count 23 of the 
federal indictment, which alleged a conspiracy that continued until August 2007. 
Therefore the conspiracy offense did not predate Defendant's sentencing and 
probation in the State case. 
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C. The trial court did not err in revoking probation. 
A preponderance of the evidence, especially when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings, establishes that Defendant violated the terms 
of his probation by failing to report to AP&P or to the court, and by being convicted 
of a federal crime. Once a determination has been made that a defendant violated 
probation, the court must then exercise its discretion to determine whether to 
modify or revoke probation. See On, 2005 UT 92, f 9 (quoting State v. Jameson, 800 
P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990)) (stating that "the district court has discretion 'to grant, 
modify, or revoke probation'"). 
On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court's findings that probation was 
violated, but he never challenges revocation of probation based on those findings. 
For that reason alone, the revocation should be upheld. 
In addition, an appellate court will not reverse a trial court's decision to 
revoke probation unless it determines "'that the evidence of a probation violation, 
viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings, is so deficient that the 
trial court abused its discretion in revoking [or modifying appellant's] probation.'" 
Id, (alteration in On) (quoting Jameson, 800 P.2d at 804). There is no indication that 
the trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation in this case. Therefore, the 
decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted April 25,2012. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
ERIN RILEY, / 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 §77-18-1 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter 18. The Judgment 
§ 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation—Supervision—Presentence investi-
gation—Standards—Confidentiality—Terms and conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or 
extension—Hearings—Electronic monitoring 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in abeyance agreement, the 
court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of 
the plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of any crime or offense, the court may, 
after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may 
place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors 
or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is with the department, 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the 
court, 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred 
to the department. These standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board of 
Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the supervision and investiga-
tion standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the standards based upon crite-
ria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and submit it to the appropriate 
legislative appropriations subcommittee. 
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(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise the probation of persons 
convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in 
accordance with department standards. 
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, continue the 
date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence inves-
tigation report from the department or information from other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement according to guidelines set in 
Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a 
recommendation from the department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in accor-
dance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(d) The presentence investigation report shall include: 
(i) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender conducted under Section 77-18-1.1; and 
(ii) recommendations for treatment of the offender. 
(e) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the 
court under Section 76-3-404, are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as 
provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the department. 
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant 
if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any 
alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the 
department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an 
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten work-
ing days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the 
record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that 
matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information the defendant or the 
prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or informa-
tion shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment program in which the defendant is cur-
rently participating, if the program is acceptable to the court; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated by the department, after considering 
any recommendation by the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensatory service program pro-
vided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
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(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, 
Crime Victims Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED certificate, or a voca-
tional certificate at the defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED certificate, or 
vocational certificate prior to being placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by Section 76-3-201.1. with interest 
and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and any extension of that period by 
the department in accordance with Subsection (10). 
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon completion without viola-
tion of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misde-
meanors or infractions. 
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an un-
paid balance upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the 
case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the ac-
count receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid bal-
ance not already recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt 
Collection. 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its own motion, the court 
may require the defendant to show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court. 
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting at-
torney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of details on outstanding ac-
counts receivable. 
(1 l)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been charged with a probation 
violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation 
term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation of probation does not 
constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing, 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report with the court alleging a viola-
tion of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the court. 
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by the probationer or upon a 
hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the conditions of probation 
have been violated. 
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(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of the conditions 
of probation, the court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe 
that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is justified, 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the defendant a warrant for his ar-
rest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked, modified, or 
extended. 
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall be served upon the defendant 
at least five days prior to the hearing, 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented by counsel at the hearing and 
to have counsel appointed for him if he is indigent, 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence. 
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit, 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the 
allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are based shall be presented as 
witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders, 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence. 
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact, 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may order the probation re-
voked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be exe-
cuted. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the Division of Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the 
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment over the defendants de-
scribed in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are classified protected in ac-
cordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63-
2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation re-
port. Except for disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the presen-
tence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the department for purposes of supervision, 
confinement, and treatment of the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation report or the victim's authorized 
representative, provided that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to statements or ma-
terials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, or to the 
impact of the crime on the victim or the victim's household. 
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under the supervision of the depart-
ment, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
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(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement, including electronic monitoring, 
for all individuals referred to the department in accordance with Subsection (16). 
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may order the defendant to participate in 
home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order of the 
court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's 
whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the defendant's compliance with the court's order 
may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through electronic monitoring as a condition of 
probation under this section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the defendant and install electronic monitor-
ing equipment in the residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the department or the program pro-
vider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic monitoring only for those persons 
who have been determined to be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section either directly or by contract with 
a private provider. 
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 2; Laws 1982, c. 9, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 47, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 68, § 1; 
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§ 3: Laws 1993. c. 82. § 7; Laws 1993. c. 220. § 3: Laws 1994. c. 13. g 24: Laws 1994, c. 198, § 1: Laws 1994, c. 
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Court of Appeals of Utah, 
. STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Jamis M. JOHNSON, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20070909-CA. 
Dec. 17,2009. 
Background: Defendant was convicted in the 
Fourth District Court, Fillmore Department, Donald 
J. Eyre Jr., J., of securities fraud, and defendant ap-
pealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, McHugh, J., held 
that: 
(1) defendant was not required to file second appeal 
pertaining to trial court's final restitution order; 
(2) defendant's action in transferring stock certific-
ates for assets of limited liability company (LLC) 
was a sale for value; 
(3) evidence was sufficient to support finding that 
property had a value of at least $10,000, as required 
to support charge of second degree securities fraud; 
(4) any error in allowing testimony of state's expert 
was not prejudicial; 
(5) statute making it unlawful to omit to state a ma-
terial fact necessary to make statement not mislead-
ing was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
defendant; 
(6) state was not required to prove individual in-
vestor believed defendant's statements to be true; and 
(7) damages incurred by investors flowed from 
fraudulent securities transaction and were properly 
charged against defendant. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and re-
manded in part. 
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of a predicate statement, and thus, statute was not 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant; 
had defendant disclosed tenuous state of his mem-
bership in state bar, and reasons for order of disbar-
ment, it would almost certainly have undermined 
false statements made by co-defendant as to de-
fendant's securities expertise. U.S.CA. 
Const.Amend. 14; West's U.C.A. Const. Art, 1, § 7; 
West's U.C.A. §61-1-1(2). 
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110 Criminal Law 
1101 Nature and Elements of Crime 
110k 12 Statutory Provisions 
110k 13. I k . Certainty and defmiteness. 
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349Bk323 k. Fraud or misrepresentation. 
Most Cited Cases 
State was not required to prove individual in-
vestor believed defendant's statements to be true, 
nor that investor relied on defendant's statements in 
his decision making process, so long as statements 
made were such that a reasonable person in similar 
circumstances would have relied upon statements in 
making an investment decision. West's U.C.A. § 
61-1-1(2), .' 
[18] Sentencing and Punishment 350H C==?2148 
3 50H Sentencing and Punishment 
3 50HXI Restitution 
350HX](D) Compensable Losses 
350Hk2148 k. Monetary, pecuniary, or 
economic loss. Most Cited Cases 
Damages incurred by dairymen related to fore-
closure of trust deed and care and feeding of addi-
tional cows brought to farm at direction of co-
defendant, flowed from fraudulent securities trans-
action and were properly charged against defendant 
as restitution, even though defendant was not con-
victed of any crime related to extra expenses, and 
co-defendant obtained loan which burdened dairy-
men with additional cows; defendant's securities 
fraud gave dairymen a false sense of security about 
transaction, which resulted in them entering into 
agreement. 
[19] Criminal Law 110 €^1181.5(8) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(U) Determination and Disposition 
of Cause 
11 Ok 1181.5 Remand in General; Vacation 
HOkl.181.5(3) Remand for Determina-
tion or Reconsideration of Particular Matters 
HOkl 181.5(8) k. Sentence. Most 
Cited Cases 
Sentencing and Punishment 350H €^>2200 
350H Sentencing and Punishment 
©2011 Thomson Reuters. 
3 50HXI Restitution 
350HXI(F) Proceedings 
350Hk2196 Order 
350Hk2200 k. Construction and opera-
tion. Most Cited Cases 
Trial court's restitution order in the amount of 
$120,000, based on $50,000 loan obtained by co-
defendant, and $70,000 in expenses dairymen in-
curred to care for additional cows brought to farm, 
and which flowed out of defendant's securities 
fraud, required remand, even though there was a 
sufficient nexus between defendant's crime and 
damages, where order did not address whether cred-
its issued to dairymen in the amounts of $11,523.54 
and $12,500 should be applied to offset amount of 
restitution order. 
*722 Rodney G. Snow, Walter A. Romney Jr., and 
Aaron D. Lebenta, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen. and Karen A. 
Klucznik, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Ap-
pellee. 
Before Judges THORNE, ORME, and McHUGH. 
OPINION 
McHUGH, Judge: 
% 1 Jamis M. Johnson appeals his criminal con-
viction for securities fraud, a violation of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act (the Securities Act), see 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 .to.-30 (2006 & 
Supp^ OOP),™1 and the accompanying restitution 
order entered by the trial court. We affirm in part 
and reverse and remand in part. 
FN1. Unless otherwise noted, we cite to 
the current Utah Code as a convenience to 
the reader because the relevant sections are 
substantively unchanged from the version 
in effect at the time of Johnson's crime. 
BACKGROUND™2 
FN2. In reviewing an appeal from a jury 
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verdict, "we view the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a 
light most favorable to the verdict. We re-
cite the facts accordingly." State v. Shep-
herd, 1999 UT App 305, 1f 2, 989 P.2d 503 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
The Transaction 
[1] f 2 In the summer of 2000, two dairymen 
held a family dairy farm, as the sole members of a 
limited liability company (the LLC). In July 2000, 
the dairymen learned that A. Paul Schwenke "was 
interested in meeting some dairy farmers to talk 
about some investment." During July and August 
2000, the dairymen had a series of meetings with 
Schwenke, Johnson, and several other individuals 
to discuss the proposed investment. Before attend-
ing the first meeting, Johnson did not know the de-
tails of Schwenke's plan.FN3 Schwenke introduced 
Johnson as "a high powered lawyer" and a "security 
expert from out of New York," which one of the 
dairymen said "lent a great deal of credibility" to 
Schwenke's presentation. Neither Schwenke nor 
Johnson disclosed that Johnson was the subject of 
ongoing disciplinary proceedings by the Utah State 
Bar for misappropriating client fluids.™4 Johnson 
was also subject to three tax liens, totaling 
$1,669,562.89, against his property, *723 and had a 
Small Business Administration judgment against 
him. Johnson did not disclose these facts at the 
meeting. Nor did Johnson tell the dairymen that 
Schwenke was an attorney who had been disbarred 
for misappropriating client funds and that Johnson 
was pursuing legal action against Schwenke over a 
failed business deal. 
FN3. Johnson was invited to attend the 
meeting to settle a debt related to John-
son's losses in a previous business deal 
with Schwenke. 
FN4. On September 14, 1999, the district 
court entered an order and judgment of dis-
barment against Johnson for misappropri-
ating client funds. At the time of the meet-
ings with the dairymen, that judgment was 
stayed, pending appeal. The Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed the judgment of disbarment 
in December 2001, see In re Johnson, 2001 
UT 110, 48 P.3d 881, more than a year 
after the transaction at issue in this case. 
f 3 At the meetings, Schwenke proposed that 
the dairymen invest in American-Dairy.com, Inc. 
(American-Dairy), a ..company that Schwenke had 
recently incorporated. Schwenke said his plan was 
to obtain 10,000 to 15.000 cows, "go online" with 
the company, and "show investors their cows over 
the internet." Schwenke also indicated that he 
would obtain financing by selling stock in an initial 
public offering. Johnson explained how stocks 
would work in the public company. Schwenke and 
Johnson told the dairymen that there were some 
risks associated with any stock transaction, but they 
did not elaborate. The dairymen described the farm, 
including the number of cows, the need to expand 
to become profitable, and the need to refinance a 
"substantial loan" against the dairy to complete the 
transaction. 
If 4 At a second meeting on August 2, 2000, 
Johnson reviewed a draft of a stock purchase/trade 
agreement with the dairymen.™5 At the request of 
one of the dairymen, Johnson again explained how 
the public offering would work, stating that the 
share prices in an initial public offering would start 
at a minimum of $4 per share and might be as high 
as $8 per share. 
FN5. Johnson did not draft the agreement, 
and he claims that Schwenke presented it 
to the dairymen. However, one of the 
dairymen testified that it was Johnson who 
presented the agreement. 
If 5 Following the August 2 meeting, the dairy-
men's personal attorney reviewed the draft agree-
ment and added a provision voiding the transaction 
if American-Dairy had not registered its stock for a 
public offering within two years. On August 9, 
2000, the dairymen returned to Schwenke's office 
and signed the revised agreement (the Agreement), 
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thereby transferring all the farm's assets, including 
the real estate, equipment, and livestock associated 
with the farm, to American-Dairy in exchange for 
stock in the company. 
^ 6 Johnson signed the Agreement on behalf of 
American-Dairy as the company's CEO and signed 
stock certificates issuing 200,000 shares to the 
dairymen. Although the Agreement recites that 
American-Dairy had issued "10,000,000 shares of 
.001 cents par value common stock," no other 
shares were issued, making the dairymen the sole 
shareholders. The dairymen also signed proxy 
agreements naming Schwenke as their "attorney 
and agent," which empowered Schwenke to vote 
their shares at all shareholder meetings "for the 
transaction of any business." 
*| 7 Following the execution of the Agreement 
and the transfer of assets, Johnson had no addition-
al direct contact with the dairymen. The parties 
never discussed whether Johnson would remain as 
American-Dairy's CEO, although the record reflects 
that Johnson continued to have some involvement 
in that capacity, as evidenced by his signature on 
American-Dairy's bankruptcy petition and his pre-
paration of a temporary restraining order on behalf 
of the company. 
• 1 8 For the most part, the dairymen continued 
to manage the day-to-day operations of the farm. 
However, because the warranty deed had been 
transferred to American-Dairy, they could not ob-
tain any bank financing. The dairymen also testified 
that Schwenke moved an additional 200 to 250 
cows onto the farm, refused to allow the dairymen 
to lease out an unused portion of the farm, and ob-
tained a $50,000 loan against the farm on which he 
never made any payments.™6 Eventually, credit-
ors foreclosed on the farm and its equipment As 
part of the foreclosure proceedings, one of the 
dairymen also forfeited a $70,000 certificate of de-
posit, *724 which had previously been used as col-
lateral for a loan to purchase cattle. 
FN6. Johnson's brief states that as sole 
shareholders, the dairymen had the author-
ity to fire or hire any officers or directors 
of American-Dairy if they were unhappy 
with how the company was managed. Al-
though the dairymen might have removed 
Johnson under normal circumstances, the 
proxy agreement gave Schwenke the right 
to vote their shares. Moreover, Schwenke 
" could not be removed because he did not 
have a formal position with American- Dairy. 
The Trial 
1| 9 On October 24, 2005, Johnson and Schwen-
ke were charged as co-defendants with one count 
each of securities fraud, a second degree felony, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (2006); id § 
61-1-21 (2)(b) (Supp.2009), and theft by deception, 
a second degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-6-405, -412 (2008). The trial court later severed 
Johnson's and Schwenke's cases, and granted the 
State's motion to dismiss the theft by deception 
charge against Johnson. After several defense attor-
neys withdrew, Johnson represented himself at trial. 
FN7. Appellate counsel, Rodney G, Snow, 
Walter A. Romney Jr., and Aaron D. 
Lebenta of Clyde Snow Sessions & Swen-
son were not involved in the trial proceed-
ings until Johnson's sentencing and they 
have generously donated their professional 
services by handling this appeal on a pro 
bono basis. We commend them for their 
efforts. 
f 10 The State called Michael Hines, the Dir-
ector of Enforcement for the Utah Division of Se-
curities, to testify as an expert witness. After the 
trial court qualified Hines as an expert, see gener-
ally Utah R. Evid. 702 ("[A] witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion ...."), the State questioned Hines about vari-
ous topics related to securities transactions. Hines 
testified that the purposes of securities laws are to 
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prevent fraud and to protect investors. Hines also 
testified that, unlike other sales, the securities mar-
ket is a "seller beware" market, meaning "the seller 
has to make sure ... [he or she] disclose[s] all ma-
terial facts to an investor." Hines defined the kind 
of material facts that must be disclosed under sec-
tion 61-1-1 of the Securities Act as those that "a 
reasonable prudent investor ... would want to 
know," adding that officers of a corporation have a 
specific duty to disclose material facts about their 
backgrounds. Hines further testified to the hypo-
thetical types of statements and omissions that 
would violate section 61-1-1, and to the meaning of 
a direct or indirect connection to the sale of a secur-
ity under the Securities Act. 
T[ 11 Johnson repeatedly objected to Hines's 
testimony on the grounds that Hines was misstating 
the law and impermissibly stating legal conclusions 
as to what the law is. In response, the trial court al-
lowed Johnson to cross-examine Hines regarding 
the alleged misstatements, and orally instructed the 
jury that 
the court is going to indicate to the jury that at 
some point in this trial the court is going to give 
you instructions with respect to ... issues of law 
that will govern your deliberations. And .., at that 
time ..., the court will instruct you as to what the 
law is. 
1 12 Johnson conducted a thorough cross-
examination of Hines, questioning him about the 
meaning of section 61-1-1, how the statute would 
be applied in different hypothetical situations, in-
cluding what additional disclosures a person like 
Johnson would be required to make before complet-
ing a transaction similar to the one at issue. To re-
but Hines's testimony, Johnson called Nathan 
Dredge, a securities attorney and former securities 
analyst, as an expert witness. Dredge also testified 
to the purpose of state securities laws, the definition 
of a security, what constituted material facts, and 
whether Johnson had an affirmative duty to disclose 
certain facts in this case. Dredge's interpretation of 
those issues differed from the interpretation in 
Hines's testimony. In addition to Dredge's testi-
mony, Johnson testified on his own behalf and 
called Schwenke as a defense witness. 
Post-Trial Proceedings and Motions 
\ 13 On March 7, 2007, after deliberating for 
six hours, the jury found Johnson guilty of securit-
ies fraud. On June 6, 2007, the trial court sentenced 
Johnson to a suspended prison term of one to fif-
teen years> thirty-six months of supervised proba-
tion, six months in the Millard County Jail, and an 
additional six months of electronically monitored 
home confinement. The trial court further imposed 
a $5000 fine and "set [c]ourt ordered restitution ... 
at $125,000, the same as [the court] ordered for ... 
Schwenke," to be paid *725 jointly and severally 
by Johnson and Schwenke. 
If 14 On June 15, 2007, Johnson filed a timely 
objection to the restitution order and requested a 
hearing on the issue. Johnson filed a timely motion 
for a new trial on June 20, 2007. The trial court 
entered final judgment on July 2, 2007, and denied 
Johnson's motion for new trial on October 10, 2007. 
The trial court' held a restitution hearing on October 
10 and 24, 2007, and entered its final restitution or-
der on December 5, 2007, ordering $120,000 in 
restitution, to be paid jointly and severally by John-
son and Schwenke. 
\ 15 On November 8, 2007, after the restitution 
hearing but before entry of the final restitution or-
der, Johnson filed a timeiy notice of appeal 
(Original Appeal) in the trial court. Johnson filed a 
renewed motion for new trial on November 14, 
2007, alleging that new evidence obtained at the 
restitution hearing demonstrated that the farm prop-
erty was not worth $10,000, as required to obtain a 
second degree felony securities fraud conviction 
under section 61-1-21 (2)(b)(i). See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-l-21(2)(b)(i) (Supp.2009) ("A person who 
willfully violates Section 61-1-1 ... is guilty of a 
second degree felony if: ... at the time the crime 
was committed, the property ... unlawfully obtained 
... was worth $10,000 or more...."). The trial court 
denied Johnson's renewed motion for new trial on 
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August 12, 2008, and Johnson filed an amended no-
tice of appeal (Second Appeal) with this court, but 
not the trial court, on August 19, 2008. Johnson 
now appeals from his conviction, the restitution or-
der, and the denials of his motions for new trial. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[2] TI 16 On appeal, Johnson contends that sec-
tion 61-1-1 does not apply to his case because the 
transfer of the LLC assets to American-Dairy 
merely "constituted a change in the form of owner-
ship" and, therefore, the "transaction did not in-
volve an 'offer' or 'sale' of a security for value." 
Similarly, Johnson argues that the transfer was not 
"for value" because the property that the dairymen 
transferred was "so encumbered as to be valueless." 
Whether the change in ownership constitutes a sale 
for value under the statute is a question of statutory 
interpretation. "The correct interpretation of a stat-
ute is a question of law and is reviewed for correct-
ness." State v. Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, \ 7, 124 
P.3d 259 (internal quotation marks omitted), affd, 
2006 UT 86, 150 P.3d'540. The question of whether 
the property in fact had any value is a factual ques-
tion that was submitted to the jury, and we will not 
overturn the jury's finding unless "the evidence and 
its inferences are so inconclusive or inherently im-
probable that reasonable minds must have enter-
. tained a reasonable doubt... Thus, so long as some 
evidence and reasonable inferences support the 
jury's findings, we will not disturb them." Id. \ 16 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
[3] Tf 17 Johnson next claims that Hines imper-
missibly gave legal conclusions and incorrectly 
testified as to the law related to securities, which 
prejudiced Johnson. "It is within the discretion of 
the trial court to determine the suitability of expert 
testimony in a particular case, and we will not re-
verse that .determination on appeal in the absence of 
a clear showing of abuse." State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 
487, 492 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted), affd, 865 P.2d 1355 
(Utah 1993). 
[4][5][6] f 18 Johnson further alleges that the 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No 
r age I U U I io 
Page 9 
K 44, 2009 UT App 382 
Securities Act, as applied to his case, resulted in 
such a vague definition of the crime that it violated 
his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Utah 
Constitution, see Utah Const, art. I, § 7. Johnson 
also maintains that Hines's testimony violated the 
Utah Constitution's Separation of Powers Clause, 
see id. art. V, § 1. "When reviewing the constitu-
tionality of a statute, we ... presume that the statute 
is constitutional. The challenger bears the burden of 
demonstrating the unconstitutionality of a statute. 
Furthermore, unconstitutionality of a statute must 
be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate 
courts review constitutional challenges for correct-
ness." State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, f 8, 
989 P.2d 503 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). However, "courts should avoid 
reaching constitutional*726 issues if the case can 
be decided on other grounds." West v. Thomson 
Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994). 
[7] % 19 Finally, Johnson challenges the trial 
court's restitution award. This court 
will not disturb a trial court's order of restitution 
unless the trial court exceeds the authority pre-
scribed by law or abuses its discretion. Further-
more, [wjhether a restitution [award] is proper ... 
depends solely upon interpretation of the govern-
ing statute, and the trial court's interpretation of a 
statute presents a question of law, which we re-
view for correctness. 
State v. Miller, 2007 UT App 332, \ 6, 170 
P.3d 1141 (alterations • and omission in original) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
I. The Timeliness of Johnson's Second Notice of 
Appeal 
f 20 As a threshold matter, the State argues 
that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the issues 
raised by Johnson in his Second Appeal, which per-
tain to the trial court's final restitution order and its 
denial of Johnson's Renewed Motion for New Trial. 
W8
 See generally Utah R.App. P. 4(a) ("[Nbtice 
of appeal ... shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
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court within 30 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from."); State v. Hous-
keeper, 2002 UT 118, K 23, 62 P.3d 444 ("[A de-
fendant's] failure to timely file [an appeal] deprives 
an appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal"), 
Johnson responds that his Second Appeal was 
timely because it was filed with this court less than 
thirty days after the trial court entered its order 
denying Johnson's Renewed Motion for New Trial 
and that, in any event, the Original Appeal gives 
this court jurisdiction to hear the issues Johnson 
raises with respect to the trial court's restitution or-
der. 
FN8. The State concedes that Johnson's 
Original Appeal, filed twenty-nine days 
after the trial court denied Johnson's first 
Motion for New Trial, was timely. 
A. Johnson's Second Appeal Was Not Necessary. 
[8] H 21 In support of its argument that the 
Second Appeal was ineffective to confer jurisdic-
tion on this court, the State notes that a notice of 
appeal must be "filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order." Utah R.App. P. 4(a) (emphasis 
added). If a defendant files a motion for new trial 
under rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Proced-
ure, "the time ... to appeal from the judgment runs 
from the entry of the order disposing of the mo-
tion." See id. R. 4(b)(1). Therefore, the State con-
tends that to appeal the trial court's denial of his 
Renewed Motion for New Trial, Johnson was re-
quired to file his appeal of that decision with the 
trial court within thirty days of the trial court deny-
ing that motion. In response, Johnson relies on the 
fact that rule 4 does not expressly state that an 
amended notice of appeal must also be filed in the 
trial court. While Johnson is correct, there is also 
nothing in the rale that provides different filing re-
quirements for appeals based on orders entered by 
the trial court after the appellant has filed an appeal 
from a prior final judgment in the same case. See 
generally id. R. 4 (specifying the requirements for 
filing an appeal). In this case, however, the Second 
Appeal was unnecessary because the issues raised 
by it had been properly raised in his Original Ap-
peal, which the State concedes was timely filed. 
T[ 22 Both notices of appeal stated that Johnson 
was' appealing from the trial court's orders concern- , 
ing. sentence, judgment, commitment, restitution, 
FN9
 and the denial of Johnson's first Motion for 
New Trial. The Second Appeal only differed from 
the Original Appeal in that the Second Appeal in-
cluded the date of the trial court's restitution order 
and stated that Johnson was appealing the trial 
court's denial of his Renewed Motion for New Tri-
al. In substance, the legal arguments contained in 
Johnson's initial and renewed motions for new trial 
were identical, and the motions only differed in the 
evidence *727 cited by Johnson in support of his 
argument. Because the same issues were already 
raised by the Original Appeal, Johnson was not re-
quired to file a second notice of appeal for this 
court to have jurisdiction to address those issues. 
FN9. We address the timeliness of John- • 
son's appeal of the final restitution order in 
the next section. 
B. The Original Appeal Included Restitution. 
\ 23 The State argues that Johnson did not per-
fect his appeal of the trial court's December 5, 2007 
restitution order because he filed the Original Ap-
peal on November 8, 2007, almost a month before 
the trial court entered the order.™10 Relying on 
State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, 106 P.3d 729, the State 
asserts that Johnson was required to perfect an ap-
peal of the final restitution order by submitting a 
new notice of appeal within thirty days of its enfry. 
Johnson disagrees, claiming both that the State's in-
terpretation of Garner is incorrect and that the 
restitution order was part of the underlying judg-
ment. 
FN 10. The trial court set restitution in the 
amount of $125,000 when Johnson was 
initially sentenced on June 6, 2007, and 
modified the restitution amount to 
$120,000 in the December 5, 2007 order. 
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\ 24 The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure re-
quire that the judgment or order appealed from be 
final. See Utah R.App. P. 4(a). In Garner, the Utah 
Supreme Court considered the effect of a sub-
sequent restitution hearing on the finality of a prior 
judgment. See 2005 UT 6, ffl 11-16, 106 P.3d 729. 
There, the trial court entered judgment, sentencing 
Garner to prison and ordering him to pay restitution 
in an amount not yet quantified. See id. f-2. Gamer 
did not file a timely appeal of that judgment. See id. 
Subsequently, the trial court clarified its judgment 
to indicate that Garner's guilty plea was condition-
al. See id. Although Garner attempted to appeal his 
underlying conviction from the date of that clarific-
ation, this court rejected his appeal as untimely. See 
id % 5. Before the order from this court dismissing 
Garner's first appeal was entered, the trial court 
"re-entered the judgment, noting that the State had 
satisfied the conditions of the plea and setting the 
amount of restitution." Id ^[3. In response, Garner 
filed a second notice of appeal, claiming that the 
trial court's reentry of the judgment "created a new 
final judgment for purposes of appeal" and that he 
was entitled to a new thirty days to appeal the un-
derlying conviction. Id. 1 4. This court disagreed, 
dismissing the second appeal of the underlying con-
viction as untimely. See id ^ 6. 
H 25 On certiorari review, the supreme court af-
firmed, stating, "Entering a restitution amount is 
more like a clarification of a judgment than a ma-
terial modification because the inclusion does not 
change the substance or character of the judgment." 
Id <f 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). The su-
preme court upheld our dismissal of Garner's 
second appeal, holding "that where orders for resti-
tution remain open to be decided at a later date, the 
• subsequent entry of the amount of restitution is not 
a new and final judgment for purposes of appealing 
the underlying merits of a criminal conviction. " Id. 
(emphasis added). 
If 26 Unlike in Garner, the issue here is not 
whether an appeal filed after entry of the restitution 
amount could give the defendant an additional 
thirty days to appeal the underlying conviction. 
Rather, this case raises the question of whether a 
defendant must file a new appeal where a trial court 
initially enters a restitution amount at sentencing 
and subsequently modifies that amount after hold-
ing a restitution hearing. In its original judgment, 
the trial court set restitution at $125,000, which the 
court said was "the same [amount] as [it] ordered 
for ... Schwenke." Johnson filed his Original Ap-
peal on November 8, 2007, expressly challenging 
"the Court's ruling concerning Full Restitution," 
After Johnson filed the Original Appeal, the trial 
court modified the restitution amount to $120,000 
to be paid jointly and severally by Johnson and 
Schwenke. 
\ 27 The State correctly contends that under 
Garner, a criminal proceeding may result in several 
final orders. See id fl 15-16 (distinguishing final-
ity in criminal and civil cases). Applying that pos-
sibility here, the State argues that the change in the 
restitution amount was a material modification of 
the judgment, necessitating a new notice of *728 
appeal. Johnson disagrees. Under the unique facts 
of this case, we agree with Johnson that a new no-
tice of appeal was not required. 
\ 28 Before entering the original judgment in 
Johnson's case, the trial court held a restitution 
hearing in Schwenke's case and set Schwenke's 
restitution at $120,000.FNn Then, in entering 
judgment in Johnson's case, the trial court stated 
that it was ordering restitution at $125,000, which 
the trial court said was "the same as [it] ordered for ' 
... Schwenke," and which Johnson and Schwenke 
were to pay jointly and severally. These statements 
establish that the trial court intended Johnson and 
Schwenke to pay the same amount of restitution, 
which the trial court had previously set at $120,000 
in Schwenke's case. When the trial court changed 
the amount of Johnson's restitution to $120,000 
after the restitution hearing, it merely changed the 
amount to correct an error it made when entering 
the original judgment.™12 Because that correction 
did not constitute a material modification of the tri-
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al court's original judgment, Johnson was not re-
quired to file a new notice of appeal. See generally 
Gittins v. Smithfield City, 2008 UT App 171, \ 6, 
185 P.3d 1133 (mem.) (stating that "only material 
modifications of or amendments to a judgment .., 
affect the finality of an earlier court order," and that 
"clerical matters" that correct or amend a judgment 
do not materially modify the original judgment); 
see also State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, K II, 106 P.3d 
729 ("[W]here a belated entry merely constitutes an. 
amendment or modification not changing the sub-
stance or character of the judgment, such entry is 
merely a nunc pro tunc entry which relates back to 
the time the original judgment was entered ....") 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Consequently, we have subject matter jur-
isdiction over the restitution award pursuant to the 
Original Appeal. We now address the merits of 
Johnson's arguments on appeal. 
FN 11. In a jury trial presided over by the 
same trial judge who presided over John-
son's case, Schwenke was convicted of se-
curities fraud for his involvement in the 
transaction with the dairymen. 
FN 12. At the sentencing hearing, the pro-
secutor incorrectly stated, "I understand 
that the restitution in the Schwenke case is 
$125,000. I'm certainly appreciative of 
[defense counsel's] concession that that 
was a number that he can live with and 
[Johnson] can live with." 
II. Whether the Sale Was For Value. 
[9][10j[ll] 1 29 We first address Johnson's ar-
gument that section 61-1-1 does not apply because 
the transfer of assets was not for value. The determ-
ination of whether the transfer of assets meets the 
statutory definition of a sale for value under Utah 
Code sections 61-1-1 and -13 is a question of stat-
utory construction. See Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 
561, 562 (Utah 1996). In interpreting a statute, we 
look to its plain language, unless it is ambiguous. 
See id. at 562-63. Where any statutory ambiguities 
exist, this court "broadly and liberally construe[s 
securities laws] to give effect to the legislative pur-
pose" of "prevent[ing] fraud." Technomedical Labs, 
Inc. v. Utah Sec. Div., 744 P.2d 320, 322 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
If 30 Under the plain language of the statute, 
section 61-1-1 applies only if Johnson's actions 
were "in connection with the offer, sale, or pur-
chase of any security, directly or indirectly." Id 
(emphasis added). Section 61-1-13 defines "sale" as 
"every contract for sale of, contract to sell, or dis-
position of, a security or interest in a security for 
value," Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-13(22)(a) (2000), 
and "offer" as "every attempt or offer to dispose of, 
or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or in-
terest in a security for value," id § 61-l-13(22)(b). 
Thus, to prove a violation of the statute, the State 
had to prove that the transfer of American-Dairy 
stock was "for value." Johnson argues that the 
transfer of assets from the LLC to American-Dairy 
was not a sale for value because it was simply "a 
change in the form of ownership" of the farm assets 
and because the farm assets were "so encumbered 
as to be valueless." 
A. The Transfer of Assets Was a Sale for Value. 
1f 31 The Securities Act does not specifically 
define the term "for value," but in the *729 section 
defining a "sale" for value, the legislature provided 
several examples of the types of transfers that are 
governed by the statute, including 
the issuance of a security under a merger, consol-
idation, reorganization, recapitalization, reclassi-
fication, or acquisition of assets shall constitute 
the offer or sale of the security issued as well as 
the offer to buy or the purchase of any security 
surrendered in connection therewith, unless the 
sole purpose of the transaction is to change the 
issuer's domicile. 
Id § 61-l-13(22)(c)(vii). Thus, the legislature 
expressly intended that section 61-1-1 apply to a 
transfer of assets like that from the LLC to Americ-
an-Dairy. 
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% 32 Johnson nevertheless argues that our pre-
vious decision in Capital General Corp. v. Utah 
Department of Business Regulation, 111 P.2d 494 
(Utah Ct.App.1989), supports his position that the 
transfer of assets was not for value.™13 We dis-
agree. In Capital General, a corporation acquired 
100 million shares in another company and sub-
sequently distributed 90,000 of those shares as gifts 
to its clients. See id. at 495. We rejected the argu-
ment that the. gifts did not constitute a "sale for 
value/5 stating, " TVlalue' can include enhanced 
abilities to borrow, raise capital, and other general 
benefits associated with publicly held companies.... 
[Tjhese economic benefits render the disposition 
'for value' under [the Securities Act], even though 
those benefits flowed indirectly from the market-
place rather than directly from the transferees." Id. 
at 497. Thus, we concluded that because the corpor-
ation received indirect benefits from the distribu-
tion, the transfer was "for value" under the Securit-
ies Act. See id 
FN13. Johnson also relies on Premier Van 
Schaack Realty, Inc. v. Sieg 2002 UT App 
173, 51 P.3d 24. Because that decision in-
terpreted the term "value" in the context of 
a contractual provision rather than the Se-
curities Act, see id. % 13, it is not helpful to 
our analysis. 
f^ 33 Like the transfer in Capital General, the 
acquisition of the LLC assets "enhanced 
[American-Dairy's] ability to borrow," see id, as 
evidenced by the $50,000 loan Schwenke obtained 
by using, the farm assets as collateral. Indeed, 
American-Dairy received indirect benefits "from 
the marketplace," see id, because the company now 
had operational assets, including land, cattle, and 
equipment that would have increased the value of 
any stock it subsequently sold. Based on our hold-
ing in Capital General and the plain language of 
the Securities Act, we hold that the definition of a 
sale for value under Utah Code section 61-1-13 
(22)(a) was met here because the transfer of the 
farm assets from the LLC to American-Dairy con-
ferred indirect benefits that, among other things, in-
cluded an enhanced ability to borrow and raise cap-
ital. See generally id, 
B. The Evidence Supports that the Farm Was Worth 
at Least $10,000, 
[12] f 34 Johnson next contends that the prop-
erty was so heavily encumbered that its value was. 
less than $10,000 and that, in fact, it had no value. 
See generally Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (2)(b)(i) 
(Supp.2009) (stating that, to support a charge of 
second degree felony securities fraud, the State 
must show that "the property ... unlawfully ob-
tained or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000 
or more"). Accordingly, we review the record to 
determine whether there was evidence from which 
the jury could conclude that the property had a 
value of at least $10,000. 
|^ 35 We agree with the trial court that the jury 
had sufficient evidence before it from which it 
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the prop-
erty had a value of at least $10,000. The State's 
evidence of the property's value included the dairy-
men's testimony that the farm equipment was worth 
between $150,000 and $200,000, the recital in the 
Agreement stating that the property had a value of 
$200,000, and the $50,000 loan that Schwenke ob-
tained by recording a trust deed against the farm. 
Where there was evidence in the record from which 
the jury could find the property had a value of at 
least $10,000, as required by Utah Code section 
61-l-21(2)(b)(i), we will not disturb the jury's de-
cision on that point. See State v. Wallace, 2005 UT 
App 434, H 16, 124 P.3d 259 ("[S]o long as some 
evidence and reasonable inferences support the 
jury's findings, we will not *730 disturb them," 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
III. The Expert Testimony 
[13] T| 36 We next address Johnson's argument 
that the trial court committed reversible error by al-
lowing Hines, the State's expert witness, to give 
testimony that uwas riddled with impermissible leg-
al conclusions" and "[i]ncorrect ^Interpretation[s] 
of the [l]aw." In response, the State argues that the 
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witness's testimony was admissible, and that even if 
it were not, Johnson was not prejudiced by the testi-
mony. 
[14] f 37 To prevail on appeal, Johnson must 
show that the testimony was both (1) admitted in 
error and (2) prejudicial. See State v. Larsen, 865 
P.2d 1355, 1363 (Utah 1993); State v. Davis, 2007 
UT App 13, 1fi[ 15-21, 155 P.3d 909; State v. Ten-
ney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah Ct.App. 1996), Be-
cause we conclude that Johnson was not prejudiced 
by the expert's testimony, we need not decide 
whether it was admitted in error.™14 
FN 14. Nevertheless, we caution that there 
are limits on an expert's license to testify 
as to the legal meaning of a statute. Where 
the witness's legal conclusions "blur the 
separate and distinct responsibilities of the 
judge, jury, and witness," or there is 
"danger that a juror may turn to the 
[witness's legal conclusion] rather than the 
judge for guidance on the applicable law," 
the expert has exceeded those limits. State 
" v. Davis, 2007 UT App 13, f 15, 155 P.3d 
909 (alteration in original). 
^ 38 Johnson cannot meet his burden to show 
that he was prejudiced by Hines's testimony be-
cause the trial court correctly and promptly instruc-
ted the jury. In Larsen, the defendant appealed the 
trial court's admission of testimony from a securit-
ies expert regarding the materiality of the defend-
ant's statements. See Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1357. The 
supreme court held both that the testimony was not 
improper and that the defendant was not prejudiced 
by the testimony. See id, at 1363. In reaching its 
conclusion that the defendant had not been preju-
diced, the Larsen court noted that the trial court 
"correctly admonished the jury as to the relative 
roles of expert testimony and opinion evidence," 
and "gave careful instructions regarding the 
[relevant] legal definition." Id, 
^[39 Here, shortly after Hines began his testi-
mony, the trial court admonished the jury that "at 
some point in this trial the court is going to give 
you instructions with respect to ..., issues of law 
that... will govern your deliberations. And ... at that 
time ..., the court will instruct you as to what the 
law is." Prior to deliberations, the trial court in-
structed the jury, "If an expert witness has ex-
pressed an opinion of the law which is in conflict 
with these instructions, you are to disregard the 
opinion of the expert witness." The trial court also 
accurately instructed the jury as to the law regard-
ing the requirements of section 61-1-1 and the 
definitions of "sale," "material fact," "fraud," and 
"willful." As in Larsen, the trial court here 
"substantially reduced whatever slight risk of con-
fusion [Hines's testimony] might have engendered 
in the jury." Id Moreover, Johnson was able to 
cross-examine Hines at length regarding the alleged 
misstatements of the law and its application, and he 
called his own securities expert to rebut Hines's 
testimony. Those actions, combined with the trial 
court's prompt and correct instructions to the jury, 
alleviated any potentially prejudicial effects of 
Hines's testimony. Accordingly, we hold that any 
error in the admission of Hines's testimony was not 
prejudiciai.FN15 
FN 15. Because the jury instructions ad-
equately explained that it was the trial 
court, not Hines, who would instruct the 
. jury as to the meaning and requirements of 
section 61-1-1, we do not reach Johnson's 
claim that Hines's testimony violated the 
Separation of Powers Clause of the Utah 
Constitution. See West v. Tliomson News-
papers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994) 
("[Cjourts should avoid reaching constitu-
tional issues if the case can be decided on 
other grounds."). 
IV. Johnson's Due Process Claim 
[15][16] \ 40 We next address Johnson's claim 
that section 61-1-1, as applied in Johnson's case, is 
unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process 
Clause of the Utah Constitution, see Utah Const, 
art, I, § 7 ("No person shall be deprived of life, 
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liberty or property, without due process of law."). 
A law is unconstitutional and 'Void for vagueness if 
its prohibitions are not clearly defined .... [so as to 
give] the person of ordinary intelligence *731 a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, 
so that he may act accordingly." West Valley City v. 
Streeter, 849 * P.2d 613, 615 (Utah Ct.App.1993) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Johnson argues 
that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as ap-
plied to him for two reasons: First, because the 
State and its expert witness improperly stated the 
requirements of section 61-1-1(2) as it relates to 
omissions, and second, because the jury was incor-
rectly instructed that the State was not required to 
prove the dairymen relied on Johnson's statements 
or omissions in making their investment decision. 
A. The Trial Court Properly Applied the Statute. 
f 41 Johnson maintains that, contrary to the as-
sertions of the prosecutor and the State's expert wit-
ness, section 61-1-1(2) does not impose an affirm-
ative duty to disclose all material facts. Johnson ar-
gues that the statute instead "requires proof of a 
material omission that renders a predicate statement 
misleading, in light of the circumstances in which it 
is made." Johnson further contends that, because no 
such predicate statements were proved, his convic-
tion must have been based on some vague obliga-
tion to disclose. Such an undefined basis for con-
viction, he argues, violates his due process rights. 
We need not reach that issue, however, because we 
conclude that the instructions required the jury to 
find that a predicate statement was made and that 
the record supports the jury's finding that such pre-
dicate statements were made. 
<f 42 The jury instructions permitted the jury to 
find Johnson guilty only if it found that he "made 
an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in light of the circumstances un-
der which they were made, not misleading. " 
(Emphasis added.) This instruction is consistent 
with the plain language of section 61-1-1(2) and 
makes no mention of an affirmative duty to disclose 
in the absence of a prior statement We presume the 
jury followed this instruction. See State v. Harmon, 
956 P.2d 262, 273 (Utah 1998). Because the jury 
was not free to find Johnson guilty in the absence 
of a predicate statement, the statute was not uncon-
stitutionally vague as applied to Johnson.™16 
FN 16. We also reject Johnson's argument 
that section 61-1-1(2) requires that the per-
son who omits a material fact also be the 
person who made the predicate statement. 
To conclude otherwise would inject lan-
guage not found in the statute and allow a 
person to evade criminal liability by re-
maining silent while others make gross 
misstatements about the person's back-
ground, skills, experience, or other qualit-
ies. See generally Dungan v. Smith, 76 
N.M. 424, 415 P.2d 549, 551 (1966) 
(upholding a finding of liability where one 
majority shareholder remained silent about 
the fact that the other majority shareholder 
had "demonstrated a capacity for misap-
propriation of funds"). 
1 43 Schwenke's statements regarding John-
son's background and experience were designed to 
create confidence in the transaction. Indeed, the 
dairymen testified that Johnson's qualifications 
"lent a great deal of credibility" to Schwenke's 
presentation, giving the dairymen a "false sense of 
security." The statements that Johnson was a "high 
powered lawyer" and a "security expert from out of 
New York" were misleading in light of the pending 
disciplinary proceedings against Johnson for misap-
propriation of client funds. Had Johnson disclosed 
the tenuous state of his membership in the Utah Bar 
and the reasons for the order of disbarment that had 
been entered but stayed pending appeal, it almost 
certainly would have undermined the false confid-
ence created by Schwenke's statements. Thus, the 
jury could have reasonably found that predicate 
statements were made and that Johnson omitted to 
state a material fact necessary to make those state-
ments not misleading. 
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B. The Jury Was Properly Instructed on Reliance. 
[17] If 44 We next address Johnson's contention 
that the jury instruction regarding reliance was in-
correct. At trial, the jury was instructed that 
it is not necessary for the State to prove that the 
individual investor believed the statements to be 
true, nor that he relied upon the statements in his 
decision-making process, so long as the state-
ments made *732 were such that a reasonable 
person in similar circumstances would have re-
lied upon the statements in making an investment 
decision, 
Johnson argues that this instruction is unconsti-
tutional because it "invites the jury to ignore the 
[dairymen's] testimony and instead substitute its 
own judgment of what information is important." 
We disagree. The supreme court, in Gohler v. 
Wood, 919 P.2d 561 (Utah 1996), held that section 
61-1-1(2) does not contain a subjective reliance ele-
ment. See id. at 563-64. The jury instruction here 
was correct. In addition, there was evidence of ac-
tual reliance in the form of the dairymen's testi-
mony that Johnson's status as an attorney "lent a 
great deal of credibility" to Schwenke's presenta-
tion and gave the dairymen a "false sense of secur-
ity" about the transaction, 
V. Restitution 
\ 45 Finally, we address Johnson's claim that 
the trial court's restitution order was erroneous both 
as to any award of restitution and as to the specific 
amount of restitution awarded. The trial court awar-
ded restitution in the amount of $120,000, based on 
the $50,000 loan obtained by Schwenke and the ex-
tra 570,000 in expenses that the dairymen incurred 
to care for the additional cows Schwenke brought 
onto the farm. Johnson challenges the award of 
restitution because he was not convicted of theft in 
connection with the $50,000 loan that Schwenke 
obtained and secured by a trust deed on the farm. 
Likewise, Johnson argues that he was not convicted 
of any crimes related to the extra expenses incurred 
for the care and feeding of the additional cows. Fi-
nally, Johnson contends that the trial court failed to 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No 
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account for two payments that the dairymen re-
ceived following foreclosure. 
If 46 "When a person is convicted of criminal 
activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the 
court shall order that the defendant make restitution 
•to the victims...." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) 
(2008). "Criminal activities" are defined as "any of-
fense of which the defendant is convicted or any 
other criminal conduct for which the defendant ad-
mits responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission of committing the criminal 
conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(2) (2008). 
"Pecuniary damages" are defmed as "all demon-
strable economic injury, whether or not yet in-
curred, which a person could recover in a civil ac-
tion arising out of the facts or events constituting 
the defendant's criminal activities and includes the 
fair market value of property taken, destroyed, 
broken, or otherwise harmed." Id § 77-3 8a-102(6). 
Interpreting these statutory provisions, this court re-
quires a "sufficient nexus" between the defendant's 
criminal conduct and the pecuniary damages 
suffered by the victim. See State v. Mast, 2001 UT 
App 402, 1f 13, 40 P.3d 1143. "Utah has adopted a 
modified but for test to determine whether pecuni-
ary damages actually arise out of criminal activit-
ies," which test requires a showing "that (1) the 
damages would not have occurred but for the con-
duct underlying the ... [defendant's] conviction and 
(2) the causal nexus between the [criminal] conduct 
and the loss ... is not too attenuated (either factually 
or temporally)." State v. Brown, 2009 UT App 285, 
\ 11, 221 P.3d 273 (alterations and omissions in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
[18] f^ 47 Johnson claims that Schwenke caused 
the dairymen's pecuniary loss, independently of 
Johnson's fraud. We do not agree. Johnson's secur-
ities fraud gave the dairymen a "false sense of se-
curity" about the transaction, which resulted in 
them entering into the Agreement. That Agreement 
allowed Schwenke to obtain the $50,000 loan and 
burden the dairymen with the additional cows.™17 
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But for Johnson's fraud, the dairymen would not 
have suffered the damages related to foreclosure of 
the trust deed and the care and feeding of the addi-
tional cows. *733 These damages flow from the 
fraudulent securities transaction and were properly 
charged against Johnson. See generally State v. 
McBride, 940 P.2d 539, . 540-41, 544 (Utah 
Ct.App.1997) (holding that where the defendant 
stole a car that was impounded and negligently sold 
by the police at auction before the victim could re-
cover the car, the defendant's criminal conduct was 
the but for cause of the victim's pecuniary loss be-
cause the defendant's "criminal act... resulted in the 
impoundment that created the opportunity for the 
[negligent sale]"). 
FN17. The cows did not provide any rev-
enue to the dairymen. Had the additional 
cows remained on the farm, they would 
have produced milk that could have been 
sold to offset the costs associated with 
their feeding and maintenance. However, 
as one of the dairymen testified, it gener-
ally takes several weeks for milk produc-
tion to take place and the additional cattle 
did not generate any income because they 
were just "starting to produce some milk" 
when they were repossessed. 
[19] \ 48 Notwithstanding our conclusion that 
there is a sufficient nexus between Johnson's crime 
and the dairymen's damages, we agree that Johnson 
raises legitimate questions regarding the amount of 
restitution awarded by the trial court. Johnson notes 
that after the foreclosure, the dairymen received 
one check for $11,523.54 and another check for 
$12,500.00. The order of restitution does not ad-
dress either of these credits. We therefore remand 
to the trial court for further proceedings to determ-
ine if these payments should offset the amount of 
the restitution order. 
CONCLUSION 
\ 49 The transfer of assets from the LLC to 
American-Dairy was a sale for value. Even assum-
ing that the expert's testimony was improper, it was 
not prejudicial. Section 61-1-1(2) was not unconsti-
tutionally vague as applied to Johnson. Accord-
ingly, we affirm Johnson's securities fraud convic-
tion, There was a sufficient nexus between John-
son's criminal conduct and the pecuniary damages 
suffered by the dairymen, and we affirm the trial 
court's determination that restitution was appropri-
ate. We remand, however, for further proceedings 
to determine whether the amounts received by the 
dairymen after the foreclosure sale of the farm 
should be deducted from the amount of restitution. 
f 50 WE CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME and 
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judges. 
Utah App.,2009. 
State v. Johnson 
224 P.3d 720, Blue Sky L. Rep. P 74,808, 645 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 44, 2009 UT App 382 
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Jon M Huntsman, Jr. 
Governor 
STATE OF UTAH 
Department of Corrections 
PROBATION AGREEMENT 
Name: JOHNSON, JAM1S M Offender* 178175 USP # 
Court: 4THDIST JUVENILE, RLlCounty: MILLARD Case: 051700056 
I, JOHNSON, JAMIS M, agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Department of Corrections and to be accountable for my 
actions and conduct to the Department of Corrections and the Court. I further agree to abide by all conditions of probation as ordered by the 
court and set forth in thi^greement, consistent with the laws of the stats of Utah. I fully understand that violation of this agreement and/or 
any condiu^n&*&erepf; or any new convictions for a crime, may result in action by the Court causing my probation to be revoked or my 
probation p^n0ti|pMcommence again. 
1. VISIT! 
2. REPOy 
Permit visits to my place of residence, my place of employment or elsewhere by officers of Adult Probation and 
Parole for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the conditions of the Probation Agreement. I will not 
interfere with this requirement by having vicious dogs, perimeter security doors, refusing to open the door, etc. 
Not abscond from probation supervision. A-Reporting: Report as directed by the Department of Corrections. 
B-Residence>£Stablish and reside at a residence of record and not change residence without first obtaining 
penmssienrfom the AP&P Officer. C-Leaving the State: Not leave the state of Utah, even briefly, or any other 
statMo which I am released or transferred without prior written permission from the AP&P Officer.. 
federal and municipal laws. ' 
Not possess, have under control, have in my custody or on the premises where residing any explosives, firearms 
or dangerous weapons. (Dangerous weapon is defined as any item that in the manner of its use or intended use is 
capable, of causing death or serious bodily injur}'.) Exceptions to this condition may be made by the supervising 
agent and must be in writing. This waiver will only apply to individuals on probation for a misdemeanor and who 
have never been convicted of a felony. 
Abstain from the illegal use, possession, control, delivery, production, manufacture or distribution of controlled 
substances (58-37-2 U.C.A.) and submit to tests of breath or body fluids to ensure compliance with the Probation 
Agreement. 
J^ errrut officers of Adult Probation and Parole to search my person, residence, vehicle or any other property under 
my control without a warrant at any time, day or night upon reasonable suspicion to ensure compliance with the 
conditions of the Probation Agreement. 
ot knowingly associate with any person who is involved in crirninal activity or who has been convicted of a 
felony without approval from the AP&P Officer. 
Unless otherwise authorized by the AP&P Officer; seek, obtain and maintain verifiable, lawful, full-time 
mployment (32 hours per week minimum) as approved by the AP&P Officer. Notify the AP&P Officer of any 
change in my employment within 48 hours of the change. 
Be cooperative, compliant and truthful in all dealings with Adult Probation and Parole. If arrested, cited or 
questioned by a peace officer; notify the AP&P Officer within 48 hours. 
Agree to pay a supervision fee of $30 per month unless granted a waiver by the Department of Corrections under 
the provisions of Utah Statute 64-13-21. 
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Comply with Utah Code A] 
unless dete 
1. COURT 
2. FINES, 
3. JAIL 
4. NO CO. 
5. NO FUDICIA&Y 
" / I A v r? CTTTT rn rwp 
Section 53-10-403-406 by submitting an adequate DNA specimen, and, 
ie is no abihty to pay, pay the required fee specified by statute. 
Defendant is to keep a current address on file with the court. Defendant is to 
report to the court whenever ordered to do so. Service by mail is deemed 
adpqrate notice. 
y?ay fines and fees in the amount of $5,000.00, plus interest. 
/ Serve 365 days in the Millard County Jail commencing 07/02/2007. 
/ ^ Defendant to serve the first 6 months, the remaining 6 months he may be on 
home confinement with electronic monitoring. Defendant may be on work 
;se if the Sheriff approves it. 
ave no contact with Mr. Myers or Mr. Young. 
t be employed in a fudiciary position. Not to represent or handle third 
arty money, 
/ray restitution in the amount of $125,000.00, plus interest, jointly and 
severally with Mr. Schwenkie. Court notes this is not the full restitution, 
either side may request a restitution hearing. 
I have read, understand and agree to be boui/d by this; agreement. If I violate any of th^co^dmons of this agreement, the Court mayjwoke 
my Probation or the Department of Correj#onsma/take other appropriate action^agifistme, an^ J I hereby acknowledged-copy j>fthjs'/ 
agreement. 
Dated this 
Witnessed By 
2.135 
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L\\ m: ns 
MARK BAER, Bar No. 5440 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, Bar No. 4666 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0199 
Facsimile: (801) 366-0268 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
..u^^M.^ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 051700056 
Judge Donald Eyre 
The Court received evidence and heard testimony on an Order to Show Cause 
(OSC) on Aug 30, 2010 in the above cited case and based upon the evidence presented, 
and with good cause appearing, this Court finds that the defendant has violated the term of 
probation in that the defendant has not obtained independent, verifiable employment and 
hereby Orders that the defendant's probation is hereby revoked and reinstated with the 
following conditions: 
1. The defendant's probationary period is reinstated for 36 months beginning August 
30,2010. 
2. The defendant is to serve 60 days in the Millard County Jail. 
3. The defendant and is to report to the Millard County Jail by no later than 5pm on 
Friday, September 3, 2010; to the Millard County Sheriff; Th§ dependant is J/)/ ^ ^ 
remanded to your custody for confinement en <yi o r ^ n ^ ^ - ^ ^ $*Js^*^ J~<L^, 
4. All other conditions or probation previously ordered in this case shall remain in effect. 
SO ORDERED this^Tday of I 
By: 
Fourth District Court J i k i g f ^ 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
dS£ <? JL 
Thereby certify that on this $_ day of *J&&*:* , 2010,1 caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order to be served by regular mail (or as otherwise noted) 
upon the following: 
Jamis Johnson, Pro Se 
1408 Military Way 
SLC, Utah 84103 
Jamis Johnson 
c/o Millard County Jail 
765 So. Highway #99 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
Mark Baer / Chariene Barlow 
Office of the Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Q. ^ ^ _ L -
/£*f.uXx Q ~ A ^ O W c 
X United States Mail, postage prepaid 
Overnight Express Mail 
m Via Facsimile 
Via Messenger 
2 
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Jamis M. Johnson 
c/o Millard County Jail 
765So.Hwy99 
Fillmore, UT 84631 
Tel. 801-530-0100 
Defendant Pro Se 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
Vs. 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
AND ORDER OF RELEASE 
Case No. 051700056 
Judge James Brady 
Defendant Jamis Johnson's Notice of Appeal and Application for Certificate of Probable 
Cause came regularly before the Court, the Honorable James Brady, Fourth District Court Judge 
presiding. The Court after having reviewed the pleadings on file and for good cause appearing 
now finds and certifies as follows: 
1. The appeal is not being taken for the purpose of delay. 
2, The appeal raises substantial issues of law or fact reasonably likely to result in reversal, 
an order for a new trial or a sentence that does not include a term of incarceration in jail or 
prison. 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED: 
The Court determines defendant is not a flight risk and that the defendant does not pose a 
danger to any other person or the community and is released pending appeal upon the following 
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least restrictive conditions that the court has determined will reasonably assure the appearance of 
the person as required and the safety of persons and property in the community: 
a. not commit a federal, state or local crime during the period of release; 
b. abide by specified restrictions on personal associations with any other person engaged in 
any criminal activity, remain residing at his usual place of abode, and engage in no travel 
outside the State without further order of the Court; 
c. avoid all conduct with the victim or victims of the crime(s), any witness who might 
testify concerning the offenses if the appeal results in a reversal or an order for a new 
trial; 
d. continues to report on a regular basis to the Court by the 15th day of each month; 
e. refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device or other dangerous weapon; 
f. except as prescribed by a licensed medical practitioner, refrain from possessing or using 
any narcotic drug or other controlled substance. 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COuSfNUV ~k P 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. 051700056 
JAMS M. JOHNSON, Judge James Brady 
Defendant [ 
Defendant, Jamis Johnson's Motion To Stay Sentence Pending Appeal, 
("Motion to Stay") and Application For Certificate of Probable Cause, 
("Application") came before the Court at a regularly scheduled and duly noticed 
hearing at 9:00 a.m., October 13, 2010. Defendant Johnson was present, and 
also Tate Bennett, who, upon affidavit of indigence, was duly appointed Mr. 
Johnson's public defender for the purpose of handling the appeal in this matter. 
No representative from the State was present and no responsive pleadings were 
on file from the State. The Court continued the hearing until the afternoon so that 
counsel for the State could be contacted. The matter was reconsidered at 3:00 
p.m. Present were Mr. Johnson and counsel Tate Bennett. The Court Clerk 
reported that since the morning continuance, she had contacted Assistant 
Attorney General Mark Baer and that he stated that he did not receive notice of 
the hearing and would not be available in person or teiephonicaliy for argument 
on this matter this day nor for the next ensuing two weeks. The Court Clerk 
affirmed that notice of this hearing was duly sent to Assistant Attorney General 
Mark Baer and to Defendant Johnson on October 4, 2010. The Court had read 
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the pleadings of Defendant and had reviewed the file and record in this matter. It 
was determined that Defendant Johnson had mailed copies of all pleadings to 
Assistant Attorney General Baer on September 7, 2010 but that the form of the 
Certificate of Probable Cause did not bear a signed mailing certificate and, the 
Court thus sent all parties a notice of an ex parte communication as to the form 
of Certificate of Probable Cause. A copy of the Certificate of Probable Cause 
was then further mailed by Defendant Johnson to Assistant Attorney General 
Mark Baer on September 21, 2010 and all pleadings hand delivered on October 
22, 2010 per letter in the record of Defendant. The record reflects that the Court 
Clerk duly sent notice of the hearing to Assistant Attorney General Mark Baer. 
The State has not filed any response to Defendant's Motion To Stay or to the 
Application, and has not appeared in the matter, and, although reached by the 
Court Clerk, Assistant Attorney General Baer declined to appear in person or 
telephonically or have other Assistant Attorneys General appear in behalf of the 
State. 
The Court duly and fully reviewed Defendant Johnson's Motion to Stay 
Sentence Pending Appeal, and the Application For A Probable Cause Certificate, 
and all related pleadings, and the same were also reviewed by Defendant's 
Public Defender Tate Bennett, who was appointed as appellate counsel for the 
purposes of the Appeal. Defendant Johnson represented himself for argument 
on the pending Motion To Stay and the Application before the Court. 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, having ascertained that the 
State had due notice and has not filed a responsive pleading, and the time for 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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response having passed, and the State declined to appear, and there appearing 
good cause in support of the motion and the application of Defendant, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion For Stay of Sentence 
Pending Appeal is granted as follows: 
1. The sentence entered August 30,2010 revoking the probation of 
Defendant Johnson and reinstating it for a further 36 months is hereby 
SHSpentigu pending the appeal of this sentence; and 
2. Defendant Johnson is released from incarceration in the Millard County 
Jail with credit for time served. 
• DATED this __t3_ day of ©etaber, 2010. 
\ ^ ^ ^ W D j s t r i c t Judge <5 
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NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RE-
LEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PER-
MANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, 
IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAW-
AL. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Jamis M. JOHNSON, Defendant and Appellant. 
No.20100734-CA. 
April 19, 2012. 
Background: State petitioned for revocation of 
probation. The Fourth District Court, Fillmore De-
partment, Donald J. Eyre Jr., J., granted petition, re-
voking and reinstating terms of probation. Proba-
tioner appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Davis, J., held that: 
(1) court's determination that probationer's employ-
ment did not constitute full-time employment was 
not clearly erroneous or against clear weight of the 
evidence, and 
(2) evidence was sufficient to support finding that 
probationer did not make bona fide efforts to meet 
conditions of his probation. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law 110 C^O-
110 Criminal Law 
Trial court's determination that probationer's 
employment did not constitute full-time employ-
ment required as condition of his probation was not 
clearly erroneous or against clear weight of the 
evidence, where determination rested on assessment 
of credibility; probationer submitted affidavits from 
attorney for whom he claimed to work as paralegal, 
but attorney's responses to interrogatories and other 
testimony raised questions as to whether probation-
er remained employed with attorney and whether 
affidavits were legitimate, and probationer did not 
take other available steps to establish his employ-
ment status. 
[2] Criminal Law 110 €==>0 
110 Criminal Law 
Assuming that revocation court was required to 
make willfulness determination in connection with 
revocation and reinstatement of probation, evidence 
was sufficient to support finding that probationer 
did not make bona fide efforts to meet conditions of 
his probation; probationer avoided repeated re-
quests from agent to verify employment he was re-
quired to maintain as condition of his probation, 
maintaining that order of clarification issued by 
court entitled him to rely solely on affidavit origin-
ally provided by his employer, making no effort to 
seek clarification from agent or court in response to 
agent's repeated requests. 
Fourth District, Fillmore Department, 051700056; 
The Honorable Donald J. Eyre Jr.Tate W. Bennett, 
Fillmore, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Erin Riley, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee. 
Before Judges ORME, DAVIS, and ROTH. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
DAVIS, Judge: 
*1 f 1 Jamis M. Johnson appeals the trial 
court's order revoking and reinstating the terms of 
his probation. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 
77-18-1 (Supp.2011). We affirm. 
U 2 "The decision to grant, modify, or revoke 
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probation is in the discretion of the trial court." 
State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990). 
"[A] trial court's finding of a probation violation is 
a factual one and therefore must be given deference 
on appeal unless the finding is clearly erroneous." 
State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah 
Ct.App.1994); see also State v. Maestas, 2000 UT 
App 22, 1 12, 997 P.2d 314 ("The trial court's de-
terminations underlying its conclusion that defend-
ant violated his probation are findings of fact we 
will not disturb unless clearly erroneous, i.e., 
against the clear weight of the evidence."). In chal-
lenging the trial court's decision to revoke and rein-
state his probation, Johnson "must show that the 
evidence of a probation violation, viewed in a light 
most favorable to the trial court's findings, is so de-
ficient that the trial court abused its discretion in re-
voking [his] probation." See Jameson, 800 P.2d at 
804 (footnote omitted). 
% 3 Johnson was required to maintain verifiable 
full-time employment as a condition of his proba-
tion for a March 2007 conviction of securities 
fraud. In an October 2008 Order of Clarification, 
the trial court approved Johnson's employment as a 
part-time legal assistant with attorney Joseph R. 
Goodman as being in compliance with the terms of 
his probation. The court based its determination 
primarily on an affidavit from Goodman (the veri-
fication affidavit), which described Johnson as "a 
1099 employee" that is paid "on a contract basis" at 
a rate of "$15 per hour" for "approximately 20-30 
hours per week." In the Order of Clarification, the 
trial court also noted that "Goodman (or any other 
attorney for whom Mr. Johnson finds employment) 
shall verify Mr. Johnson's work as [Adult Probation 
and Parole (AP & P) ] periodically inquires." Dis-
satisfied with the employment verification Johnson 
provided, AP & P filed several probation progress/ 
verification reports, one of which resulted in an or-
der to show cause hearing held on August 30, 2010 
(the August 2010 hearing). During the August 2010 
hearing, the trial court determined that Johnson was 
"in violation of the terms of his probation" for fail-
ing "to provide verification of] full-time employ-
ment." This determination was based on the testi-
mony of three witnesses—an agent from AP & P 
(the agent), a volunteer with the Utah State Bar's 
Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee (the vo-
lunteer), and Johnson himself. 
TJ 4 The agent testified that he repeatedly re-
quested that Johnson provide documentation to 
verify his employment status and that Johnson was 
consistently unable to provide the agent with a 
paycheck stub, a 1099 tax form, an employment 
contract, or any other similar documentation. The 
agent testified that he "even brainstormed with Mr. 
Johnson on thingfs] that [Johnson] could provide" 
to help AP & P verify his employment, but ulti-
mately "Johnson felt that the only way to verify 
employment for him was by an affidavit." Addi-
tionally, the agent testified that Johnson had fallen 
behind on his restitution payments, also a violation 
of the terms of his probation, which prompted the 
agent to send "a request to the court for a writ of 
garnishment, and [that,] as part of that writ of gar-
nishment [,] ... interrogatories ... were sent to Mr. 
Goodman." Goodman's answers indicated that he 
was not "indebted to" Johnson; that Johnson had no 
interest in "any property or money" in Goodman's 
"possession," "charge," or "control"; and that 
Goodman knew of no debts that might be owed to 
Johnson or property owned or controlled by John-
son. The agent testified that Goodman's answers to 
the interrogatories implied that "there was really no 
nexus... between [Goodman] and Mr. Johnson." 
*2 H 5 Next, the volunteer testified that in May 
2010, he investigated Johnson for the unauthorized 
practice of law in conjunction with a business 
called Homeowners Legal Defense. The volunteer 
discovered that Goodman was listed as the agent 
for Homeowners Legal Defense. The volunteer con-
tacted Goodman to ask if he "was aware or familiar 
with" Johnson; Goodman responded that "he was 
not involved at all with ... Johnson ..., and he only 
agreed to be the[ ] agent for this company." 
f 6 Johnson then testified, contending that the 
agent never asked him for a pay stub and explaining 
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that his "2009 tax information [had] not [been] pre-
pared yet," so he could not provide it to the agent to 
verify his employment. Johnson testified that he 
"consistently ... work[s] with" Goodman, that 
Goodman submitted the verification affidavit in 
2008 upon which the court approved Johnson's 
work arrangement with Goodman as in compliance 
with the terms of his probation, see supra f 3, and 
that Goodman filed another affidavit with the trial 
court in May 2010 to verify that "Johnson contin-
ue[d] to work with [him] on law matters per the 
Court's authorization" in its October 2008 Order of 
Clarification. Johnson further testified that "the 
cases that [he] worked on [were] contingency cases 
... and [he] didn't have income most of 2008." Not-
ing a disparity between Johnson's testimony that he 
worked on a contingency basis and Goodman's 
verification affidavit, which stated that Johnson 
was paid $15 an hour, the trial court asked Johnson 
for clarification. Johnson responded, 
Mr. Goodman did not say he was going to hire 
me fiill time at $15 an hour. What happens is—if 
someone comes in on a case, I am attributed $15 
an hour. 
[H]e doesn't pay me unless money comes in from 
clients and then hopefully we get more than that 
if I get bonused as a staff member from a contin-
gency, but he doesn't pay me $15 an hour for 
work I do automatically. We've got to get pay-
ment in on his cases, and then I get paid at the 
rate of $15 an hour.... [I]f we are victorious, I get 
$15 an hour for everything I did on a case plus if 
he's successful he will bonus me more than that 
amount.... 
\ 7 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial 
court determined that Johnson's description of his 
employment did not constitute "full-time employ-
ment," and that the terms of his probation require 
that he both retain full-time employment and 
provide verification of that employment. Con-
sequently, the trial court "revoke[d Johnson's] pro-
bation" and "reinstate[d] it under the same terms 
and conditions as previously ordered with the addi-
tional provision that [Johnson] serve 60 days in ... 
jail." 
[1] f 8 We conclude that the trial court's de-
termination was not "clearly erroneous" or "against 
the clear weight of the evidence," State v. Maestas, 
2000 UT App 22, ] 12, 997 P.2d 314. In this case, 
the trial court's determination boiled down to a mat-
ter of credibility, pitting the testimony of the agent 
and the volunteer against that of Johnson; such 
credibility determinations are distinctly within the 
province of the trial court, see State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) (noting that the trial 
court is "in the best position to assess the credibility 
of witnesses"). Here, the agent testified that he re-
peatedly asked Johnson for documentation to verify 
his employment and that Johnson insisted that an 
affidavit from Goodman was the only verification 
he could provide. Although Goodman submitted a 
subsequent affidavit verifying Johnson's ongoing 
employment in May 2010, Goodman's responses to 
the interrogatories and the volunteer's testimony 
raise doubts as to whether Johnson remained em-
ployed with Goodman and whether one or both of 
Goodman's affidavits were legitimate. Johnson 
pointed out during the hearing that the agent could 
have spoken with Goodman to confirm Johnson's 
status as his employee; however, the agent's failure 
to do so does not render the trial court's determina-
tion clearly erroneous. Johnson testified that he was 
not paid in a traditional manner, implying that he 
did not receive pay stubs or sign an employment 
contract, and that his tax documents were not yet 
ready because he was still working on filing them. 
However, as the trial court aptly observed, John-
son's "problems personally filing his own income 
tax return" should "not prevent Mr. Goodman from 
issuing a 1099 to" Johnson that Johnson could then 
show the agent to verify his employment. 
*3 [2] Tf 9 Johnson also argues that the trial 
court's revocation and reinstatement of his proba-
tion was arbitrary and capricious because Johnson's 
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violation was not willful, nor did it threaten the 
safety of society. We agree that "as a general rule, 
in order to revoke probation for the violation of a 
condition of probation not involving the payment of 
money, the violation must be willful or, if not will-
ful, must presently threaten the safety of society." 
State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 277 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990). The court must determine willful-
ness "by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. 
Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah Ct.App.1994). 
Assuming, without deciding, that a willfulness de-
termination is necessary here where probation was 
revoked and reinstated rather than just revoked, cf. 
State v. Orr, 2005 UT 92, | 35, 127 P.3d 1213 ("It 
is not clear whether the willfulness requirement ap-
plies to the mere extension of probation for failure 
to pay restitution."), "a finding of willfulness 
'merely requires a finding that the probationer did 
not make bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of 
his probation,' " Peterson, 869 P.2d at 991 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Archuleta, 812 
P.2d 80, 84 (Utah CtApp.1991')). Additionally, 
"the word 'willful' should not be equated with the 
word 'intentional' " Id. 
If 10 Johnson argues that the trial court could 
not conclude that he willfully violated a term of his 
probation because he "was reasonable in his reli-
ance on the November 12, 2008 Order [of Clarifica-
tion,] which outlined the manner in which [his] em-
ployment was to be verified, wherein it stated that 
'Attorney Goodman (or any other attorney for 
whom Mr. Johnson finds employment) shall verify 
Mr. Johnson's work as AP & P periodically in-
quires.' " This argument is unavailing. Although 
Johnson was permitted to rely on the November 
2008 order as confirmation that the employment ar-
rangement with Goodman, as it was described in 
Goodman's verification affidavit, satisfied the terms 
of his probation, the order did not permit Johnson 
to duck the probation agent's requests that Johnson 
verify his employment status himself. Assuming 
Johnson truly believed that the November 2008 Or-
der of Clarification placed the employment verific-
ation responsibility entirely on Goodman, then the 
agent's repeated requests of Johnson to verify his 
employment surely should have prompted Johnson 
to seek clarification from the agent or trial court in 
light of this otherwise obvious misunderstanding. 
There is no evidence that Johnson did any such 
thing. Moreover, Johnson failed to present this ar-
gument during the August 2010 hearing from which 
he appeals, lending weight to the inference that 
Johnson was not confused about his responsibilities 
under the November 2008 Order of Clarification 
but that he was simply avoiding the agent's re-
quests. Such behavior does not demonstrate "bona 
fide efforts to meet the conditions of his probation." 
Peterson, 869 P.2d at 991 (emphasis omitted). 
*4 f 11 Accordingly, the trial court's determin-
ation that Johnson violated a term of his probation 
was not clearly erroneous, and its decision to re-
voke and reinstate his probation was not an abuse 
of discretion. Affirmed. 
t 12 WE CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME, and 
STEPHEN L. ROTH, Judges. 
UtahApp.,2012. 
State v. Johnson 
— P.3d — , 2012 WL 1356488 (Utah App.), 2012 
UT App 118 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT-FILLMORE COURfl 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAjH 
MAR 2 9 2011 
OF MUJLARD COUNTY 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
vs 
JOHNSON. J amis M 
MILLARD COUNTY ^ 
^ DEPUTX 
:AMENDED 
Plaintiff, AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
:ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
:COURT CASE NO. 051700056 
Defendant, JUDGE: JAMES BRADY 
.•DEFATTY: TATE W. BENNETT 
):ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF MILLARD ) 
TROY STAKER, being duly sw orn upon an oath deposes and says that: He is a Probation 
Officer for the Utah State Department of Corrections; that on the 7th day of March, 2007, the 
above-named defendant was adjudged guilty of the crime of Securities Fraud, a Second Degree 
Felony, in the above-entitled Court and on the 6th day of June, 2007, was sentenced to serve a 
term of One to Fifteen Years in the Utah State Prison; that the execution of the imposed sentence 
was stayed and the defendant was placed on probation under the supervision of the Department 
of Corrections; that the above-entitled defendant did violate the terms and conditions of the 
defendant's probation as follows, to-wit: 
(d> *,jt? O 
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1. By having failed to establish residence of record or changed residence without permission, on 
or about October 21, 2010, in violation of a standard condition of the Probation Agreement. 
2. By having failed to report as directed, on or about October 21, 2010, in violation of a standard 
condition of the Probation Agreement. 
3. By having been convicted of the offense of Aiding and Abetting; Willfully Causing another to 
Commit a Crime (18 USCA 1349 (2)(a) and (b)), on or about March 18. 201U in violation of 
condition number three of the Probation Agreement. 
4. By having committed or by having been convicted of the offense of Conspiracy (18 USCA 
1349), on or about March 18, 2011, in violation of condition number three of the Probation 
Agreement. 
5. By having committed or by having been convicted of the offense of Mail Fraud (18 USCA 
1341), on or about June 27. 2007, in violation of condition number three of the Probation 
Agreement. 
6. By having committed or by having been convicted of the offense of Wire Fraud (18 USCA 
1343). on or about March 18, 2011, in violation of condition number three of the Probation 
Agreement. 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that an Order from the Court issue directing and 
requiring the above-named defendant to be and appear before said Court to show cause, if any he 
has, why the aforesaid period of probation should not be revoked, and why said defendant should 
not be forthwith committed to the Utah State Prison. 
3 TROY STAKER, PROBATION OFFICER 
Subscribed and, sworn to before me this £& day of \A(\ Y~C Y) 20 \\ 
v
- • • NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing:^ j A \ j ~ 1 ( l Y { , Utah 
NzictY Publi* 
Commission expires: M H S " ^ T ) \ I 
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STATE OF UTAH 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
PROTECTED 
PROGRESS/VIOLATION REPORT 
1<UUW 11 OLcnrv a cA-urnui. UI_L.I U\ 
OF THE DISTRICT COUR" 
MILLARD COUNTY 
n 
_CLERK 
DEPUTY 
TO: FOURTH DISTRICT COURT -
Fillmore, Millard County, Utah 
ATTN: Judge James Brady 
FROM: Salt Lake A.P.& P. 
REGARDING: JOHNSON, Janus M. 
CASE NO.: 051700056 
OFFENSE: Securities Fraud, a Second Degree 
Felony 
DATE: 03/22/2011 
PROBATION DATE: 06/06/2007 
LEGISLATIVE DATE: 08/29/2013 
DEFENSE ATTY: Tate W. Bennett 
OFFENDERS 178175 
ADDRESS: FEDERAL CUSTODY, Davis 
County Jail, Farmmgton, Utah 
EMPLOYMENT: None 
COMMENTS: 
On June 6, 2007, the Court placed Jamis M JOHNSON on probation with the following conditions: 
1. Defendant is to keep a current address on file with the court. Defendant is to report to the court 
whenever ordered to do so. Service by mail is deemed adequate notice. 
2. Pay fines and fees in the amount of 55,000.00, plus interest. 
3. Serve 365 days in the Millard County Jail commencing 07/02/2007. Defendant to serve the first 6 
months, the remaining 6 months he may be on home confinement with electronic monitoring. 
Defendant may be on work release if the Sheriff approves it. 
4. Have no contact with Mr. Myers or Mr. Young. 
5. Not be employed in a fiduciary position. Not to represent or handle third party money. 
6. Pay restitution in the amount of $120,000.00, in reference to case #051700056, at a rate as directed by 
Adult Probation and Parole. 
PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED INFORMATION: 
On August 30, 2010, the Court held an Evidentiary Hearing on one of the two pending Orders to Show 
Causes in this matter. 
256G Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RE: JOHNSON, Jamis M - 2 -
Note* There is another Order to Show Cause from March 2009 on multiple Federal Charges. This 
Order to Show Cause has been continued several times. The defendant has a trial set for February 22,
 { 
2011 in the United States District Court. ' 
I 
At the conclusion of the Evidentiaiy Hearing, the Court found the defendant m violation of his probation, 
to wit: Failure to maintain full time employment. The Court ordered the defendant to serve 60 days in • 
the Millard County Jail. The Court then placed the defendant on probation for his third attempt to 
complete probation. I 
On October 13, 2010. the Court held a hearing and released the defendant from the Millard County Jail. It 
appears the defendant filed a second appeal in this court case. 
Note: The defendant has pursued an earlier appeal. The appeal w as denied by the Utah Court of ' 
Appeals. The Utah Supreme Court denied review. - i 
The defendant filed an Affidavit with the Court in this affidavit, he admits he has not had employment j 
since July 2007. See page 2 (top of the page) Affidavit of Indigency, Jamis Johnson, October 13, 2010 
in the Court's File. , 
The Court suspended the balance of the 60 days jail sentence and released the defendant. The Millard , 
County Jail released the defendant. 
When 1 got the email (October 13, 2010) from the Millard County Jail that the defendant was being ' 
released, I called 801-364-2411. This phone number has been disconnected. I called the defendant's cell | 
phone 801-347-1112. I left a message to remind him to report to Adult Probation and Parole on October 
14,2010. j 
On October 14, 2010, the defendant did not report to Adult Probation and Parole. The defendant did not 
call or otherwise leave a message about why he didn't report. 
Note: Each time the defendant has reported to Adult Probation and Parole, I have given him a paper I 
of instructions. The instructions denotes: Report in person upon release from jail at 8:00 am the 
next business morning. This instruction is capitalized, bolded, and underlined on this paper. | 
On October 21, 2010, the defendant did not report to Adult Probation and Parole. The defendant did not 
call or otherwise leave a message about why he didn't report. 
Note: On July 15, 2010, the defendant was told to report on October 21, 2010. This instruction was 
denoted on a calendar of the month of October 2010. This date was shaded and bolded. 
i 
On October 22, 2010, the defendant has not reported since he was released from the Millard County Jail on 
October 13, 2010. 
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NEW INFORMATION: 
On March 18, 2011, a federal Jury convicted the defendant of the offense of Aiding and Abetting; Willfully 
Causing another to Commit a Crime (18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2)(a) and (b)); Conspiracy (18 U.S C. § 1349); 
Mail Fraud (18 U.S.C. §1341); and Wire Fraud (18 U.S.C. §1343). He is set to be sentenced on July 
18,2011 
The defendant is m the kro-risk category. This category suggests we can help the defendant by getting him 
onto the right path and he would continue thereafter. The defendant has been working on his attitude and 
finances. The defendant still has a severe attitude problem, in that: he will not get viable employment and 
start doing the items on his probation agreement. 
The defendant has a severe employment problem. The defendant has NEVER held employment during the 
last three years on probation. Further, the defendant has racked up multiple new federal offenses of Mail 
Fraud, Wire Fraud, Money Laundering, Conspiracy and Aiding and Abetting, and Willfully causing another 
to commit a crime. Adult Probation and Parole is concerned these new crimes arise solely and because of 
the defendant's refusal to get and hold viable, full time employment as approved by Adult Probation and 
Parole. Adult Probation and Parole is concerned about the relationship between the defendant and Joseph 
R. Goodman. Mr. Goodman has sworn out several Affidavits to this Court attesting the defendant has an 
employment type relationship going back through the years to October 2008. However, the defendant 
finally admitted (October 13, 2010) that he has not had employment since July 2007. 
2568 
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This is the FIFTH Order to Show Cause requested on the defendant. This is the SIXTH problem the 
defendant has had while on probation. In August 2007, the defendant was caught attempting to short sell 
his home (that is a part of the above alleged crimes) after the "buyer" ended up in foreclosure when no 
payment was made on the defendant's home. In May 2008, the defendant had no verifiable employment 
and had missed a restitution payment. In March 2009, the defendant was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury 
for Mail Fraud, Wire Fraud, Money Laundering, Conspiracy and Aiding and Abetting; and Willfully 
causing another to commit a crime. In February 2010, it was discovered the defendant doesn't actually have 
employment and isn't making his restitution payments. In March 2010, the defendant didn't have \ mble 
employment and was still committing the violation denoted m August 2007. In October 2010, the 
defendant was released from jail and never reported to Adult Probation and Parole. In March 2011, he was 
convicted of these federal charges. 
It should be noted one co-defendant taking a plea deal was sentenced to 56 months in federal prison. The 
other co-defendant hasn't been sentenced. It is estimated the defendant will receive about 60 to 180 
months in federal prison. 
OSC RECOMMENDATION: 
It is respectfully recommended to the Court that if the defendant is found in violation of one or more of the 
conditions of his probation that his probation be revoked, and the original sentence be imposed. 
RECOMMENDATION: 
It is respectfully recommended to the Court to allow Adult Probation and Parole to amend the pending 
Affidavit in Support of an Order to Show Cause and close Adult Probation and Parole's interest in this 
matter. 
AL LOLOHEA, SUPERVJ^OR 
Zh&=& 
TROY STfKER, PROBATION OFFICER 
APPROVED AND ORDERED:. 
DENIED: 
DATE: 
COMMENTS: 
~ nl.O.CX 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: Please be seated, gentlemen. Call the 
3 case of State of Utah versus Jamis M. Johnson. Could I have 
4 both parties make their appearances, please. 
5 MR. BENNETT: Tate Bennett for Jamis Johnson, 
6 defendant. 
7 MR. BAER: Mark Baer, Attorney General's Office, for 
8 the State of Utah. 
9 THE COURT: Are both sides ready to proceed? 
10 MR. BAER: Your Honor, could we briefly approach? 
11 THE COURT: You may. 
12 (An off-the-record discussion was held at the Bench.) 
13 THE COURT: You've been listening to my white noise 
14 for the last little while. Counsel, I believe we're ready to 
15 proceed now. Let me just make a record and indicate that 
16 during the last 15 or 20 minutes we've tried to make certain 
17 that we were organized and prepared and all addressing the same 
18 issues today. 
19 There has been some question since late October as to 
20 which documents have been filed as order to show causes with 
21 affidavits, which documents are requests for the hearing, and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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22 what issues are actually before the Court today. I think we've 
23 clarified. The Court has reviewed its file and has made copies 
24 for the parties, but just so we're clear, this is the State of 
25 Utah versus Jamis Johnson, Case No. 051700056. We're here 
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT 
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1 today for hearing on the order to show cause brought against 
2 Mr. Johnson by the State of Utah alleging violations of his 
3 probation. 
4 These allegations were initially raised in October. 
5 Based on a number of hearings that were held and motions that 
6 were filed, they were not responded to until the end of January 
7 at which time they were denied by Mr. Bennett on behalf of his 
8 client and the matters are now at issue for an evidentiary 
9 hearing. 
10 I also have before me an order to show cause which 
11 was only recently filed. Garth, I can't find the order to show 
12 cause from April. This is, excuse me, these are all stapled 
13 together. Just give me one moment so I can read through them. 
14 Okay. I have the March ones here. And the November ones here. 
15 Thank you. I do have them. 
16 We also have an order to show cause which was filed 
17 recently, the end of March, and it was scheduled and noticed 
18 for a hearing today. However, the defendant has not yet had a 
19 chance to admit or deny the allegations raised in that order to 
20 show cause and I'm just asking counsel now for defense, do you Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 wish to have an admit deny hearing today and if necessary 
22 schedule an evidentiary hearing for another day or how would 
23 you like to proceed? 
24 MR. BENNETT: I think that's the way we need to 
25 proceed, your Honor. And will the Court accept me entering a 
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT 
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1 denial on Mr. Johnson's behalf? 
2 THE COURT: I'll accept a general denial on all 
3 allegations. 
4 MR. BENNETT: When it comes to the issue of setting a 
5 date, your Honor, the allegations include, among other things, 
6 that he was — that Mr. Johnson was convicted in federal court 
7 of and then there's a number of charges listed there. While 
8 ordinarily an evidentiary hearing on that matter would just be 
9 a matter of well were you convicted or not and, you know, it's 
10 a pretty simple evidentiary hearing, never that simple, of 
11 course, with us. And what I mean by that is as the Court can 
12 see, despite what may have entered as a conviction, Mr. Johnson 
13 remains free today. 
14 That's based in part on a hearing from about a week 
15 ago that I do not pretend to understand, but he has, in fact, 
16 been released. Sentencing is set for mid-July. In the interim 
17 Mr. Johnson plans on filing a motion for a new trial, et cetera 
18 which could potentially backdate or move back a sentencing 
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19 date. In any event, we have to deal with what's actually set 
20 and right now sentencing is set for July 18th. Fully 
21 anticipate the federal public defender's office filing the 
22 motion for new trial as we said earlier. Apparently it has 
23 been filed. 
24 So we'd ask that if those are denied, then I would 
25 imagine they go forward with sentencing and then this 
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1 evidentiary hearing would be rather short and sweet. So could 
2 we set it for just after the federal sentencing date as it 
3 exists now? Then if it gets more complicated, we can move it, 
4 but at the earliest I'd like it set -- my request is that it be 
5 set after the sentencing date in federal court which I believe 
6 right now is July 18th. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Before you respond, Mr. Baer, I'll 
8 give you a chance to respond, I don't have my calendar right in 
9 front of me. I can turn to my clerk and ask her to verify, the 
10 month of June is almost not available anymore and the month of 
11 May with the exception of the 17th and 18th — well, not 
12 the 17th. We're already using that. The month of May is 
13 almost not available because of the Court's schedule already. 
14 I think we may have the 18th as a full day. That's 
15 available. We may actually have a day next week that I just 
16 found out about, but what I'm getting at is if it's not set 
17 before June 12th, and I don't know that we have the ability Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to set it before June 12th, it cannot be set until after the 
Fourth of July. 
So with that in mind, Mr. Baer, tell me what your 
preference would be? 
MR. BAER: Our preference would be, your Honor, to 
have the hearing as soon as possible because we can combine — 
well, let's start the first issue. If you take a look at this 
new March, relatively new March allegations. It's not just the 
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1 federal convictions. It also alleges other matters such as 
2 failure to report or failure to reveal established residence of 
3 record, that's allegation No. 1, or failure to report. I mean, 
4 these are much the same as the other allegations. And I 
5 believe that is exactly the issues that we're going to address 
6 today on the earlier orders to show cause which the Court would 
7 know he's a defendant, he's a felon, and he has an obligation 
8 to report both to this Court and to his probation officer. And 
9 so if he continues to not do that, probation officer has 
10 continued to file his PV report. 
11 So there are other issues which would warrant us 
12 hearing it earlier regardless, but secondarily, he does stand 
13 convicted, this individual does stand convicted of federal 
14 crimes at this point. It is pro forma in some cases and 
15 certainly customary that individuals file appeals, unless 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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16 there's some sort of stay issued by the federal court, those 
17 are convictions and we'd like to proceed on those. 
18 But given that they are separate issues entirely 
19 besides the federal that the Court can rest its hat on if the 
20 Court feels more comfortable, we'd ask it be set as soon as 
21 possible. And to make it hopefully not too much more money, 
22 this individual was released last week from federal custody. 
23 He has not reported to our knowledge to any authorities whether 
24 it's this Court or to the probation officer since his release 
25 last week. 
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1 And based upon that, there's another ongoing PV 
2 report that we'd like to file today and then he can deny those 
3 so we know we're dealing with today's Filing, March filings at 
4 our next sentencing. Today we know we're dealing — all very 
5 clear now that we're dealing with November's allegations so it 
6 becomes very succinct so we don't run into this problem again. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. 
8 MR.BAER: Thank you. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you. 
10 MR. BENNETT: May we respond? 
11 THE COURT: Yes. 
12 MR. BENNETT: First, what he has filed is not an 
13 appeal. It's a motion for a new trial which would serve as a 
14 stay. So holding an evidentiary hearing based on convictions Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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15 prior to letting those convictions — whether we know they 
16 stand or not kind of negates the purpose of him filing a motion 
17 for new trial. What would happen if we held the evidentiary 
18 hearing, the Court probably is going to take judicial notice 
19 that at this moment of our evidentiary hearing the convictions 
20 have been ordered and then they turn around and are overturned 
21 weeks later, then we have — it's just a quagmire we don't need 
22 to get into. 
23 So there's really no need — if his motions are 
24 defeated, they will go forward with sentencing and then we can 
25 come back and it will just be a much cleaner situation so 
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9 
1 that's the basis for this. Well, and as to the allegations of 
2 not reporting, your Honor, those aren't before us now so I 
3 actually choose not to respond to those. 
4 THE COURT: And I am not taking — I won't be making 
5 decisions based on just allegations that are not before me, not 
6 admitted and not proven at this point, but I'm taking them as 
7 simply notice that the State is giving me that we may well have 
8 other matters that we may need to schedule. 
9 In terms of today's hearing, we're going to proceed 
10 with the November issues. We'll have an evidentiary hearing on 
11 those issues. When we complete that, I'm going to address the 
12 timing of the next hearing. I'm not persuaded that I should 
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13 not hold a hearing until he's sentenced. I believe that his 
14 motion for a new trial could be granted or denied before the 
15 July date. It may not be. And so I'll address that when it 
16 comes time to setting that hearing. 
17 I'm also not persuaded that I need to rush a hearing 
18 on his convictions if there is a pending motion to set aside 
19 that decision. And other than the convictions, I only have 
20 failures to respond, excuse me, failures to establish a 
21 residence or notify a change and failure to report which are 
22 not unlike what he already has alleged against him. So I'm not 
23 in a big rush to hear this on matters that we're not certain 
24 of, but I also don't feel a need to delay it until after a 
25 future sentencing date which may or may not exist by the time 
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1 we get there anyway. 
2 So we'll deal with that at the appropriate time. I 
3 believe the only issues that are before me today, other than 
4 having accepted his general denial on the January orders to 
5 show cause, the only things that are before me today is an 
6 evidentiary7 hearing on ~ I'll call it the November order to 
7 show cause. 
8 Are we ready to proceed on that? 
9 MR. BAER: We are, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Baer. If you would call 
11 your first witness, please. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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12 MR. BAER: First witness I call Mr. Troy Staker to 
13 the stand. 
14 THE COURT: Please come forward, Mr. Staker. My 
15 clerk will swear you in. 
16 MR. BAER: Judge, may I just proceed from the bench 
17 here? 
18 THE COURT: Please do. I need to have you near a 
19 microphone. 
20 
21 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
22 BY MR. BAER: 
23 Q Sir, can you please state your full name and spell 
24 your last name for the record. 
25 A Yes, Troy Staker, S-t-a-k-e-r. 
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT 
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1 Q Mr. Staker, where do you work and what do you do, 
2 please? 
3 A I work at Adult Probation and Parole for the 
4 Department of Corrections for the State of Utah. 
5 Q And what office do you work under? 
6 A Like what's the address? 
7 Q No - yeah, the Salt Lake office? 
8 A Yeah, the Salt Lake office at 36 West Fremont. 
9 Q All right. Sir, have you had an opportunity to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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10 supervise an individual by the name of Mr. Jamis Johnson? 
11 A I have. 
12 Q And when were you first assigned that case? 
13 A It's been a while. Pm not actually sure about when 
14 I was first assigned that case. 
15 Q You've had it for a couple of years at least? 
16 A That would be accurate. 
17 Q And has Mr. Johnson — he's been under your 
18 supervision personally. Is that correct? 
19 A That would be correct. 
20 Q And this individual, you've met with him previously, 
21 seen him previously? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q Is that individual in the courtroom today? 
24 A Yes, he's sitting at the defendant's table. 
25 MR. BAER: Your Honor, may the record reflect just 
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1 the identification of the defendant? 
2 THE COURT: Yes. 
3 MR. BAER: Thank you. 
4 BY MR. BAER: 
5 Q Mr. Staker, you prepared and submitted an order to 
6 show cause in this matter which we're referring to as the 
7 November, meaning November 2010, order to show cause, correct? 
8 A Yes, that's correct. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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9 Q And we're just dealing with that one here today, 
10 correct? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q Could you outline for the Court what gave rise to the 
13 filing and execution of that affidavit? 
14 A Yes, basically what had happened is the Court had 
15 found Mr. Johnson in violation of his probation and sentenced 
16 him to a period of time in the Millard County Jail. I had 
17 received an email from the Millard County Jail saying that they 
18 were going to release Jamis Johnson on October 13th 2010. So 
19 what happened is that I took and Mr. Johnson — I didn't want 
20 him to have any difficulties on this go around for probation so 
2.1 what I did is I called his phone number of record to let him 
22 know that basically I was aware that he would be getting out, 
23 but that number had been disconnected so. 
24 Q How would you have been provided with that number? 
25 A When he would report. I would ask him what his phone 
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT 
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1 number was. His address, phone number, wrhere he worked, things 
2 like that. 
3 Q That number then was provided by the defendant 
4 originally? 
5 A Yes, that's correct. 
6 Q Had he given you any additional numbers or any 
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7 additional contacts to substitute for that one? 
8 A Yes, he had. He gave me a mobile number as well. 
9 Q Okay. Well, did he give you another non-mobile 
10 number? 
11 A I believe he gave me a house phone number that was 
12 disconnected and a mobile number that was not disconnected. 
13 Q So you indicated that you called the home number. 
14 Just to be clear the record is clear, what happened when you 
15 did that? 
16 A The thing said that the number had been disconnected. 
17 Q Okay. Since the release of this defendant, had he 
18 called you and said I have a different home number? 
19 A No. 
20 Q Had he notified you of any different numbers? 
21 A No. 
22 Q Okay. You may proceed. 
23 A So I called the defendant's mobile number which was 
24 still active and basically left a message letting him know that 
25 I was aware that he was going to be released from the Millard 
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT 
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1 County Jail. 
2 Q And who provided you with that number, again, so the 
3 record is clear? 
4 A The defendant. 
5 Q Okay. Proceed, please. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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6 A And basically at that point I reminded him that 
7 whenever he'd come in and report, that I would always direct 
8 him to report to me at 8:00 the next business morning in person 
9 upon his release from jail and that would be October 14th. 
10 Q What happened October 14th? 
11 A The defendant didn't report to Adult Probation and 
12 Parole. He didn't call or otherwise leave a message to why he 
13 didn't report. 
14 Q Did he do any of those activities any time relative 
15 to that October date? 
16 A No. 
17 Q Now, with respect to your affidavit, your second 
18 allegation indicates that — I guess actually the first one, 
19 we've done this in reverse order, die failure to establish 
20 residency of record. 
21 Why did you file that allegation? 
22 A Oh, what had happened is that when Mr. Johnson had 
23 got out of jail, when I last met with Mr. Johnson on 
24 July 15th, 2010,1 gave him a calendar and on the calendar 
25 basically it showed to report every third Thursday of every 
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT 
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1 month. And basically the next third Thursday after his release 
2 from the Millard County Jail would have been October 21st and 
3 so at that point I waited to see if he was going to show up for 
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4 that meeting as well. On October 21st he didn't report and 
5 he didn't call or leave a message as to why he didn't report. 
6 At that point we hadn't had any communication from 
7 Mr. Johnson as to where he left the Millard County Jail to go 
8 live, and we didn't have him ever reporting to us and letting 
9 us know that he had been released from Millard County Jail 
10 Q Did you ever receive any new, additional or 
11 subsequent addresses from this defendant within that time 
12 period? 
13 A No. 
14 Q Or any other contact information within that time 
15 period? 
16 A No. 
17 MR. BAER: All right. Your witness. 
18 
19 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
20 BY MR. BENNETT: 
21 Q Mr. Staker, you indicated that you received a jail 
22 phone call from the Millard County Jail indicating that Mr. 
23 Johnson would be released on October 21st, 2010, correct? 
24 A No, that wouldn't be correct. I received an email 
25 from the Millard County Jail on October 13th saying they were 
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT 
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1 releasing him that day. 
2 Q Okay. So he was to be released on October 13th. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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3 Did the email indicate why they were releasing him on 
4 October 13th, 2010? 
5 A No. 
6 Q Were you aware of why they were releasing him on 
7 October 13th, 2010? 
8 A No. 
9 Q Did it strike you as odd that they were releasing 
10 him? 
11 A Yes, I was wondering because his 60 days or whatever 
12 sentence the Court had given him hadn't expired at that time. 
13 Q So you were, in fact, confused as to why they were 
14 releasing him? 
15 MR. BAER: I'll object to the form of the question. 
16 THE COURT: You can ask the question. You can't tell 
17 him what you think he was. I don't think he stated he was 
18 confused so you need to re-ask the question. 
19 MR. BENNETT: I believe I did ask. I said were you 
20 confused as to why and he said yeah because the 60 days hadn't 
21 been — 
22 THE COURT: Okay. I thought I had heard it 
23 differently. 
24 MR. BENNETT: And perhaps I'm mistaken. 
25 MR. BAER: I think the term was, and it's okay, we're 
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT 
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1 probably splitting a hair here, but I think he asked him if he 
2 was surprised which is a different concept. 
3 THE COURT: That was my understanding as well. 
4 MR. BENNETT: Okay. I apologize. 
5 THE COURT: Yep. 
6 BY MR. BENNETT: 
7 Q So you were surprised that he was being released? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q Because of the surprise did you take any affirmative 
10 steps to find out why he was being released early? 
11 A I did look up on court links to see if there was any 
12 notations and there was nothing on court links as to why he was 
13 being released. 
14 Q So you had no idea as to why he was released? 
15 A No. 
16 Q As of today do you understand why he was released? 
17 A I'm actually not 100 percent sure on that in that no 
18 motion documents or orders have ever been sent to me as to why 
19 he was released. 
20 Q So none have ever been sent to you, but are you 
21 aware? 
22 A I believe that he had a court hearing and the judge 
23 released him. 
24 (Mr. Bennett is speaking away from the microphone and 
25 cannot be heard consistently.) 
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1 Q Mr. Staker, do you recognize (inaudible)? 
2 A You want me to — 
3 Q Do you recognize the document? 
4 A I've never seen it actually before until now. 
5 MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, this is what I'm moving to 
6 introduce into evidence and so I'm asking to try and lay a 
7 foundation here. It's a Court signed certificate of probable 
8 cause and order of release. I'm asking the Court to take 
9 judicial notice that it, in fact, existed and (inaudible.) 
10 THE COURT: May I see it? 
11 MR. BENNETT: (Inaudible). 
12 THE COURT: Have you shown it to counsel? 
13 MR. BENNETT: I have. 
14 MR. BAER: I have a copy. 
.15 THE COURT: Any objection, Counsel? 
16 MR. BAER: No, I think the Court can take judicial 
17 notice of its own pleadings anyway. 
18 THE COURT: Yeah. 
19 MR. BAER: And we're not going to argue about the 
20 foundation of that. I'm fairly certain where the argument will 
21 go in any event and we're prepared for that so that's fine. 
22 THE COURT: Having reviewed the document I recognize 
23 it as the document I previously reviewed that's in the Court 
24 file that I signed on November 3rd. It's admitted. 
25 (An exhibit was admitted but no number was mentioned 
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1 so it cannot be identified in the index.) 
2 MR. BENNETT: And then I would also - I think this 
3 is probably the quickest way to do this, move for admission of 
4 both — well, the Court would have conceded that order and 
5 that's the motion for stay pending appeal and application for 
6 certificate of probable cause, both of which were prepared by 
7 Mr. Johnson in his pro se capacity. You know, and I failed to 
8 mention there's also a memorandum in support of that motion for 
9 stay So there are tiiree — 
10 MR. BAER: Well, again, I think the Court can take 
11 judicial notice of its own pleadings. I don't know if it has 
12 to be entered as separate. 
13 THE COURT: The only thing I need to do is verify 
14 what he's referring to is what I recognize. I'll note for the 
15 record and I will take judicial notice that I'm looking at a 
16 motion for stay pending appeal and memorandum in support of 
17 motion for stay and an application for certification of 
18 probable cause, all appear to have been prepared by Mr. 
19 Johnson. They all bear the Court stamps. All of them on • 
20 September 7th, 2010. I'll take judicial notice of the fact 
21 that they are already in the Court's file. 
22 MR. BENNETT: So in that case we do not need to 
23 (inaudible?) 
24 THE COURT: You do not. 
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25 BY MR. BENNETT: 
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1 Q Mr. Staker, you indicated that upon Mr. Johnson's 
2 release you attempted to make contact via telephone with Mr. 
3 Johnson, correct? 
4 A That would be correct. 
5 Q But that those numbers were disconnected, correct? 
6 A That would not be correct. One number was 
7 disconnected, one number actually had a message machine or 
8 message-type thing that you could leave a message. 
9 Q Okay. First, do you recall the number that you 
10 attempted to make contact with Mr. Johnson on that was 
11 disconnected? 
12 A I don't. However, it's in the report. I believe it 
13 started with 347 and it's in the report of October 22nd I 
14 believe is the date of the report. 
15 Q And then the number that you called where you 
16 indicated it just went to a voice machine-type thing? 
17 A Uh-huh, that number is also reflected in the report. 
18 Q Okay. Thank you. You indicated that part of your 
19 allegations in the probation violation were that Mr. Johnson 
20 had failed to establish a residence of record, correct? 
21 A That would be correct. 
22 Q And the requirement to establish a residence of 
23 record is part of the Adult Probation and Parole agreement 
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24 entered into with Mr. Johnson and the Office of Adult Probation 
25 and Parole, correct? 
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1 A Right, Paragraph 2. 
2 Q And that agreement was entered into when 
3 approximately, if you don't know the exact date? 
4 A I don't know the exact date Mr. Johnson executed that 
5 document. 
6 Q Do you recall when Mr. Johnson was sentenced in this 
7 matter? 
8 A I believe it was in 2007. 
9 Q And so is it safe to say that he entered into the 
10 probation agreement sometime shortly after being sentenced in 
11 2007? "' / 
12 A That would be correct. 
13 Q Okay. Do you recall when you filed this order to 
14 show cause dated — counsel for the State referred to it as the 
15 November progress report violation? 
16 A Uh-huh. 
17 Q The day on, it and correct me if I am wrong, is 
18 October 25th, 2010, right? 
19 A That would be correct. 
20 Q Do you recall emailing that report to the local Adult 
21 Probation and Parole office here in Millard County for 
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22 dissemination? 
23 A Yes, I don't do that personally. Our agent assistant 
24 does that and then sent me a copy saying that that had been 
25 done. 
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1 Q Okay. And then do you recall or are you aware of 
2 counsel for Mr. Johnson responding to that email and kind have 
3 questioning what the basis for the probation violation was? 
4 A I recall something about a motion or something that 
5 was filed to quash the warrant that was issued from that 
6 report. 
7 Q And so just so we're clear, you're acknowledging that 
8 you recall receiving an email from counsel that stated to the 
9 effect of hold on a minute this motion is being filed? 
10 Do you recall receiving an email from counsel is the 
11 specific question? 
12 A That I do not. 
13 Q You do not recall receiving an email from myself — 
14 A No. 
15 Q — in response to your email to the local AP&P 
16 office? 
17 A No, I don't recall an email on that. I'm not saying 
18 that email wasn't sent. I'm just saying I don't specifically 
19 recall anything on that. 
20 Q And I guess it's possible that where you didn't send 
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21 the email personally, any response perhaps wasn't due by you 
22 personally either? 
23 A Right. 
24 Q But you were aware that an email was sent and this 
25 motion — you called it a motion to quash, but this motion was 
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1 filed. You were aware of that? 
2 A I'm aware that basically I sent a report to the 
3 Court. The Court issued a warrant, I believe, in November and 
4 that basically there was some pleadings pursuant to having the 
5 warrant set aside and basically allowing Mr. Johnson to just 
6 come to an order to show cause. 
7 MR. BENNETT: Okay. Thank you. No other questions, 
8 your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Very well. You may step down. 
10 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
11 THE COURT: I'm sorry. Do you have any reply? 
12 MR. BAER: It was just — probably just to make sure 
13 that it's clear 
14 
15 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
16 BY MR. BAER: 
17 Q How many times have you met with Mr. Johnson over the 
18 years? 
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19 A G o s h -
20 MR. BENNETT: Objection. Relevance. 
21 THE COURT: I find it relevant. 
22 THE WITNESS: I would say - well, generally Mr. 
23 Johnson comes in every third Thursday of every month since he's 
24 been assigned to the Salt Lake office and met with me. 
25 BYMR.BAER: 
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1 Q All right. With the exception of these allegations, 
2 his non-report, correct? 
3 A Right. 
4 Q All right. So it's been years that you've had them, 
5 correct? 
6 A That would be correct. 
7 Q Have you ever changed residence, your employment 
8 residence at any time during this time period? 
9 A No. 
10 Q Have you changed your telephone number at any time 
11 during this time period? 
12 A No. 
13 Q Have you changed your email at any time during this 
14 time period. 
15 A No. 
16 Q Has anything changed that would make it different, 
17 more difficult or otherwise minor or substantially altered way 
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18 to contact you from the beginning of this case to, in fact, 
19 this very day? 
20 A No, and our reporting times have, I believe, been 
21 uniformly the third Thursday of every month between 7:30 in the 
22 morning and seven at night. 
23 Q All right. It's fair to say you've handled hundreds 
24 if not thousands of probations over the years? 
25 A That would be correct. 
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1 Q This is standard procedure in these cases? 
2 A Yes. 
3 MR. BAER: No other questions. 
4 THE COURT: Thank you? Any further questions. 
5 MR. BENNETT: No, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Witness may step down. Mr. Baer, any 
7 other witnesses? 
8 MR. BAER: No, your Honor. I think we'd submit on 
9 those two narrow issues for purposes of today's hearing. 
10 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr Bennett, do you wish to 
11 call any witnesses? 
12 MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, Mr. Johnson would like to 
13 testify on his own behalf so defense calls Jamis M. Johnson. 
14 THE COURT: Mr. Johnson, if you'll come forward, 
15 raise your right hand to be sworn in. 
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16 JAMIS M. JOHNSON 
17 Called by the Defendant, being first 
18 duly sworn, testified as follows: 
19 THE CLERK: Do you solemnly swear that the testimony 
20 you are about to give in this matter will be the truth, the 
21 whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
22 THE WITNESS: I do. 
23 THE COURT: Come up here, Mr. Johnson. Have a seat. 
24 
25 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
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1 BY MR. BENNETT: 
2 Q Mr. Johnson, you've heard Mr. Staker testify today 
3 that he attempted to contact you at sometime after release on 
4 October 13th from the Millard County Jail, October 13th of 
5 2010 from the Millard County Jail, correct? 
6 A Yeah, I heard that. 
7 Q Were you aware at that time that Kir. Staker had 
8 attempted to contact you? 
9 A I wras aware, but I would like to go back before that 
10 because he — 
11 THE COURT: No. Mr. Johnson, I'm going to instruct 
12 you that in this instance you're the witness and he's the 
13 attorney so you answer his questions at this time. Then if you 
14 need to take a moment to talk to him about how he's conducting 
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15 his case, you're welcome to do that. 
16 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
17 THE COURT: But I'm not going to have you direct the 
18 conversation from the witness chair anymore than I would any 
19 other. 
20 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
21 THE COURT: So you ask the questions, you answer the 
22 questions, we'll proceed that way. Then if you want to take a 
23 break and talk to your attorney, you may. 
24 THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you. 
25 BY MR. BENNETT: 
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1 Q So, again, were you aware that Mr. Staker had 
2 attempted to contact you? 
3 A I was aware of that. Mr. Staker called me and left a 
4 message October 14th at 7:45 in the morning. I'd gotten home 
5 the night before about 9:00. The judge had released me the day 
6 before and I got that call. 
7 Q What did you do in response to that call? 
8 A Well, I contacted you and I checked the Court docket 
9 because the judge had granted my two motions and — 
10 Q You just mentioned two motions. Let's be clear what 
11 you're referring to. 
12 A I had filed on September 7th — when I entered the 
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13 Millard County Jail, I filed personally a — as I recall, a 
14 motion for — I filed a notice of appeal and I filed a motion 
15 for a stay pending appeal and I had filed an application for a 
16 probable cause certificate on September 7th and I sent notice 
17 to the State, to Mr. Baer. 
18 Q Do you recall the date on which you sent that notice? 
19 A Notices were sent three times. I sent notices on 
20 September 7th to Mr. Baers office and then again roughly 
21 about 15 days later. 
22 MR. BAER: Judge, I'm going to object on a relevance 
23 basis. You know whether or not he sends notice to the State 
24 doesn't change one way or another his obligations to the Court. 
25 I'd just ask for some sort of foundation as to the relevance to 
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1 this proceeding. 
2 THE COURT: Help me with the relevance question, Mr. 
3 Bennett. 
4 MR. BENNETT: Well, first of all, Mr. Staker 
5 indicated that he had no notice of this. I think additionally 
6 whether the State had notice is relevant because ultimately 
7 these motions and the probable cause certificate were granted, 
8 in part I think the Court could deem it as a default because 
9 (inaudible). The Court, when the State failed to appear, 
10 granted these motions so I think whether or not Mr. Jamis 
11 complied with the concept of notice is important in 
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12 establishing that the State did, in fact, have notice of the 
13 filing of the proper— 
14 THE COURT: But those issues have been resolved. 
15 They've been ruled on. As far as I know, there's not a 
16 question of notice at this time. The only question is after he 
17 was released what did he know, what did he do, and that's where 
18 we need to go. 
19 MR. BENNETT: Okay. And we'll fast forward to that. 
20 And the Court is correct I was setting up an argument 
21 anticipating so I'll just farther forward. 
22 BY MR. BENNETT: 
23 Q So, Mr. Johnson, ultimately these probable causes, 
24 your motion for stay was granted or denied? 
25 A It was granted. 
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1 Q The probable cause certificate in order of release 
2 was granted or denied? 
3 A It was granted. 
4 Q And you were aware that they were granted of course? 
5 A They were granted, yes, on October 13th and then 
6 again on November 4th. 
7 Q What do you mean by that? 
8 A November 4th there was — the Court signed a fairly 
9 extensive order affirming the granting. 
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10 Q Okay. So you're released — we need to fast forward 
11 kind of to the ultimate point. You're released. And as 
12 Mr. Staker indicated and you've sort of conceded, he made 
13 contact with you, but you did not respond to Mr. Staker, 
14 instead you responded by calling your counselor, correct? 
15 A Right, I called you and also checked the court 
16 docket. 
17 Q Can you kind of give us the context of what that 
18 conversation between — and, of course, that would be otherwise 
19 frivolous conversation, but if you choose, would you like to 
20 share with the Court what the context of that conversation was? 
21 A Yes, I indicated to you that I'd received this call 
22 from Mr. Staker and the — I thought that this matter had been 
23 stayed and that probation had been shifted to the Court during 
24 the appeal. 
25 Q That was your understanding? 
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1 A That was my understanding. 
2 Q And you base that understanding on what? 
3 A Well, it was extensively argued. This specific 
4 remedy was asked for with specificity and it had been granted. 
5 Q Okay. So you're saying that you had asked for that 
6 remedy in your motion to stay, in your memorandum in support of 
7 the motion to stay, correct? 
8 A Yes. 
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9 Q So that we're clear, the remedy that you had asked 
10 for in those motions was that your probation be converted to 
11 court probation pending the outcome of the appeal, correct? 
12 A Yes, and that the sentence of probation also be 
13 stayed pending the appeal. 
14 Q Yes, correct. So after our conversation, did you 
15 then return Mr. S taker's call and report to AP&P as he 
16 indicated you should? 
17 A No, the advice of counsel was that that was 
18 unnecessary, the matter had been stayed and that I had to 
19 report to the Court. You also indicated that you were 
20 concerned that I would — it was simply an effort to get 
21 further information from me because the State had deliberately 
22 not appeared and we were concerned that that was improper. 
23 Q I'm not — well — in any event, so is it safe to say 
24 then that you're relying on the orders of the Court and that 
25 your counsel was relying — well, first of all, who prepared 
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1 the order that was ultimately signed by the Court? 
2 A On November 10th? I mean, November 4th? 
3 Q The certificate of probable cause? 
4 A Oh, I did. 
5 Q Okay. 
6 A The Court signed — yeah, I think I did. 
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7 Q Okay. So for the purposes of determining your 
8 mindset on that day and maybe even today, what's your 
9 understanding as to what your probation obligations are pending 
10 the outcome of the appeal? 
11 A My understanding was that the (inaudible) of 
12 probation was stayed pending appeal and that I had to report 
13 to --1 was on court probation and to clarify also that further 
14 action with the State sort of ratified, seemed to be ratifying 
15 their claim that they still were in charge. 
16 Q But your belief of who you had to report to was whom? 
17 A The Court. 
18 MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, I have no further 
19 questions, but I'd like to confer with my client. 
20 THE COURT: That's fine. 
21 MR. BENNETT: No further questions. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Baer. 
23 MR. BAER: Just a moment, please. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. 
25 MR. BAER: No questions, your Honor. I have no 
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1 questions of this witness. 
2 THE COURT: Thank you. You may step down. 
3 THE WITNESS: Thank you, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Any other witnesses that are going to be 
5 called by the defense? 
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6 MR. BENNETT: No, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Do the parties wish to be heard on 
8 argument? 
9 MR. BAER: Yeah, I think we do. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Baer. 
11 MR. BAER: Thank you very much. And I'd like to 
12 reserve a little bit of my argument for rebuttal, but as far as 
13 the gravamen, the central theme and thrust and point of this is 
14 very clear. Mr. Johnson is — has been convicted of a felony 
15 in this case. He is the probationer. Mr. Staker is not the 
16 probationer. Court is not the probationer. The State is not 
17 the probationer. Mr. Bennett is not the probationer. The 
18 Court and certainly this defendant is well aware of the 
19 obligations of any probationer in this case. 
20 Mr. Staker has testified that he told him he had to 
21 report. He had to report regularly. He indicated that he had 
22 to keep in contact with him, give him information if he changed 
23 his residence. He didn't do that. He didn't give him the new 
24 telephone number. He didn't come into his office. Mr, 
25 Johnson's creation of documents do not go to the central 
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1 obligation of a probationer to report to his probation officer. 
2 What's pretty clear from this is Mr. Johnson is 
3 attempting to play off this Court against the AP&P department, 
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4 and/or vice versa and cover that by essentially irrelevant 
5 testimony about whether he had any emails to his counsel or 
6 not. Actually what happened is what the Court should center 
7 its attention on. And what happened is this individual was 
8 convicted in July of 2007 of a securities fraud. 
9 He has distinct and clear obligations as all 
10 probationers do to report to his officer, to let the officer 
11 know when he changes his address, to let the officer know if he 
12 has a new telephone number, if his old telephone number changes 
13 and to regularly report. And the unrefuted testimony, in fact, 
14 the admission by the defendant is that he didn't report to 
15 Mr. Staker or at least that he was aware that he had to report. 
16 That was his first point, but there's no evidence in front of 
17 this Court that he actually did report. 
18 Instead he has an amorphous obligation in his mind 
19 that he has to report to the Court. If you take a look in any 
20 of those orders that the Court signed, nowhere in there does it 
21 negate his obligation to report to AP&P. It doesn't say here 
22 oh just report to the Court but never mind reporting to AP&P. 
23 It doesn't do that. It asked him to continue to report on a 
24 regular basis to the Court. And I think the Court — by the 
25 way, I would ask that the Court take judicial notice of its own 
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1 record. There's no point in asking the defendant. I think the 
2 Court can know whether he reported on a regular basis each 
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3 month on the 15th. 
4 The Court--
5 MR. BENNETT: Objection, your Honor. That is not 
6 evidence that is properly admitted during the taking of 
7 evidence in this. It's introduction of evidence (inaudible). 
8 MR. BAER: Well, he introduced, defense counsel 
9 introduced or attempted to introduce a certificate of probable 
10 cause. The Court takes judicial notice of its own pleading. 
11 So it's now been taken judicial notice in this proceeding and, 
12 therefore, the content of it is before the Court. 
13 THE COURT: The content is before the Court. Whether 
14 he reported or not is the form of the objection. Counsel, 
15 that's not going to be the basis for my decision, but I do 
16 understand your point. 
17 MR. BAER: Yeah, the argument, other than putting the 
18 Court or the clerk on the stand or maybe your computer, I'm not 
19 sure what other basis — what other avenue we could use to get 
20 to that point, but it's the point and I appreciate the Court 
21 notes that. 
22 It's a relatively simple matter — despite the 
23 State's position, it's a relatively simple matter despite the 
24 defendant's attempts here to muddy the v/aters and to make them 
25 more difficult. He is a felon. As a felon he is a 
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1 probationer. As a probationer he has a probation officer. He, 
2 like every other probationer, has a myriad of obligations both 
3 to this Court, to the Adult Probation and Parole, and, in fact, 
4 to society at large. 
5 Society at large has reasonable expectation that this 
6 probationer like any probationer doesn't play games with the 
7 Court and doesn't play games with AP&P, but he reports as he 
8 should be reasonably and has been reasonably requested and 
9 ordered to do both by this Court and by his AP&P officer. And 
10 he just didn't do it. And he didn't report a change in 
11 residence and he didn't report that his phone had been changed. 
12 Again, we believe he's played off the Court against AP&P 
13 perhaps and vice vera, but despite all that at the end of the 
14 day he didn't do what he was asked to do. 
15 And the final point would be this. And please 
16 correct me if I'm missing something because Lord knows it's 
17 confusing enough, but the documents that the Court took 
18 judicial notice of, the certificate of probable cause and order 
19 of release, is dated November 4th. That's the stamp on that 
20 document, and it was signed by this Court on November 3rd. 
21 Mr. Staker's testimony was about October. Now, that's before 
22 this order. So either he did or he didn't report in October. 
23 Either he did or didn't turn over the information or report the 
24 information to Mr. Staker that he was supposed to. 
25 This November 4th, even if it were effective or the 
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1 Court could find in some way that it effected the intent or the 
2 knowledge of this defendant, it's certainly not retroactive to 
3 October. And on that basis alone I think the Court can find 
4 this defendant in violation of the affidavit signed 
5 October 25th, 2010. Thank you. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Baer. Mr. Bennett. 
7 MR. BENNETT: The truth is we probably could have, 
8 and this is the fault of the attorney, we probably could have 
9 stipulated to some facts and made this a legal — 
10 THE COURT: I think maybe, but we didn't do that. 
11 MR. BENNETT: Anyhow, that's what we're doing now. 
12 Everything that Mr. Baer said I really take no issue with 
13 except that he doesn't address, and I think the State has to in 
14 order to make its argument, intentionally just ignore the fact 
15 that that certificate of probable cause in Subparagraph d, and 
16 I turned mine in as Exhibit 1 so I don't have it before me, but 
17 it clearly states that Mr. Johnson is to, upon his release, 
18 report to the Court on the 15th of each month. I'm not 
19 reading, but that's just what it says. 
20 That's the intervening cause here. Forget about — 
21 well, Judge Eyre's revocation and reinstatement of probation 
22 was stayed. The Court previously ruled that nonetheless the 
23 filing of the original cause tolled out through at least 
24 December, and that's the only reason Mr. Johnson really has to 
25 respond to this allegation today because according to the 
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1 Court, the probation was tolled, but that doesn't change the 
2 fact that the Court actually ordered Mr. Johnson's release, 
3 signed a certificate of probable cause which stated, among 
4 other things, and I think the relevant one is that he only had 
5 to be — he reported to the Court. That then usurps the power 
6 from Adult Probation and Parole. 
7 Therefore, it means Mr. Johnson isn't required — I 
8 understand Mr. Staker, I questioned him and I have no reason to 
9 not take him at his word. He wasn't aware. He thought that 
10 Mr. Johnson, and he was telling Mr. Johnson you've got to 
11 comply, you've got to comply and, of course, in his mind he 
12 felt that he did, but that's because he wasn't aware of the 
13 certificate of probable cause which directs Mr. Johnson to 
14 report to the Court. I think it really is just that simple. 
15 Mr. Baer did make one valid point a point that I 
16 considered previously and that's that the order is dated 
17 November 3rd, Well, that's simple. Nunc pro tunc ~ orders 
18 are nunc pro tunc back to the day that they are actually 
19 ordered in court, that's the effective date of the order. This 
20 hearing that we held was September. 
21 MR. BAER: October 13 th. 
22 MR. BENNETT: October 13th. That's the date that's 
23 relevant. So the fact that the Court didn't actually stamp or 
24 sign the order until November 3rd becomes irrelevant. I'd 
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25 just like to — and I think I made my point, but quoting, your 
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1 Honor, from State versus Hodges, which is actually quoting 
2 numerous other cases, in fact, it's an analysis of State v 
3 Bonza (phonetic) and United States Supreme Court case Bearden 
4 (phonetic) versus Georgia. It simply states that consistent 
5 with Utah law and with Bearden we hold that, as a general rule, 
6 in order to revoke probation for the violation of a condition 
7 of probation not involving the payment of money, the violation 
8 must be willful or if not willful, must presently threaten 
9 safety of society. 
10 It can't be said then that Mr. Johnson willfully 
11 violated probation when he's relying on a probable cause 
12 certificate saying that he's to report to the court in lieu of 
13 reporting to AP&P. That was the opinion his counsel gave. I 
14 stand by that legal analysis as good legal analysis and as good 
15 legal advice. Even if the Court were to then say, and the 
16 memorandum of decision, and I think we'll ask the Court to 
17 clear this up, may have revoked the stay and may have actually 
18 ordered Mr. Johnson back on the original terms of probation, I 
19 don't believe it does, but that may be argument for another 
20 day. Even if the Court were to decide that, that order was 
21 issued in January so we can't then say Mr. Johnson should have 
22 known that we were going to change our mind about the probable 
23 cause certificate and impute to him knowledge. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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24 What's relevant is was Mr. Johnson — did he do 
25 anything that willfully violated probation? He did not. One, 
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1 he actually did exactly what the Court told him to do, reported 
2 to the court on the 15th of each month. And two, even if 
3 that ultimately turns out not to have been the right way to 
4 handle it, he was reasonable in relying on that and, therefore, 
5 it can't be said to be a willful violation. 
6 THE COURT: Mr. Baer. 
7 MR. BAER: Just quickly, your Honor. The Court well 
8 knows standard here is lower than beyond a reasonable doubt. 
9 And the State believes its proved its burden of proof to the 
10 level necessary today. There are burdens on this defendant. 
11 Wilfulness, like intent, and I'm sure the Court has seen 
12 hundreds if not thousands of instructions to that effect, are 
13 not always — are not always — you cannot always find them 
14 intentional like I willfully decide not to call the Court, I 
15 willfully. You have to take the circumstances in total and 
16 look at those total circumstances to make that determination of 
17 willfulness or intent. 
18 I think it's very clear from what's gone on here that 
19 this was an intentional act by the defendant not to comply with 
20 his orders of this Court and/or Adult Probation and Parole. 
21 He, in fact, did not do those things in the allegation. The 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 allegation is before this order whether the order is nunc pro 
23 tunc, his intent isn't nunc pro tunc, I mean, either he's 
24 thinking that or he wasn't in real time. So I think the case 
25 has been made that he didn't do what his obligation was. If 
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1 you have to go to the letter of his own order, I'll just 
2 redirect the Court to that order. 
3 Nowhere in there does it say he has to stop reporting 
4 to AP&P. Nowhere in there does it say that he's not under the 
5 obligation of what he and any other probationer would have with 
6 Adult Probation and Parole. And I think the Court — the State 
7 has made its case regarding these particular allegations. 
8 Again, just as we're attending to that first set and we'll 
9 obviously get to the other ones later. 
10 We ask that the Court find him in violation at this 
11 time. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you. Very interesting case. Very 
13 interesting issues. I need to indicate upfront that my initial 
14 impression is that there's plenty of questions about what Mr. 
15 Johnson may have been thinlcing at any given time when we talk 
16 about October 13th. There's a certain amount of known facts 
17 on that day. If we look at November 4th, there are different 
18 facts. In December there's different facts. January, 
19 February, March different facts, but on November 13th we had 
20 had a hearing and at that hearing I granted this motion. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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21 I don't believe I ever ruled from the Bench that his 
22 probation had terminated. I think that's an assumption that he 
23 arrived at either on his own or with the help of counsel, but 
24 having been contacted by probation and being told that he 
25 needed to report, he then made the decision to walk the tight 
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1 rope of not reporting and relying upon his belief that 
2 probation may have been terminated by my oral statements from 
3 the Bench. 
4 In the order that was prepared based on those oral 
5 statements it also does not say that he's relieved from 
6 probation or that his probation is terminated. There was a 
7 question regarding his probation and how long his probation 
8 runs. And often times when faced with the perilous 
9 consequences, people sometimes like to see how close to the 
10 edge they can get. Some people like to stay far away and be 
11 more conservative. 
12 I believe in my mind most conservative approach by 
13 Mr. Johnson would simply have been to make a phone call on the 
14 13th once he received his notice and to say I believe there's 
15 a question as to whether or not probation has jurisdiction over 
16 me or not. I believe the judge just released me from 
17 jurisdiction of probation. If I'm wrong, I'll check with my 
18 attorney, file the appropriate papers for clarification, but 
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19 instead Mr. Johnson decided to go forward with his belief that 
20 his probation had either terminated by act of time and along 
21 the terms of its original creations, or he relied on advice to 
22 believe that his probation may have terminated. 
23 In either event subsequent to the 13th a 
24 determination was made that his probation had not terminated 
25 and it had nothing to do with this particular hearing or the 
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1 release that had been signed by me. It had more to do with the 
2 tolling of the times for his probation. So I'm concerned that 
3 Mr. Johnson relied upon his belief or understanding and thereby 
4 took no action to respond to probation instead of at least 
5 broaching the subject with probation as I believe would have 
6 been reasonable under the circumstances and to say I know you 
7 want me to report, I'm not certain that I need to report, 
8 however, I don't want to be in trouble with you or with the 
9 Court. He didn't choose to go that direction. That may or may 
10 not be the determining factor in my decision, but it is one of 
11 the determining factors. 
12 There's a little more fault to go around because this 
13 whole issue may not have come up but for a motion that was 
14 filed and not responded to and a hearing where nobody appeared 
15 and the Court entered an order that may have created confusion 
16 and that, I think, creates the argument that defense is relying 
17 upon that wouldn't be here but for those circumstances. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 It was interesting in the closing arguments that Mr. 
19 Bennett argued that the Court should not consider evidence of 
20 whether Mr. Johnson reported to the Court by the 15th of each 
21 month under the terms of court probation, but then in his 
22 closing argument he indicated that Mr. Johnson met those terms 
23 and met with the Court on the 15th of each month. And I have 
24 to tell you from the Court's own knowledge, I'll take judicial 
25 notice of the fact, that I have not laid eyes on Mr. Johnson 
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1 since our October meeting. And I do not know that he's 
2 reported on the 15th of each month even under that order. 
3 That's not before the Court. I haven't issued a Sua sponte 
4 order to show cause on those issues. 
5 My point is that I believe both sides are doing a 
6 fair job of trying to present their case. In the end I do find 
7 that Mr. Johnson was under the jurisdiction of probation, Adult 
8 Probation and Parole. He was still controlled by the terms and 
9 conditions of his probation agreement and that he willingly 
10 violated that by not reporting notwithstanding that he was 
11 confused or that he was relying on his own beliefs or the 
12 beliefs that had been given to him by others. 
13 Having said all of that, this is not a probation 
14 violation whose consequences I'm going to determine today. I'm 
15 going to enter the finding that he has violated. My 
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16 anticipation is that we're going to come back for further 
17 discussions about sentence or — I don't know mean sentence, 
1.8 excuse me, sanctioning for these probation violations. We'll 
19 come back on another day and we will pursue other issues 
20 regarding the now outstanding order to show cause. And I've 
21 been told, we've all heard, that there may be yet another that 
22 may be filed. 
23 So I think what's imperative today is I am finding 
24 that there was a violation. I'm going to reserve for a later 
25 date the opportunity to determine what the appropriate sanction 
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1 would be. And we need to set a date for that hearing which 
2 will be a combination of any orders to show cause that are 
3 filed more than 20 days prior to that hearing. So if there is 
4 an order to show cause now that we know about, we're setting 
5 that. We're going to review the sanctions on this one. There 
6 may be another order to show cause filed between now and then, 
7 but I'm not going to allow any additional orders to show cause 
8 to be piled on to that date unless they are filed at least 20 
9 days prior to that date so that counsel has a chance to review 
10 and understand — no, I can't even do that because we have to 
11 do the admit or deny. So at this point nothing else will be 
12 scheduled. We will schedule only the one that has been denied 
13 and the sanctions on this hearing. 
14 If another one comes up, if there's time to process Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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15 through the admit and deny, we can add those to it, but I can't 
16 bypass the admit or deny stage. 
17 MR. BAER: Your Honor, we do have another one here 
18 today because it's based —.as I mentioned before, there are 
19 allegations of violations since his release from federal 
20 custody so we could present those to the Court, enter denials, 
21 we'll hear those at the same time that we hear the March 
22 allegations and that way we have the November done. We just do 
23 the March and today's and there will be no more filed, 
24 particularly if we can get this hearing set fairly 
25 expeditiously. 
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT 
45 
1 THE COURT: Well, at this point if you want to file 
2 something, file it. If Mr. Bennett wants to admit or deny, he 
3 can on behalf of his client, but I'm not going to press him to 
4 make that decision at this moment. 
5 MR. BENNETT: The allegations that he hasn't reported 
6 since he was released on April 20th? 
7 MR. BAER: Yeah. 
8 THE COURT: I'm only responding to what I've heard. 
9 You certainly can review those allegations and in an 
10 appropriate timeframe respond to them, but at this point I'm 
11 just indicating that if we have appropriate pleadings, 
12 admissions and denials, then when we come back, we can hear 
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13 them. And if there's not enough time, we won't hear them so 
14 we'll deal with it when the time comes. 
15 Right now I need to know when our available date is. 
16 We're going to have an evidentiary hearing similar to this one 
17 so I'm assuming it will be done in an hour or less. Is that 
18 fair? 
19 MR. BAER: It should be quicker than today because we 
20 now have the blue print and we knowr where we're headed. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MR. BAER: And I suppose the only thing that would 
23 add a little time to it is if we add the new allegations. The 
24 State would also ask that the Court add what the Court declined 
25 to do. It's sua-sponte request is information as to whether or 
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1 not this individual reported to the Court. If he makes that 
2 representation, let's have that at issue at our next hearing. 
3 THE COURT: And the Court will determine. That's why 
4 they call it Sua sponte. So at this time we have one hearing 
5 with a sanctions attached to it that we're scheduled for. When 
6 is my next available date? 
7 MR. BENNETT: Which is joint with the evidentiary 
8 hearing on the denials that were entered today. 
9 THE COURT: I'm sorry. That's what I meant to say, 
10 yes. 
11 MR. BAER: Can we go the 18th? The 25th I happen Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to be in trial. 
THE CLERK: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: You could do the 17th. What we have on 
May 17th and 18th went off so we've now scheduled for the 
17th a morning calendar in Juab, but I could come here for an 
afternoon calendar. 
THE CLERK: (Inaudible). 
MR. BAER: The afternoon actually works better. I 
have a final pretrial for that trial in the morning and then I 
could come straight from court. 
THE COURT: Well, let me see what Mr. Bennett's 
calendar indicates. 
MR. BENNETT: I'm available May 17th, the 
afternoon, your Honor, but I just remind the Court what I've 
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1 already stated, and maybe the Court is taking this into 
2 consideration, and that is the motions for new trial that would 
3 directly affect the evidentiary hearing on that day. 
4 THE COURT: It would affect all but two of the items. 
5 Would you like to proceed on those two if the decision hasn't 
6 been made on die motions? The other option, Counsel, let me 
7 give counsel another option because you have a desire to wait 
8 until that decision comes out. 
9 MR. BENNETT: Sure. 
12 
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15 
16 
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22 
23 
24 
25 
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THE COURT: As a practical matter you may or may not 
choose to wait for that decision, but clearly I'm not going to 
address issues that are pending in motion in the other court so 
let me ask counsel this. I can simply set a date further out 
giving the Court, that is considering the motion, plenty of 
time. And then if and when a ruling is made on that motion, 
you could contact the Court and we could move it up. 
MR. BAER: No, I think we should address the 
remaining allegation to one and two that are separate and 
distinct from the convictions. However, I would appreciate at 
least the opportunity to brief the Court on that issue if we 
find otherwise. 
THE COURT: I understand that and that would be fine. 
MR. BAER: Okay. 
THE COURT: Let's go with the 17th. I'm coming 
from Juab. I believe we're doing prelims in the morning. 
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1 Let's do it at 2:00 just so I'm sure I can be here. 
2 MR. BENNETT: That's May 17th? 
3 THE COURT: May 17th at 2:00. And just so we're 
4 clear on the record, evidentiary hearing on the order to show 
5 cause that was just recently filed at the end of March and 
6 determination of sanctions on the hearing that we had today. 
7 MR. BAER: Judge, I guess we should probably then 
8 have an admit/deny on the ones that we're filing today, if they 
10 
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25 
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9 don't choose to admit or deny today, right, so we know where 
10 we're headed? 
11 MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, may I approach the Bench 
12 with the new — 
13 THE COURT: Give it to my clerk. That will be fine. 
14 I believe counsel has the right to review those with his client 
15 before he has to submit an admit or deny. I'm not going to put 
16 him on the spot at this moment at the Bench, although I can 
17 indicate a timeframe for him to enter an admit or deny then we 
18 can address those issues. 
19 MR. BAER: Sure. No, I'm suggesting (inaudible.) If 
20 he doesn't respond to the Court with a denial, whatever is 
21 convenient for the Court or sufficient for the defendant, we'll 
22 just add that admit deny. 
23 THE COURT: I'll add it as an admit deny in May. 
24 MR. BAER: If we don't — if he chooses not to do 
25 that in sometime, then (inaudible.) 
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1 THE COURT: That's fine. Then let's put that as the 
2 third item on the calendar. 
3 I'm sorry. Have I confused you completely? Oh, for 
4 purposes of the computer it will be evidentiary/sanctions. 
5 That would be fine. 
6 Mr. Bennett. 
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7 MR. BENNETT: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: On that date if it hasn't occurred prior 
9 to that time, I'm going to ask that your client respond to the 
10 allegations on the affidavit and order to show cause that are 
11 being filed today. 
12 MR. BENNETT: That's what I would anticipate. Your 
13 Honor, I think I know the answer Mr. Johnson's request, and I 
14 don't think it's an unreasonable request, based on this Court's 
15 ruling then it's now Mr. Johnson's understanding that from this 
16 point forward he is to report and abide by the terms of the 
17 Adult Probation and Parole probationary terms, not the probable 
18 cause certificate probationary terms, correct. 
19 THE COURT: That's my understanding? 
20 MR. BENNETT: Okay. 
21 THE COURT: And just to clarify. I understand there 
22 was a question at one time as to whether or not he was under 
23 Adult Probation and Parole jurisdiction because of the running 
24 of time, not addressing the tolling of time, and things of that 
25 nature. I don't know that I have ever intended to give anybody 
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1 an indication other than that at this time he's under Adult 
2 Probation and Parole jurisdiction. 
3 MR. BENNETT: Thank you. 
4 THE COURT: So if there was confusion, I'm taking 
5 this opportunity to clear it up. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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6 MR. BENNETT: There's kind of the parallel question 
7 and that's did the Court's memorandum of decision then overrule 
8 the motion to stay — well, I think we know the answer to that 
9 too, but the motion to stay sentence pending appeal? The 
10 answer to that I'm assuming is no. That's a separate, that's a 
11 separate parallel, similar to parallel matter, right? I 
12 mean — 
13 THE COURT: I would suggest that you read through my 
14 decision because I'm happy to answer the question. I just 
15 don't want to rehash the same material two or three times and 
16 run the risk that it's understood one way one time and another 
17 way another time. The decision really speaks for itself, but 
18 if you're asking me my current recollection of what I ruled on 
19 that date, my recollection is that I have issued a stay on his 
20 jail term and the imposition of the sanction that was issued by 
21 Judge Eyre pending an appeal and outcome, but I have not 
22 terminated his probation. That's my understanding. 
23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And, your Honor, I believe in 
24 our current PV going before the Court we're asking for a 
25 warrant. Perhaps now would be an appropriate time to look at 
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1 whether or not it would be appropriate to issue a warrant and 
2 take Mr. Johnson in custody or if just issue the order to show 
3 cause — 
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4 THE COURT: I'll be glad to address that question. 
5 Is the State requesting a decision on that? 
6 MR. BAER: Yes, I think it's appropriate. 
7 THE COURT: Very well. I now have a commitment from 
8 Mr. Johnson's attorney that they are going to respond to those 
9 allegations that were just filed today by the 17th of 
10 November. He is represented by counsel. I'm not going to 
i 1 authorize a warrant on this order to show cause, but we will 
12 have a response by May 17th. 
13 MR. BAER: Good. 
14 THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, did you have anything 
15 further? 
16 MR. BENNETT: I do, but I don't want to try the 
17 Court's patience. The Court's memorandum of decision indicated 
18 that probation was tolled at least through December 17th. It 
19 intentionally does not address whether it was tolled beyond 
20 that. 
21 THE COURT: Well, and that's because I don't have a 
22 crystal ball and I don't know to what extent other probation 
23 violations may be alleged and what affect they would have. As 
24 was indicated, I think, in my memorandum of decision, that upon 
25 the filing of an order to show cause sim >^lv the filina of the 
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1 order to show cause tolls the probationary period. Now, if you 
2 put that into effect on Mr. Johnson's history from, let's say, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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3 October 13th or even before when Judge Eyre was considering the 
4 one that was filed last spring or last summer, you can count up 
5 the days and you can add those up and see if there was ever a 
6 time period. I don't believe there has been a time period 
7 since Judge Eyre issued his order when there wasn't some level 
8 of tolling that was being considered. 
9 Now, maybe from the time he ordered until the time he 
10 was serving his sanctions in jail, maybe it tolled then. I 
11 don't recall, but there was a tolling when it was filed last 
12 spring and summer. This one we were dealing with was filed at 
13 the end of October and we're just now dealing with it today so 
14 it's arguable that it tolled from the end of October until 
15 today. My decision said at least until December 17th because I 
16 didn't know when this would be resolved, if it would be 
17 resolved, anything else that might be filed and the effect it 
18 might have. 
19 I can't project how many different toliings might 
20 come in on a certain case, but on this case I hope I've 
21 clarified for you that it did not end with the tolling on 
22 December 17th. It was at least until that time. 
23 MR. BENNETT: Right. I understood the at least. So 
24 at the very least the time between the October order to show 
25 cause and this, that amount of time, Mr. Johnson is at least 
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1 responsible to report to AP&P that amount of days starting 
2 today? 
3 THE COURT: If you want to look into the future, and 
4 I'm not going to be held to establishing a deadline — 
5 MR. BENNETT: Yeah. No, no, no. Right. 
6 THE COURT: — or any early date for probation, but I 
7 am going to indicate my understanding, and you can do the math, 
8 that anytime an order to show cause issues until the order to 
9 show cause is resolved, at the very least that period of time 
10 is added on. It's not added on, but the time is tolled during 
11 that period so the necessary effect is that the probationary 
12 period extends out farther and farther. 
13 Now, I won't go through the math. I won't give you a 
14 date and I won't make you feel comfortable that as of June or 
15 July or three years from August, I'm not going to do that, but 
16 you can go through the math and calculate it. And if there is 
17 a question, you can present it and I'll address that question, 
18 but at this point I'm not going to do it today. 
19 Counsel, I appreciate both of you being here and 
20 responding. I need to move on. We do have other matters. 
21 MR. BAER: Can I just ask one quick request with 
22 that. Could the judge issue at least its order just clarify 
23 what we're going to do on that next hearing or would you like 
24 me to prepare one either way just so there's no — 
25 THE COURT: If you would like to prepare one, send it 
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1 over to Mr. Bennett and Mr. Bennett will approve it as to form 
2 or let you know why he doesn't. The other option is my clerk 
3 can prepare a minute entry, but if you want it to be more 
4 specific, you're welcome to prepare the order. 
5 MR. BAER: So we don't have any confusion. And just 
6 so it's clear on the record, I will include that, at least the 
7 State's understanding currently if the Court will consider what 
8 it would not consider Sua sponte today, whether or not there 
9 was compliance then with the defendant's own order. Now, that 
10 will be coming. He may not approve of that as to form, but 
11 that will be one of the things the State is asking the Court to 
12 consider at our next hearing, 
13 THE COURT: You might indicate that you're requesting 
14 it to be considered. 
15 MR. BAER: Exactly. 
16 THE COURT: But I'm not very comfortable having 
17 parties indicate to me what I ought to be doing Sua sponte so. 
18 MR. B AER: That's probably the wrong way to phrase 
19 it. 
20 THE COURT: Thank you. 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, may I ask a clarification 
22 and I do this with ail due respect so I understand and it's on 
23 the record. From this day forward I will contact — I'm to 
24 contact my probation officer, Mr. Staker, and comply with the 
25 probation that was in place. 
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1 Have I understood you correctly? 
2 THE COURT: I will answer it this way. I believe you 
3 had that responsibility since you began that agreement and that 
4 it has not terminated as of today. 
5 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
6 THE COURT: And that it will continue for some future 
7 time. I do not know how long. 
8 THE DEFENDANT: And then I have a further question. 
9 There was a stay. Is the Court today overruling the stay or is 
10 the stay that was ordered still in place? 
11 THE COURT: The stay was not addressing probation. 
12 It was addressing the order of Judge Eyre and that included his 
13 findings and his sentence, whatever that sentence was. It's on 
14 appeal and I've stayed it. 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. 
16 MR. BAER: Thank you, your Honor. 
17 MR. BENNETT: Thank you. 
18 THE COURT: Thank you. 
19 (PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
20 MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.) 
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1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
3 County of Utah ) 
4 I, Colleen C. Southwick, Registered Professional 
5 Reporter for the State of Utah, do certify that the foregoing 
6 transcript was taken down by me stenographically from an 
7 electronic recording and thereafter transcribed; 
8 That the same constitutes a true and correct 
9 transcription of the said proceedings; 
10 That I am not of kin or otherwise associated with any 
11 of the parties herein or their counsel, and that I am not 
12 interested in the events thereof 
13 
14 WITNESS my hand at Provo, Utah, this 4th day of 
15 August, 2011. 
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COUNTY CLERK & EX-OFFICE CLERK 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
MAY 1 6 2011 
MILLARD COUNTY 
CLERK 
/foFoEPUTY 
MARK BAER, Bar No. 5440 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, Bar No. 4666 Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0197 
Facsimile: (801) 366-0268 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 051700056 
Judge James Brady 
A hearing was held on April 27, 2011 in the above cited matter. The defendant, 
defendant's counsel, counsel for the State and the defendant's probation officer were in 
attendance. Based upon testimony received, representations of the parties, and good 
cause appearing, this Court hereby Orders as follows: 
1. Defendant Jamis M. Johnson is found to be in violation of his conditions of 
probation as memorialized in the November 2010 affidavit of defendant's probation 
officer, Troy Staker. The defendant will be sentenced on this finding of violation on May 
17, 2011 at 2pm. 
2. The defendant Jamis M. Johnson further entered denials to allegations 
contained in the March 2011 affidavit of probation officer Troy Staker. The Court will 
hear evidence concerning this affidavit alleging a probation violation on May 17, 2011 at 
2pm. 
3. Adult probation officer Troy Staker filed an additional Probation/Violation 
Report and affidavit on April 27, 2011. The Court will receive defendant's admit or deny 
responses to the allegations in this affidavit on May 17, 201 
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4. Other (per the Court): H/lo^ 
SO ORDERED this j i day of 
i^VS 
,2011 
mes Brady 
istrict Court Judge 
Tate Bennett 
Attorney for defendant Johnson 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
J hereby certify that on this _/4_ day of ¥H(LUL , 2011,1 caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be served by the method indicated below upon the 
following: 
Tate Bennett, Esq. 
P.O Box 272 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
Fax No. (888)743-4102 
MarkBaer 
Office of the Attorney General 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Fax No. (801)366-0268 
fcttj -J^L^A, 
n^P^— 
fry £*, «n& -f~) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum K 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT - FII1L#>RE| % AH 9: 33 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
 A/v^ -
STATE 
JAMIS 
OF 
M. 
UTAH ) 
Plaintiff ) 
VS. ) 
JOHNSON ) 
Defendant. ) 
CASE NO. 051700056 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES BRADY 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT - FILLMORE 
765 S. HIGHWAY 99, SUITE 6 
FILLMORE, UTAH 84631 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING and SENTENCING 
ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED ON 
MAY 1 7 , 2011 
i n - . , R L E D 
w ..-.., Mrf-tLLAJ fc COURTS 
SEP 02 2011 
Reported by: Colleen C. Southwick, RPR/CSR 
ORIGINAL 2375 
^ ~ * l ~ i i V A . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
MARK W. BAER 
Deputy Millard County Attorney 
765 South Highway 99 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
TATE W. BENNETT 
Millard County Public Defenders 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
J 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated, gentlemen. 
3 We're here today on two different items. State of Utah versus 
4 Jamis M. Johnson, Case No. 051700056. Today we are to address 
5 an allegation of probation violation which was denied by 
6 Mr. Dotson and is set for an evidentiary hearing today. Also 
7 today is the sentencing based on an earlier finding of 
8 probation violation. • ' • 
9 Are both parties ready to proceed? 
10 I MR. BAER: State is ready, your Honor. Mark Baer for 
11 the State. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bear. 
13 MR. BENNETT: Tate Bennett for the defense. Your 
14 Honor, may I address the issue of the evidentiary hearing issue 
15 briefly? 
16 THE COURT: You may. 
17 MR. BENNETT: Last time we were here when we 
18 discussed an issue of whether or not it was appropriate for Mr. 
19 Johnson to even enter an admission or denial to.new allegations 
20 I which are allegations that he'd been convicted of a crime in 
21 federal court in violation of a term of his probation, we 
22 indicated to the Court at that time that there was a motion for 
23 new trial, another potentially dispositive motion pending in 
24 that case. 
2 5 The Court indicated at that time that it would be 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 hesitant to hold an evidentiary hearing or make findings 
2 subsequent to an evidentiary ruling if that was, in fact, the 
3 case. So as a preliminary matter that motion to -- motion for 
4 a new trial does exist, it is pending and so is it, in fact, 
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6. j today's hearing? 
7 THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, I'm going to ask you to 
8 remind me your recollection of what it is I said because I 
9 believe that at that time we had allegations. There was a 
10 . question of whether he wanted to admit or deny. 
11 MR. BENNETT: Correct. 
12 THE COURT: You indicated there was a matter -- that 
13 although there was a conviction there were motions pending in 
14 the federal case. I had nothing in front of me at that time 
15 regarding the federal case. I didn't even have, I don't 
16 believe, evidence of the conviction other than verbal 
17 • communications and verbal communications that there were some 
18 matters pending. 
19 Did we not proceed at that point to enter a denial 
2 0 for him? 
21 MR. BENNETT: We did. We did. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 3 MR. BENNETT: And for those reasons, but in the 
24 interim, though, assuming the Court has verified that there is, 
25 in fact, a motion, there are motions pending in the federal Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 court which would then serve -- if I understood the Court's 
2 position correctly would then serve as a precursor, that they 
3 would have to be resolved prior to this evidentiary hearing 
4 which of course they haven't. I may have misread the Court.' 
5 • THE COURT: And "^erha^s I wasn' t V6rv clear in my 
6 J thinking at that time or in my expressions. I would hesitate 
7 to proceed on anything based on verbal representations that 
8 there were either convictions or that there were matters 
9 pending. And today in response to a comment you've just made, 
10 Mr. Bennett, the Court has done nothing to research whether or 
11 not there are any orders or any motions pending in the federal 
12 court. I'm anticipating the parties will fill me in on that 
13 kind of information rather than have me do that research. 
14 MR. BENNETT: Okay. 
15 THE COURT: So I don't have any firsthand knowledge 
16 of anything other than I did receive a document that appears to 
17 have been filed just today and I'm --well, I'm in -- excuse 
18 me. That's not true. There was a document filed just today, 
19 but I don't know that it's pertinent to today's hearing. That 
2 0 was an appeal by Mr. Johnson that he filed pro se. I have a 
21 document that is recorded as of yesterday and in that document 
22 I do have attached to that a verdict form from the federal 
23 district court indicating various findings and indictment and 
24 other documents relating to the federal court. 
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1 with me. I'm not aware of any other information. And when I 
2 say I hesitate to go forward, I don't think it was that I would 
3 hesitate to go forward because in another matter there may be 
4 other proceedings, but I would not want to go forward without 
5 I some evidence of what those were or what their status was. So 
6 [ I am prepared for both sides to go forward today on this 
7 probation violation allegation. 
8 MR. BENNETT: Okay. Then the follow-up question is 
9 does the Court want the parties to actually present evidence, 
10 ! for example, be it testimony or just proffer? 
11 THE COURT: Have you received a copy of the State's 
12 hearing and sentencing memorandum? 
13 MR. BENNETT: I did. It was in my email this 
14 morning. I can see it was sent yesterday. I object to that 
15 actually being --we haven't reviewed it. Obviously I haven't 
16 had time to go over it so I object to the Court actually 
17 considering that in determining because there is two parts to 
18 this hearing the sentencing so I object to the — or at least 
19 need time to be able to prepare and respond to that memorandum. 
20 I THE COURT: Well, let me tell you what I guess I need 
21 more information from you on then, Mr. Bennett. As I look at 
22 this, there's a couple of items that they've attached with 
23 regard to restitution that you dispute, the calculation of the 
24 amounts or the payment or nonpayment, but when it comes to a 
25 document that they've presented to me that comes from --Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 purports to come from the federal district court and it does 
2 have the federal district court stamp on it and it does 
3 reference a trial which I assume your client was present for, 
4 what is there that you would need to prepare for that would 
5 preclude me from simply taking judicial notice of the fact that 
6 I there are (inaudible). 
7 MR. BENNETT: Well, I'm only saying we need some time 
8 to respond to the sentencing. The fact that there's a jury 
9 verdict, I don't need time to respond to that. It speaks for 
10 itself. Am I clear there --
11 THE COURT: You were asking me if I wanted evidence 
12 or proffer and I was going to indicate that we do have some 
13 items that I think could be proffered or I could take judicial 
14 notice of, and that may resolve at least part of what those new 
15 allegations are. Is that correct? 
16- MR. BENNETT: Absolutely. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. So as to that aspect we're not 
18 in -- you don't have a request for additional time to respond? 
19 I MR. BENNETT: No, no, no, no. Absolutely not. That 
20 I verdict form is something or the conviction is something that 
21 Mr. Staker actually provided, although it wasn't a certified 
22 copy. I don't know that it matters, he provided me a copy with 
23 the verdict form at least ten days ago so I have no objection 
24 to that. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 MR. BENNETT: Just the sentencing memorandum itself 
2 which I haven't even had time to review. 
3 THE COURT: And the truth is I don't know that I 
4 asked either side to give me a memorandum for sentencing. I 
5 think that I simply stayed my decision until after this hearing 
6 J was held and it's not -- it's not my custom to take the 
7 evidence and then ask the parties to brief what their 
8 recommendations are for my decision with regard to any type of 
9 sentence. It's really not a sentence. It's a --
10 . MR. BENNETT: Sanction. 
11 THE COURT: -- it's a sanction hearing. And I 
12 typically don't ask for briefs on sanctions, but I allow either 
13 side to make any comment that they think I ought to take into 
14 consideration. 
15 Having addressed these issues, with you, Mr. Bennett, 
16 the Court is ready to proceed with an evidentiary hearing and I 
17 do have some documents which I anticipate, Mr. Bear, you're 
18 going to want the Court to take judicial notice of? 
19 MR. BAER: I will, your Honor, if I could -- just to 
2 0 I back up just a moment. Your first comments were that we were 
21 here on two matters. I think we're here on three matters 
22 actually. There is the sentencing, then there's today's 
23 evidentiary hearing which is on the federal convictions, and 
24 then the third one is an admit deny on the probation violation 
2 5 report that was filed at the last hearing. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. And has Mr. Johnson received a 
2 copy of that report? Is he in a position today that he could 
3 admit or deny? Do you know? 
4 MR. BENNETT: I can just enter a denial on his 
5 behalf, your Honor. 
6 J THE COURT: Okay. 
7 MR. BAER: So that would take care of No. 3. on your 
8 last order so we're down to the last two points. And, yes, 
9 your Honor, then I can address the next point which was we did 
10 bring a certified copy of that verdict, if I may approach, and 
11 we would ask the Court to take judicial notice of that . 
12 certified copy. 
13 THE COURT: Just so we're clear on the record, I've 
14 just received Mr. Bennett's general denial on the admit deny on 
15 the new allegations and we'll set a hearing date for that. Is 
16 that correct? 
17 MR. BENNETT: That's correct. 
18 THE COURT: On the sanctions to be imposed for the 
19 hearing that was held in April, that has not occurred at this 
2 0 | point and we are now proceeding with what will be the 
21 evidentiary portion of the hearing scheduled today on an 
22 evidentiary hearing. 
23 MR. BAER: That's correct, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Very well. 
2 5 MR. BAER: If I might approach, your Honor? 
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1 THE COURT: Please. 
2 MR. BAER: This is a certified copy. The State would 
3 ask that be accepted by the Court as our sole exhibit for the 
4 purposes of the evidentiary hearing for today's allegations, 
5 J the allegations that are being held, substantive hearing on 
6 them --
7 THE COURT: I'll note I just received a certified . 
8 copy of the verdict form from the District Court Central 
9 Division in the federal court here in Salt Lake City 
10 identifying Jamis Melwood Johnson as the defendant and the 
11 United States of America as the plaintiff. Counsel, as I read 
12 through this, it appears that we have 3 8 counts and they appear 
13 to be sequential. So am I to understand then that this is 
14 being presented to show me 38 guilty verdicts with regard to 
15 Mr. Johnson in the federal court case? 
16 MR. BAER: That is correct, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Very well. It will be received for that 
18 ' purpose. 
19 (An exhibit has been received into evidence but not 
2 0 I identified by number and cannot be entered in the 
21 index.) 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, did you have any objections? 
23 I was quick on the draw? 
24 MR. BENNETT: No objections, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Very well. It will be received. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 1 
1 Anything further, Mr. Bear? 
2 MR. BAER: I don't believe so, your Honor, not on 
3 that particular issue unless the Court needs some elucidation. 
4 I know the probation officer monitored that case being his 
5 I probation officer, Mr. Staker, who is present here today can 
6 answer any questions of the Court. I think the allegations 
7 we're addressing from an evidentiary standpoint today regard 
8 those convictions. We've entered certified copies now of those 
9 convictions which speaks directly to that allegation. And 
10 unless the Court needs clarification, I think that evidence 
11 speaks for itself on that issue. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bear. Mr. Bennett, do you 
13 have -- I'm sorry. Do you have any other evidence then? Does 
14 the State rest? 
15 MR. BAER: The State rests on that allegation. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Bennett, do you have any 
17 evidence that you want the Court to consider? 
18 MR. BENNETT:' First -- and, yes, I will address that 
19 I your Honor, but allegation five of the order to show cause for 
20 I which v^ e' re here for an evidentiary hearing states that Mr, 
21 Johnson was convicted of mail fraud on or about June 2 7 of 
22 2007. As the State has just rested and I don't believe any 
23 evidence was offered that substantiates that allegation, I'm 
24 going to ask that the Court dismiss allegation No. 5 from the 
25 order to show cause. I'm referring to Mr. Staker's affidavit. 
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Well, no, allegation five from the order to show cause. 
THE COURT: Give me just a moment. I may have that 
in my earlier files because I'm not finding it here. Thank 
you, counsel. I have it. This is the affidavit of Troy 
Staker, March 22 , 2011, Paragraph 5 having committed or 
having been convicted of the offense of mail fraud on or about 
June 27t , 2007, in violation of condition number 3 of the 
probation agreement. 
Is that what you're referring to? 
• MR. BENNETT: I don't believe -- I'm sorry, your 
Honor. You indicated you're looking at the March 22 
probation violation report, correct? 
THE COURT: That's correct. 
MR. BENNETT: And the order to show cause page 2 
allegation No. 5. 
THE COURT: Is that not what I read? By having 
committed or having been convicted of the offense of mail 
fraud, and then the section on or about June 27 , 2007? 
MR. BENNETT: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Okay, . 
MR. BENNETT: So I motion the Court to dismiss that 
as the State hasn't even attempted to introduce evidence that 
substantiates that allegation. 
THE COURT: Any response? 
MR. BAER: Yes, your Honor. If you take a look at 
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1 the copy of the -- now, the certified copy of the guilty 
2 verdict form what's attached to it starting at page 11, you'll 
3 see it corresponds to the Count 5, 6, 7, 8, all that is mail 
4 fraud. With respect to having committed, No. 5 here says mail 
5 fraud 18 USCA, 1341, and that's what those counts were 
6 referring to in that document. 
7 THE COURT: Beginning on page 11? 
8 MR. BAER: Yeah, I mean, actually if 'y°u look at 
9 page 9, it says Counts 1 through 10 are mail fraud, and then it 
10 spells out each one and names this particular defendant in 
11 those --in each one of those federal Counts 5, 6, 7, 8,9, and 
12 10 so it's all mail fraud. 
13 MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, so that this makes sense, 
14 Mr. Johnson was sentenced and placed on probation in this Court 
15 in -- kind of just off the top of my head -- June of 2007. 
16 THE COURT: Right? 
17 MR. BENNETT: Count 1 indicates the date of the 
18 occurrence would be March of 2 006. Count 2, April 2 006. Count 
19 3, April 2006. It's true of every count with the exception of 
20 Count 10. Indicates it's June 22 n d, 2007. 
21 , . THE COURT: That doesn't happen often. Excuse me, 
22 folks. 
2 3 Mr. Bennett, I see the dates you're referring to 
24 ending with June 22nd of '07 before I interrupted you. 
2 5 MR. BENNETT: Okay. So all actions there that 
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1 occurred prior to Mr. Johnson being placed on probation can't 
2 serve as the basis for a probation violation. I understand 
3 that doesn't resolve Count 10, 22 --,.— • 
4 THE COURT: Let me make it easy for you. 
5 MR. BENNETT: — 10 or 22. Yeah, please. 
6 THE COURT: No, I'm sorry. Go ahead. I shouldn't 
7 cut you off. . 
8 MR. BENNETT: However, we brought today, your Honor, 
9 a copy of the minute entry which was just actually obtained. 
10 If you recall, I indicated I assumed the Court was going to do 
11 it whereas in state court we use court exchange. There's the 
12 Pacer system for the federal court. The minute entry indicates 
13 clearly that both Counts 10 and 22, among others, but only 
14 dealing with 10 and 22, were dismissed. So actions occurring 
15 prior to violation can't be deemed as the basis for a probation 
16 violation nor can counts that were dismissed. He wasn't 
17 convicted of them. They were dismissed. 
18 ' The only two counts that even fit chronologically 
19 I within the terms of his probation were 10 and 22 and the minute 
20 ! entry that I'll present to the Court indicates that those were 
21 dismissed. 
22 MR. BAER: Judge, I'd object to the entry of that 
23 document in this hearing. It's not certified. We don't know 
24 where it came from. We don't have any notice of that, but I 
25 can address it in a different way that may make it easier for 
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1 the Court, that the Court could look at that, but I don't think 
2 it's -- and I'll object also on a relevancy basis and let me 
3 tell you why. Because counsel brings up the point about the 
4 timing of the convictions, but.he's going-off of the wrong date 
5 I because he's going off of the conviction date in this case 
6 which happened in 2 007. 
7 However, this case was filed in 2005 for allegations 
8 of activities that happened back before 2005, so what's going 
9 on here is that after the filing of the criminal Information in 
10 this case, and at least some of the counts occurred during the 
11 time period between when this case was filed and this case was 
12 continued and some of them continued on past the date of 
13 conviction in this case. So beyond the fact that we'd object 
14 to the introduction of that document, we don't know the source 
15 of it, we don't know the contents of it, it's not certified, we 
16 maintain that the criminal activity occurred subsequent to the 
17 filing of the criminal case in .this case and some of the 
18 convictions occurred -- some of the criminal activity occurred 
19 I clearly after the convictions were entered in this case, some 
20 of the criminal activity in the federal case, and I think it's 
21 a distinction without a difference, the Court could find on one 
22 or two as easily as it could find on six. The criminal 
23 activities continued past both the filing and the conviction in 
24 our case and that's the sui generis of our allegation here 
2 5 today. 
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1 THE COURT: Mr. Baer, let me ask you a question 
2 directly if I can? 
3 MR. BAER: Sure. 
4 THE COURT: Take this away from our current set of 
5 I facts because of the involvement that everybody has with their 
6 own case, but just in generic sense, an individual commits a 
7 crime. He has a two-year delay before he goes to trial and 
8 then at trial he's convicted and he is sentenced and he's 
9 placed on probation. Subsequent to being placed on probation 
10 the Court finds out that he has committed other crimes in the 
11 interim. . 
12 Are those considered probation violations if the 
13 person is not on probation at the time of their commission 
14 regardless of when he gets convicted? Isn't the probation 
15 violation something where the probation has to be in existence, 
16 right in place before the actions take place? 
17 MR. BAER: Correct, your Honor, and that would go to 
18 the second point. We don't know the general context of that 
19 particular document that was just handed to us, but clearly 
2 0 I some of the convictions happened for acts after the convictions 
21 of the -- the federal convictions happened far after 
22 convictions that were entered in this state case. So the 
23 distinction that you're making is a good one, but at the end of 
.24 the day one or two or ten, a violation is a violation, and I'd 
25 ask that you find a violation based upon those. 
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1 If we can -- it may warrant if the Court is not 
2 anxious -- I understand why the Court may not be anxious to 
3 enter violations on those earlier ones, if we just give leave, 
4 if the Court feels if necessary for us to check those dates and 
5 I cross check them to make sure we have --to make sure that the 
6 numbers in this document just handed to us are consistent with 
7 the numbers in the federal indictment and cross check with the 
8 dates of occurrence, we'd be able to respond, I guess, a little 
9 bit more accurately, but the bottom line is at least a couple 
10 I of them have occurred clearly outside that critical timeframe. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. Let me do this just so we're clear 
12 on the record. The State has rested its case. There's a 
13 motion to dismiss at least as to No. 5 and I'm going to deny 
14 that motion because I believe there is evidence indicating at 
15 least one, if not more, possible counts that would apply. 
16 However, I think there are arguments to to be made. And my 
17 concern is we're slipping into arguments on the motion to 
18 I dismiss which more appropriately ought to be placed on whether 
19 or not there's a violation. And I don't want to preclude the 
20 argument that I anticipate State will make on other violations. 
21 Counsel, I think that you've made a good argument as 
22 to items that are alleged to have occurred prior to being 
23 placed on probation, and you can elucidate me further at the 
24 end of your presentation of evidence if you intend to, but if 
25 you don't intend to present evidence, we can go into those 
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1 arguments now. 
2 MR. BENNETT: No, we do. That was just the evidence 
3 as it related to just allegation five. That wasn't meant 
4 obviously to address any of the other allegations. 
5 THE COURT: And what I do note is that in my file 
6 sentencing took place on June 6 , 2007. That being the 
7 case, I would be very hesitant to find any actions taken by the 
8 defendant prior to June 6 to be violations of probation, 
9 but he was placed on probation on June 6 . In response to 
10 J your motion I see that Count 10 does occur after June 6th and, 
11 therefore, I'm going to deny your motion, but I'll allow you to 
12 argue further at a later time. 
13 Do you have other motions or would you like to 
14 continue? 
15 MR. BENNETT: Well, you say it's -- you're looking at 
16 Count 10? 
17 THE COURT: Yes. Excuse me, Count.10 of the. 
18 exhibit -- Count 10 on page 12 of the exhibit that was 
19 presented to me by the State. 
2 0 • MR. BENNETT: Oka'17. 
21 THE COURT: If you look at page 9 --
22 MR. BENNETT: Yes. Yes. 
23 THE COURT: -- page 9 indicates these are mail fraud. 
24 MR. BENNETT: My apologies. 
2 5 THE COURT: You turn through each page then, has dates 
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1 of events. All of these up through nine predate his conviction 
2 here and his sentencing here, excuse me, predate his sentencing 
3 here. Count 10 comes at least several weeks after he was 
4 placed on probation.. 
5 I MR. BENNETT: I understand. 
6 • ... MR. BAER: And that would include No. 22 as well. 
7 THE COURT: And as I said, there is at least a basis 
8 for me to deny the motion on No. 10 alone and you can argue the 
9 rest when we complete evidence. 
10 J MR. BENNETT: Which then brings me to the exhibit 
11 I that I move to introduce. 
12 ' THE COURT: I'll be glad to consider the exhibit. 
13 MR. BAER: If the Court could just note the State's 
14 objections at this point. 
15 I THE COURT: I note the State has made its objection 
16 at this point. I'd like to see the exhibit so I understand the 
17 objections better. Thank you. . 
18 I've been handed Defendant's Exhibit 2 which appears 
19 to be a printout from the Pacer Service Center. Give me just a 
1 r\ ! rrv—mom +- ar^ T r* a n -v-oar^ f-'hmr.rr'h t~ "h i a 
21 If I understand the objection correctly, Mr. Baer, if 
22 I misstate this, you correct me, you're indicating it's not a 
23 certified court document. You don't have foundation and you're 
24 concerned about the source and accuracy of the information. Is 
25 t h a t c o r r e c t ? 
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MR. BAER: That's correct, your Honor. And without 
proper time to cross reference the content, the substantive 
content of that. There are a lot of numbers being bantered 
around. The only certified copy of anything here is the 
verdict, the federal verdict which has the numbers clearly 
delineated on it that the State is relying upon. 
THE COURT: I don't know if either of you can 
enlighten me on this. I do have a concern. We are relying 
more and more on computerized printouts. The Courts are 
encouraging people to file and utilize computer systems. We 
now have a Pacer service that is nationwide for federal courts 
and some of the state courts and I'm handed a document which is 
very similar to being handed a copy of a docket, a minute entry 
out of some file. My concern is in part it doesn't have the 
type of certification that I would like to see it have, but the 
thing that really concerns me is if I followed this document, 
it's a direct contradiction of the other document that I'm 
looking at unless either of you can help me understand how 
these two are not inconsistent. 
I have the verdict which shows Counts 1 throuoh 3 8 
being found guilty, but I'm told that even before --. if I look 
at Defendant's Exhibit No. 2, I'm told that even before the 
closing arguments and before it was given to the jury, a number 
of these were dismissed. So I'm trying to understand why it 
would be given to me -- I mean, how it could have occurred and 
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1 how I can try to understand these two interplay. 
2 MR. BENNETT: I don't know the answer, your Honor, so 
3 I can just surmise here, but as this Court is well aware, often 
4 times an Information filed at the state court will begin with 
5 I Counts 1 through 5. Via motions to suppress or some other 
6 reason prior to trial the counts will be dismissed. They don't 
7 then refer to the counts at trial as Counts 1, 2 and 5 if 3 and 
8 4 were dismissed. They renumber them Counts 1, 2, and 3. I 
9 don't know that's what happened, but that seems to be the 
10 reasonable response. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Baer, would you like to be heard on 
12 my question? 
13 MR. BAER:. I wouldn't want to speculate at this 
14 point, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you. As I look at this, Counsel, I 
16 considered that same question, but I have in addition to the 
17 verdict form, I have the indictment. Maybe I better check the 
18 date and see if this is an amended indictment without saying 
19 I it's amended. The indictment I'm looking at has 3 8 counts. It 
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21 that's when it was assigned to Judge Benson. The stamp date I 
22 really can't read on it, March 16 of something. I guess 
23 that will remain a mystery to me for now. I'm going to allow 
24 this in. 
25 MR. BAER: All right, your Honor. I will make one 
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point on this particular document. I think the Court, as the 
Court is well aware on an order to show cause, it's a noticed 
Information and defendant is on notice. The Court -- we are 
not talking about an indictment situation where a date is off 
by a day or off by a month or even off by six months or a year. 
The Court can find of its own, and I think probably I'm wafting 
into the argument for later on, but certainly the Court can 
find of its own volition that this individual -- I mean, you 
would have to suspend all consideration and conclude that this 
defendant here sitting before you, in fact, has not been 
convicted of any federal crimes even Sua sponte much less the 
fact he's been put on notice that the State believes and Adult 
Probation and Parole believes that there's a violation of the 
conditions of his probation for his federal convictions. 
The fact that it may be off by a day or month or even 
a few months we believe is diminimus and it does not speak to 
the sui generis or the gravamen of the offense. 
MR. BENNETT: If you look at the verdict form, 
actually I think it is answered here. Just as I glance at it, 
it 3.0Dears as thouoh the verdict form returns guilty verdicts 
in 1 through 38, but as you look closer, there is no Count 10 
nor is there a 22. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
- MR. BENNETT: So I think that answers that. 
THE COURT: They aren't sequential then as I assumed 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
earlier 
There is 
they would be. 
! no ten. 
MR. BENNETT 
THE COURT: 
There is no three. There is no eight. 
Correct. 
There is no 17, no 20, no 22. Thank you. 
Anything further, Mr. Baer? 
MR. BENNETT: 
to allegations three, 
your Honor, the State 
THE COURT: 
1 sworn in. 
you are 
We do. I think we now have to 
four and six. So in order to do 
{sic} calls Jamis Johnson to the 
Mr. Johnson, please come forward 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON 
Called by the Defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: 
about to give 
respond 
that, 
stand. 
and be 
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony . 
in this matter will be the truth, 
whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God! 
Q 
correct? 
A 
Q 
THE WITNESS: 
M"D TD T7VTNTI?TT . 
Mr. Johnson, 
' 
I believe I 
Yes. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
you're aware of why you're here 
am. 
the 
> 
today, 
You're aware of the allegations three, four and six 
in the State's order to show cause, correct? 
r*r\Trnm n n r i T i T r i T r r i n T\/-N.Tm\/n-TNTrn 
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1 A I read the order to show cause. I'm not sure 
2 specifically which they are, but I'm --
3 Q Well, even generally then. What is it you've been --
4 I want to make sure that we're clear that you understand what 
5 I it is -- because I want to limit our question and response here 
6 to just the allegations that are left remaining. 
7 So can you tell us the substance of allegations 3, 4, 
8 and 6 even in general terms? 
9 A I can't from memory. 
10 Q Do you recall where you were on March 18 , 2 011, 
11 Jamis? Jamis, is there a federal case pending --
12 A Yeah, because I was in trial. 
13 Q Okay. Okay. And you are aware of the allegations of 
14 the State that you've been convicted of federal crimes, 
15 correct? 
16 A Oh,: okay. Yes, yes. 
17 Q Okay. Now, the State has presented to the Court a 
18 copy of a verdict form. Are you denying that you were 
19 I convicted on March 18tx\ 2011 --• 
2 0 ! A No. 
21 Q --of federal crimes? 
22 A No. 
23 Q After a conviction on that date, where did you go? 
24 Where were you housed? 
25 A Well, I was released -- well, I went back to the 
r i A T T n m n n n m T r i T ' n ' n T~\/""\/^",IT TA/rT?T«.TTi 
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1 Davis County Jail that evening. 
2 Q Why were you in the Davis County Jail? Do you 
3 remember? 
4 A Well, I have to back up. On December 7 I was 
5 I detained as a flight risk on a motion by the U.S. Attorney and 
6 1 was sent to jail. 
7 Q That was prior to your federal trial? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q Okay. You said you wanted to back up. Was there 
10 J anything else you wanted to state prior to -- because I just 
11 want to fast forward to the date of the conviction and what's 
12 happened since the entry of conviction. 
13 A Okay. Well, no, that's why I was detained 
14 December 7 of -- or December 8 , I'm sorry. 
15 | Q Okay. So you were detained prior to trial because 
16 you were deemed a flight risk, correct? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q Then you were convicted on March lBt , 2011, of 
19 various federal crimes, correct? 
21 Q Are you still in custody, federal custody? 
22 I A No, in -- a motion was made -- well, there was some 
23 | posttrial motions made. There was a -- on March 15 , excuse 
24 I me, on April 15 a motion for new trial was made. 
25 Q Okay. And who made that motion, Jamis? 
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• 1 A It was filed by Rob Hunt. 
2 Q And Mr. Hunt is? 
3 A Mr. Hunt was my former federal prosecutor. 
4 Q He was your federal prosecutor? 
5 I A I mean, my federal defender. 
6 Q Okay. 
7 A Former federal defender. There was also a motion for 
8 to release me from detention based on, I guess, prosecutorial 
9 misconduct and that I was not actually a flight risk and that 
10 the original findings were incorrect. 
11 Q Were findings or orders made pursuant to your motion? 
12 A Yeah, we had a hearing on April 20t . Judge 
13 Waddups --
14 MR. BAER: Judge, I'm going to object to this on both 
15 hearsay grounds and relevance grounds. 
16 MR. BENNETT: We're in an evidentiary hearing 
17 probation violation. The Rules of Evidence are clearly lax in 
18 these types of hearings. He's not -- I don't know what the 
19 hearsay would be. He's saying these motions were filed. I 
20 I asked if --
21 THE COURT: Well, asked whether they are filed, I 
22 don't think that's a hearsay question, but I believe he was 
23 just telling us what Judge Waddups was saying at a hearing. 
24 MR. BENNETT: Well, if he was, I apologize. 
25 BY MR. BENNETT: 
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1 Q The question is were there findings and order made 
2 pursuant to your motion? 
3 THE COURT: And that's either a yes or no. 
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, there were. 
5 | BY MR. BENNETT: 
6 Q And what was that order? 
7 MR. BAER: I'm going to object. I know that lax 
8 Rules of Evidence apply here, but Best Evidence Rule is if 
9 we've got an order, we should at least look at the order, not 
10 Mr. Johnson's --
11 THE COURT: Or least a minute entry of it. 
12 THE WITNESS: I have the minute entry and the 
13 transcript of that hearing. 
14 THE COURT: Counsel, spend a moment with your client 
15 and see what documents he might have and then if he does have 
16 documents, show it to Mr. Baer before it's discussed further. 
17 (Counsel conferred with his client.) 
18 (Counsel is not speaking directly into a microphone 
19 and is difficult to understand.) 
2 0 MR.. BENNETT: Your Honor, I presented Mr, Baer, and 
21 Mr. Johnson has actually brought an entire transcript from 
22 (inaudible) or certified copy of order or findings and . 
23 conclusions. That's not what we have available. We have an 
24 actual transcript of the April 20 motion hearing 
25 (inaudible). 
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1 THE COURT: Mr. Baer. 
2 MR. BAER: IIm sorry? 
3 THE COURT: He's just presented a document'to be 
4 marked and he's asking that it be admitted into evidence. I'm 
5 I just wondering your response, if any. Any objection? 
6 MR. BAER: Well, it's the same objection as before. 
7 It's not certified. We haven't had a chance to look at it and 
8 it's a relevance objection. If the Court wishes to take a few 
9 moments to review through that and wants to point out what's 
10 relevant, I think the relevancy objection goes to this very 
11 simple detail which I've alluded to before that this defendant 
12 can make his arguments as much as he wishes. 
13 He stands convicted of federal crimes including 
14 aiding and a betting and conspiracy which covers all of the 
15 dates and that's what's in the allegations, all of the dates. 
16 And the Court is now on notice that he is, in fact, convicted 
17 of those* 
18 This may be better for argument from counsel that in 
19 some ways he believes this Court should not take that into 
20 I consideration, that's one thing, and he certainly has a right 
21 to present his evidence, but we believe the Court can cut to 
22 the chase by noting those violations and the fact that they 
23 either are violations or they aren't. And if he wants to make 
24 an argument about why they should not be considered, that's 
25 different. 
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MR. BENNETT: That argument, though, hinges of 
evidence which is, as the Court indicated, not before the 
Court. So prior to me even making argument when I'm going to 
reference evidence, the Court has indicated it needs evidence 
before it. We don't have certified copies. 
THE COURT: Tell me, if I can understand, just very 
succinctly, Mr. Bennett, I'm assuming in this document you want 
to present to me is something indicating the status of the 
federal court on the motions that were made and that you want 
to utilize that status as a basis for some type of argument. 
Is that a fair statement? 
MR. BENNETT: That is exactly correct, your Honor, 
(inaudible) motion to dismiss has been filed, that the kind of 
ancillary motions, his motion for his own release which 
obviously was granted because he's here, but there's also 
evidence of that. So the Court is correct I want to just 
specify of the two or three things. One, is that a motion to 
dismiss actually has been filed in court. 
MR. BAER: For a new trial. 
MP.. BENNETT: And evidence of that is referenced and 
noted in the transcript. Also, his motion for his release and 
motion for appointment of a new public defender, I believe 
those are (inaudible,) but those would be the three pieces of 
evidence which I'll need to allude to make the argument that 
everyone - -
r O T T P T rT7PTTT?TT7n nnPTTMT7-KTT 
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1 THE COURT: And I understand from his testimony that 
2 those motions were made. It may also be --
3 MR. BENNETT: They were objected to as hearsay and 
4 the Court, I believe, was going to sustain those'so. 
5 | THE COURT: Not that the motion was made. I 
6 understand. I've allowed him to testify as to the motions that 
7 were made. I have not allowed testimony as to rulings by 
8 judges. My question is are these transcripts -- is this 
9 transcript going to contain a ruling by the judge or is it 
10 simply indicating that motions were made? 
11 MR. BENNETT: Well, with respect to the motion to 
12 dismiss or, excuse me, the motion for a new trial, merely 
13 reference that it has been made, that it has been filed. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. BENNETT: With respect to the motion for release 
16 pending hearing on the motion for new trial, that it was 
17 granted. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. • •• 
19 I MR. BENNETT: And with respect to motion for 
2 0 I appointment of a new public defender, that it was granted. So 
21 I think there's a --
22 THE COURT: May I confer with counsel for a moment? 
23 I feel like I'm losing control of everything. 
24 Counsel, what you want me to understand from this 
25 that you consider relevant then is that there's a motion for a 
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1 new trial, whether he has a new attorney or not, whether he's 
2 in custody or out. The relevant issue is they are alleging a 
3 conviction. He's alleging he wants a new trial. And as I 
4 understand it, the district court has not yet ruled on that. 
5 I Is there more to this for relevancy purposes than I 
6 understand? 
7 MR. BENNETT: It speaks to, and if we need to be a 
8 little bit more formal about it, then we can withdraw Mr. 
9 Johnson after he finishes this testimony, but it speaks to the 
10 sanction that will sort of be the second part of this hearing. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 MR. BENNETT: But if we want to take evidence from 
13 Mr. Johnson on two separate occasions so that we're clear, then 
14 that's fine. 
15 THE COURT: Counsel, I'm going to have my abilities 
16 to sort through this. Mr. Baer, I hope you'll have patience 
17 and understanding,, but I'm going to overrule the objection. 
18 I'm going to admit the transcript. I'm going to accept 
19 counsel's brief recitation as to what the rulings are as being 
20 indicative of what that transcript will say, but I'll note for 
21 the record I haven't read it and I probably will-- at least 
22 I'll read the ruling portion of it before I make a decision. 
23 Go ahead, Counsel. 
24 BY MR. BENNETT: 
2 5 Q So Jamis, then what was the -- what was the finding 
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT 
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and order with respect to the motion for release and motion for 
new public defender? 
A Well --
MR. BAER: I'll make it easy, not that it's my job to. 
make the defendant's job easier,' but (inaudible) and the Court, 
we'll stipulate he's been released. He's here. We'll 
stipulate he has a new counsel. He has new counsel and I don't 
believe that that's particularly relevant to this -- I mean, 
it's relevant probably to Mr. Bennett's argument, but we have 
stipulated (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. BENNETT: If it was then stipulated to and that 
becomes evidence, then the following question is: 
BY MR. BENNETT: 
Q Jamis, it's just been stipulated that, in fact, those 
motions were granted. You're out --
MR. BAER: Well, no,.no, the motions were made and 
that he's out --
(Counsel were talking on top of one another and could 
BY MR. BENNETT: . 
Q So Jamis, are you still required -- are you under 
some sort of restrictions in this federal jurisdiction or the 
purview of the federal court? Are you still under some 
obligation? 
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1 A Yes, when I was released, I was released into custody 
2 of a federal pretrial officer and I brought a letter from him. 
3 I report daily and I am at my son's home. I was released on 
4 the evening of April 20 and that's where I am. There are 
5 I some things I think I need to correct. 
6 THE COURT: Mr. Jamis, I am not going to have you be 
7 attorney from the chair. You're here as a witness today. I 
8 understand you're a party. I'll give you any break you want as 
9 far as time to consult with your attorney. 
10 J THE WITNESS: Okay. 
11 THE COURT: But I am not going to have him direct the 
12 case from the table and have you direct your case from the 
13 chair. That won't happen. 
14 MR. BENNETT: If I may approach, I'm afraid he's 
15 going to say that I've misrepresented the --
16 THE COURT: . If you two want to take a brief recess 
17 and talk, you're welcome to, but when you come back, Counsel, I 
18 I want to address you and I want him to answer questions. 
19 MR. BENNETT: Understood, your Honor. 
. l i U C V J U U i . 1 1 1 C >.<=; a. J_ _L v xz. u u u u u c 
21 recess . 
22 (Recess taken by the Court.) 
23 THE COURT: Counsel, during the break I had an 
24 opportunity to scan through what's been marked as Defendant's 
25 Exhibit No. 3. This is the transcript. By no means have I 
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1 made a thorough read of this document. It would have taken 
2 quite a bit of time, but trying to skip through and find items 
3 that are pertinent and relevant to the case, it's clear to me 
4 why it is the Court's don't accept matters that are not 
5 relevant to the issues before them. 
6 It makes for fascinating reading, but it also 
7 clutters the mind with a lot of information and circumstances 
8 that really are not relevant to the questions that I need to 
9 answer. What I'm going to do, I've already admitted this over 
10 J the objection of counsel, but I'm going to indicate to both • 
11 counsel that rather than read through Exhibit 3 to understand 
12 its purpose, I'm going to accept the representations that have 
13 been made that there's a motion pending for a new trial, that 
14 there is a motion and request for a new public defender and • 
15 that there was a request for release. And the last two of 
16 those were approved and that the first one has not been 
17 approved. And that's as far as my inquiry into this document 
18 I is going to go. Otherwise, I'm concerned that I'm going to be 
19 influenced or tainted by irrelevancies. 
2Q ! MR. BENNETT: And that's the onl^ evidence we're 
21 attempting to --
22 THE COURT: Thank you. Are we ready to proceed? 
23 MR. BENNETT: We are, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, go ahead. 
25 MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, now that that's been . 
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1 cleared up, I just want to indicate to the Court that the 
. 2 following questions are now geared to -- not the response to 
3 the allegations i.e., the evidentiary h e a r i n g / b u t rather speak 
4 to sanctions or the second part of this hearing. 
5 I THE COURT: Okay. 
6 BY MR. BENNETT: 
7 Q So, Mr. Johnson, backing up August 30th, 2010, you're 
.8 convicted or, excuse me, you're found in violation of a term of 
9 your probation. At that time what transpired? 
10 A Judge revoked my probation and reinstated 36 months 
11 of probation and sent me to jail for 60 days. 
12 Q Did you serve those 60 days? 
13 A Yeah, it was put off for a week approximately and I 
14 entered on the - - o r started serving this new probation term on 
15 j the 7th of September. 
16 Q Okay. Why did you not complete the entire 60 days? 
17 A I made a motion for -- I filed an appeal of this new 
18 36-month probation and made a motion also for a probable cause 
19 application, for probable cause certificate and a motion to 
2 0 stay the remainder of the sentence I was serving pending my 
21 appeal. 
22 Q And what's your understanding or what was your 
23 understanding at the time of the outcome of those motions? 
I fch 
24 A Well, the day that it was October 13 x we argued it 
25 and originally from the Bench it was granted and my 
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understanding was that the --in the motions the old stay had 
been -- the old probation had been revoked and I was serving a 
new sentence and I didn't believe that I was serving the 
parallel -- that they were both running parallel and then I was 
released and I went home that evening. 
Q Okay. Did you report -- well, we know you didn't 
report to probation because that's what -- in our prior 
evidentiary hearing in this Court you were found in violation 
for a term of your probation for failing to report to 
probati on, but now, and maybe it's been answered, but why 
didn't you report on that day for probation? 
A Well, the next morning I got the call from Mr. Staker 
saying I was to report and as you know, I called you and we 
discussed it. I thought that I was operating under a new 
sentence and that it had been stayed, and I thought the old 
sentence had been revoked and then we discussed it and you 
advised me that I didn't want to acquiesce, or waive that stay 
and that I shouldn't -- I shouldn't proceed to communicate 
further. 
Q In any of those motions for stays or motions for 
stays pending appeal and the application for certificate of 
probable cause did you ask for any specific remedy from the 
Court? 
. MR. BAER: Objection at this point, your Honor. This 
has been going on for a long time, but I think we are talking 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 about things that we had already resolved at your last hearing. 
2 This is what we're talking about the stay pending. And also 
3 what Mr. Johnson knows or thinks or believes is not relevant 
4 for purposes of the court determination of whether he has 
5 violated what we're here to do. I know he's speaking to the 
6 sentencing issue, but still it certainly isn't relevant to the 
7 violations that we're asking the Court to find here today nor 
8 -- and in addition, rather, it has been discussed and reviewed 
9 at the last hearing. 
10 MR. BENNETT: Of course Mr. Baer is correct. It 
11 isn't relevant to the State's request that he be found in 
12 violation. It's not supposed to be. It just speaks to 
13 sanctions. The Court at the prior evidentiary hearing found 
14 that Mr. Johnson's violation was willful. Notwithstanding that 
15 we're not trying to argue with the Court about that, but there 
16 are varying degrees of willfulness when we talk about a 
17 violation. It's not.well it was willful and, therefore, it was 
18 (inaudible). For this Court to impose an appropriate sanction 
19 the Court needs to consider what goes on in the mind of a 
20 probationer when they violate. 
21 How willful is it? Is it a blatant thumb of the nose 
22 to the Court or is it he was legally erroneous, but was he 
23 acting reasonably in acting the way he did. Those merit very 
24 separate sanctions from the Court. So it is relevant in 
2 5 understanding what was Mr. Johnson's mindset so the Court can 
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1 then impose an appropriate sanction based on the level of 
2 willfulness of the violation. 
3 THE COURT: I appreciate the objection. I'm going to 
4 overrule it. Continue, Mr. Bennett. 
5 I BY MR. BENNETT: 
6 J Q So Mr. Johnson, did you ask for any specific remedy 
7 in those motions that we've just read? •' 
8 A I did. I asked for the stay. I asked also to be put 
9 on court probation. And I decided that the prior sentence had 
10 J been revoked and I asked that the current sentence, while we 
11 explore this, that it be stayed. So those are the two 
12 primary -- and I also asked --
13 Q With respect to probation, did you ask for any 
14 specific remedy? 
15 I A well, that it be stayed and that I be put on court 
16 probation. 
17 Q Okay. And, again, your understanding.of the outcome 
18 I of those motions was what? 
19 A Well, I thought that it was stayed and that I would 
2 0 I have to report to the Court and that I also woulu. have to 
21 comply. 
22 Q Let me stop you there. Did you ever report to the 
23 Court?. 
24 A Yes, in -- in -- in -- well, in mid-October we spoke 
25 and you first --
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1 Q Mr. Johnson, did you ever report to the Courts? 
2 A Well, yes, pursuant to that I wrote a letter --
3 THE COURT: I'm sorry, Counsel. I appreciate your 
4 not objecting. I want him to answer yes or no questions with 
5 I yes or no. If you're going to follow up. on it, then ask him a 
6 follow-up question. I do not want him to be utilizing a single 
7 question as the launching pad for a general discussion. 
8 BY MR. BENNETT: 
9 Q Mr. Johnson, did you ever report to the Court? 
10 J A Yes. 
11 Q When and how? 
12 A It was -- I think it was in, like, late October, 
13 early November I wrote a letter. I wasn't sure how to report, 
14 but I wrote a.letter that conveyed the --there was a motion --
15 | there was an order that was signed by the Court that was sent 
16 in, that was prepared and sent in. I prepared it. And on 
17 November, I think, 4th the-Court signed it. The cover letter, 
18 I believe it was that cover letter. I also indicated in that 
19 letter at the end of the letter that I'm trying to be in 
2 0 compliance and I indicated to the court that I was reportincr 
21. and I wasn't sure beyond that what I should do but. 
22 Q When did you say that letter was sent to the Court? 
23 A I believe it went with the order that was signed 
24 November 4 . And I can't recall the date specifically, but 
2 5 it would have been --it was intended to be for November. 
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1 Q And did you report to the Court in December? 
2 A No, I was detained in December. 
3 Q Okay. And that detention was because of the federal 
4 case, correct? 
5 I A Yes, I was gone. 
6 Q Following -- and we started\this a little bit. And, 
7 your Honor, just so the Court is aware this is, again, 
8 attempting to speak to Mr. Johnson's degree of willfulness of 
9 that October 2 0 t h violation. . 
10 You indicated previously, Mr. Johnson, that you are 
11 subject to certain requirements or conditions in your federal 
12 release. Is that correct? ";. 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q And what are those conditions? 
15 | A Well, I have a letter that outlines them, but I 
16 report daily and I am to -- I have a curfew, ten in the evening 
17 to six in the morning, and then I'm not to leave Salt Lake 
18 County without prior permission. 
19 ] Q Well, and I'm assuming there's a list of others, but 
20 ! I think we get the point. Are you in compliance with the terms 
21 of your federal release? 
22 A Yes, I'm in compliance. 
2 3 (Counsel is again not speaking in the microphone.) 
24 MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, and I've showed this to Mr. 
25 Baer, I move for admission of the letter of Mr. Johnson's -- I 
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1 don't know if the term is federal probation officer, but the 
2 person with whom he reports pursuant to (inaudible)? 
3 THE COURT: Mr. Baer. 
4 MR. BAER: Same objection as before, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT:. Thank you. It will be admitted. Thank 
6 you. 
7 (At which time an exhibit was admitted but no number 
8 was referred to and cannot be entered in the index.) 
9 BY MR. BENNETT: 
10 Q Mr. Johnson, you were, and we talked about this, but 
11 since you were found in violation of the term of your probation 
12 that you report to AP&P as directed to do so, that finding 
13 being made by this Court April 27 of this year, just a few 
14 weeks ago, since that time have you been in compliance with the 
15 terms of your state probation? 
16 A I reported to Mr. Staker as requested, but I also 
17 told him that I don't have a job. I've been found to be 
18 disabled by social security and I think that might -- I'm 
19 I supposed to have full-time work under the terms of the old 
2 0 probation and I just got out and I don't have a full-time job 
21 and I have this disability determination, so that would not be 
22 in compliance, I would imagine, but I'm trying to be and I've 
23 reported. 
24 Q Okay. Mr. Johnson, is there anything else -- with 
25 respect to your desire to be in compliance, with respect to the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
42 
1 I willfulness of the violation of failing to report on 
2 October 20 , 2010, to Mr. Staker, is there anything else 
3 youfd like the Court to be aware of? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Please. 
6 A Further indication of not only did I write the Court 
7 which I thought I was supposed to do, but we sent an email to 
8 Mr. Staker, you sent an email to Mr. Staker in mid-October 
9 informing him of the status, our understanding of the status. 
10 And the (inaudible) I would like before the Court that I 
11 certainly have every desire to be in compliance. I didn't 
12 willfully try to avoid reporting. I'm glad to report. 
13 . THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Baer, do you have any 
14 questions for Mr. Johnson? 
15 MR. BAER: Just a couple of questions for 
16 clarification. 
17 
18 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
19 | BY MR. BAER: 
20 I Q Mr. Johnson, it's true then, you have just admitted 
21 with explanation, that you failed to report to the probation 
22 officer on October 21st, 2010, on your release with 
23 explanation; yes or no? 
I st 
24 A Yeah, I didn't report to him on the 21 
25 Q Okay. And by not reporting you'd have to agree it 
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1 would be impossible for you to establish with him any residency 
2 that you may have had upon your release. Isn't that true? 
3 MR. BENNETT: Objection, Judge. I believe we've 
4 resolved those in the prior evidentiary hearing. The Court has 
5 found that he was in violation of the term of his probation for 
6 failing to report on those days. 
7 MR. BAER: Yeah, but I just want to make sure that 
8 it's clarified his testimony. I mean, it was brought up on 
9 direct. 
10 THE WITNESS: Could you ask me again. 
11 THE COURT: Oh, it's overruled. I have heard the 
12 objection and it is overruled for the reason that it was 
13 brought up and also for further clarification. I will tell 
14 both sides in my mind I can differentiate between the findings 
15 that have already been made by the Court and a determination of 
16 what the sanctions should be and I anticipate that you brought 
17 things up to help clarify what was in his mind, and I 
18 anticipate that counsel is trying to establish that he knew 
19 that he had not done certain things and I don't see a problem 
2 0 j with than. Continue, Counsel. 
21 MR. BAER: Thank you, your Honor. 
22 BY MR. BAER: 
23 Q So just a follow up, I think close facsimile at least 
24 to the last question. You have to agree then.by not reporting 
25 when you were supposed to report, you could not have reported 
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1 your establishment or your residence of establishment at that 
2 time period, correct? 
3. A I didn't have any notice I was to report. I didn't 
. 4 get that notice. 
5 Q The question is by -- I'll let it sit. 
6 . THE COURT: Sounds like a good argument. 
7 MR. BAER: Thank you, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: I'm sorry. I don't mean to qualify your 
9 question. I'm simply saying that's more of an argument than an 
10 J evidentiary question. 
11 MR. BAER: Thank you, your Honor. 
12 BY MR. BAER: 
13 Q Now, Mr. Johnson, it's true that with respect to your 
14 federal convictions, that the time period of those convictions 
15 started in 2005 and finished on or around August 6, 2007. 
16 That's true, isn't it? 
17 A No. 
18 Q That's what the allegations were? 
19 I A No. 
2 0 ! n That's not what it ssvs in the consulrac^r document? 
21 A No. 
2 2 MR. BAER: No other questions, your Honor. 
23 THE WITNESS: I'll correct it. 
24 THE COURT: Anything further? 
25 
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BENNETT: 
Mr. Johnson, do you want to -- obviously on direct 
-- you need to answer yes or no, but you appeared to 
correct something. 
2007 
in 
Yes 
' 
Please. , 
There was one -- there were October -- there were 
transaction that was the basis for Counts 2 and 22, 
August 
dismissed 
down 
obvi< 
move 
• 
DUS 
tc 
j or not. 
first, 
lies wi 
first. 
you " whe 
Mr 
iy 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
2007. And those are the two counts that were | 
BENNETT: Thank you. 
COURT: Anything further Mr. Baer? 
BAER: No, your Honor. Thank you. 
COURT: Thank you, Mr. Johnson. Please step 
. Bennett, any further witnesses? 
MR. 
it1. 
BENNETT: No, your Honor. When we come to --
3 the State's burden to argue, but we will then 
sanctioning and so I don't know who needs to go first 
: 
If we were juat doing sanctioning, I would ask to go 
but I i 
th 
re 
the 
THE 
I'm 
jnderstand we're dealing with the burden which 
State so I'll defer to the Court as to who speaks 
COURT: If the parties will permit me, I'll tell 
at and you can then decide what you need to do to 
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1 persuade me which way you feel I need to go. 
2 . Based on the evidence that was presented, 
3 specifically Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, the verdict and the 
4 attached indictment, after listening to argument that was 
5 I presented by defendant and reviewing these documents combined 
6 with the affidavit of the probation officer, Mr. Staker, that 
7 was signed March 22 , if we looked at Item No. 3, the 
8. allegation is that he was convicted of aiding and a betting 
9 willfully causing another to commit a crime. On No. 5 there's 
10 an allegation that he was convicted of mail fraud, and on No, 6 
11 excuse, me did I skip the wrong one? 
12 MR. BAER: You skipped No. 4, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: No. 4, conviction of the offense of 
14 conspiracy and on No. 6, wire fraud. I've just gone through 
15 these various allegations during the break and what I find is 
16 that on No. 5 by the federal court having dismissed or whoever 
17 it was in the federal court that made the motion, the Court 
18 dismissed the allegation on Count No. 10 in their action, and I 
19 believe that was the only allegation that tied into" our current 
2 0 probable cause statement and affidavit alleging mail fraud. I 
21 don't see that I have a lot of evidence on mail fraud. You may 
22 want to address that if you feel I'm viewing that in error. 
23 I do see by the convictions that there are 
24 convictions on Counts 18 through 20 -- I'm sorry. The 
25 following convictions refer to incidents or counts that are 
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1 alleged to have transpired after sentencing, and that would 
2 include the Counts 18 through 22, 23 and 24 through 28, so 
3 combining all of those it's 18 through 28. 
4 Now, the concerning part to me in all of this is that 
5 I the State is trying to prove that he has violated probation by 
• 6 committing these acts even though they weren't convictions 
7 until later. He committed these acts after the time of 
8 sentencing. 
9 It appears to me that viewing the verdict and also 
10 j the attached indictment, that Mr. Johnson may have been 
11 .involved in a series of conduct over a period of several years 
12 interrupted by his conviction in this court, but in which he 
13 continued to participate even following his conviction and that 
14 that didn't result in a conviction on those following matters 
15 until after it was addressed in the federal court recently. 
16 So I'm telling both sides that I find in my mind 
17 right now that I'm leaning towards, on the question of ; 
18 violation, finding that he has committed certain acts which the 
19 federal court now has entered convictions on that occurred 
~ ~ j _, .fr f. ^ .^ 4_ v, ^  n £ t- n
 A v r i l i n A ^ r~v £ / £ ^ • f t r>n ?. * "U -I ^ v , ^ -^ ^  •£ ^ ,, v~, A A >-, 
21 Counts 18 through 28. I believe that those will substantiate . 
22 several of the State's allegations, but not substantiate at 
23 least one of the State's allegations. I'm not stating this as 
24 a finding. I'm stating this as my understanding. And I would 
25 appreciate either side informing me if they believe I have 
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misinterpreted what I have read. 
With regard to the arguments, I'm going to ask Mr. 
Baer to proceed with any arguments that he feels needs to be 
made with regard to the probation violation issue and then 
after I rule on probation violation, we will address sentencing 
on either the former or both of these violations. 
Mr. Baer, proceed. 
MR. BAER: Thank.you, your Honor. The State, without 
it coming as a surprise, would subscribe to the comments of the 
Court. That is the focal point of the State's position that he 
continued.to conduct these acts not only after the conviction 
in the underlying state case, but I think the Court can also, 
either by way of the allegations in the probation violation 
report or Sua sponte, note that clearly these acts continued 
after his conviction. 
I respect the Court's comments before, but I think 
that is too fine a distinction. The State believes it's too 
fine a distinction. Certainly once this defendant was . 
convicted on the State count, and that would be back in March, 
to continue to sn^s^s in the criminal activity that led to the 
federal convictions is thumbing-- in the. State's view is the 
defendant thumbing his nose at this Court. 
The fact that he may have been sentenced later, and 
if you look at the docket, he was sentenced quite a bit later 
based upon some continuations which I probably should have 
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looked a little closer at that before I made the argument, the 
State is usually prepared to go forward in these matters and 
the continuations are filed by the defendant. I don't know 
that for fact, but I'll just represent that the State's 
position, would clearly be that it was the defendant's thumbing 
of this Court by•continuing in those criminal acts right after 
the day of his conviction on until sentencing to say nothing of 
the post-sentencing time. 
So we believe he's in violation for those reasons of 
the allegations now contained in the March allegations that 
we're doing substantively here today. And I can speak to the 
sanctions if the Court finds for violations today or I can 
speak just to the November findings or I can wait. I don't 
think the State, quite frankly the State's position is not 
going to be any different. This defendant has been violated 
before by this Court. He's been violated for not maintaining 
employment. He's been violated for not complying with other 
conditions; not reporting to this probation officer. He's now 
being requested he be violated for federal convictions, also 
for not reporting again to this officer in establishing his 
place of residence. 
The sum in this case is bigger than the parts. I 
mean, what we have is a sophisticated defendant who has played 
this game for a very long time and parsed it extremely closely, 
but even he can't pars it close enough to negate the findings 
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1 that he has violated the orders of this Court. He certainly 
2 has violated the spirit of the orders of this Court. He has 
3 not --he seems to seek to be treated differently because he's 
4 a' smart guy and because he's a sophisticated guy and because he 
5 can pars words and say what his understanding is. 
6 J But the clear evidence is that he has violated the 
7 spirit and the orders of this Court and the State maintains 
8 that the Court should invoke the original sanction that was 
9 available to this Court at sentencing and that would be on the 
10 I underlying felony that he was convicted of in this case.. 
11 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Baer. Mr. Bennett. 
12 MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, as I read the indictment, 
13 the date on or about is similar to filing of an Information in 
14 the State court where it alleges that specific illegal conduct 
15 | occurred on or about and then the date follows. None of the 
16 allegations except for Counts 10 and 22 even allege that the 
17 criminal conduct occurred when the defendant was placed on 
18 probation. Those on or about dates all predate Mr. Johnson's 
19 probation. That is clear, unequivocal. 
20 Counts 10 and 22, the on or about dates clearly show 
21 that the alleged misconduct there did occur after Mr. Johnson 
22 was placed on probation. That's obvious. But to the Court's 
23 point that that somehow demonstrates that he continued to 
24 persist in illegal conduct after he was placed on probation, 
25 the Court can't make that leap because there is no conviction. 
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1 Those were dismissed. They were dismissed. 
2 And while the Court may be tempted to say well the 
3 fact that he was charged, you know, there can be inferences 
4 drawn it's evidence that, but the bottom line is he wasn't 
. 5 I convicted so how can this Court find that he violated a term of 
6 probation based on allegations only two of which even 
7 chronologically occurred or alleged to have occurred when he 
8 was on probation when those very counts were dismissed? I . 
9 think that's violative of a number of defendant's; rights; 
10 notice, due process, but more specifically there's just no 
11 conviction on which the Court can hang its hat. That's my 
12 response to allegation No. 5 of the order to show cause. 
13 In response to allegations three, four and six, the 
14 only reason that the State didn't have to put on much evidence 
15 j is because it doesn't take much to show that he was, in fact, 
16 convicted on March 18 of this year. We can't even dispute 
17 that. What we're asking the Court to do, though, however, is 
18 to refrain from making findings or conclusions, much less 
19 sanctions, when there are potentially dispositive motions filed 
O n ! -I -•-, 4-1-..—. P ^ i : v 4 - T V - «=•. 4- . ^ . ^ n r r " ! /-if- A . ^ n A r-i n " h / - v v - f - f- A m a mA r-\/-3 T rr~\-\ i r » r > n l r\ 
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21 be overturned and then we would have a situation where the 
22 State court has sanctioned Mr. Johnson for being convicted of a 
23 federal crime which conviction no longer stands. 
24 That certainly wouldn't be in the interest of 
25 justice, so while there's no getting around the fact that he 
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1 was convicted on March 18th, there are motions that could 
2 overturn that conviction. It makes sense in the interest of 
3 justice for this Court then to hold off in making findings, 
4 conclusions, much less any sanction until those are determined. 
5 And it's my understanding that sentencing is still set for July 
6 in this case. Therefore, any motion for a new trial would have 
7 to be heard and would have to take place prior to sentencing. 
8 Sentencing hadn't been moved out. It's still existed July. 
9 So it's not like we're asking the Court to hold off 
10 J for a year or two to see if his conviction is overturned. I 
11 can't see how the federal courts can make its decision after 
12 ' sentencing. It would have to do so prior to sentencing even 
13 considering its motion for a new trial. So we're not asking 
14 the Court to hold off making any findings for any lengthy 
15 period of time. 
16 I'm not going to pretend like things don't get 
17 continued in federal court too. I'm sure they do just as they 
18 do in state court, but, again, with respect to allegation five, 
19 in summation the allegations that fit that could have even 
20 occurred when he was on probation were dismissed. The 
21 convictions that now exist could be overturned. 
22 Thank you, your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bennett. Before Mr. Baer 
24 responds, I got the impression that Mr. Baer combined both his 
2 5 argument regarding whether or not a violation existed with his 
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1 ' argument for sanctions. 
2 MR. BENNETT: Okay. 
3 THE COURT: And I don't want you to be confused 
4 because I think when you finish, I'm going to hear from Mr. 
5 I Baer regarding his final argument and I will allow you one last 
6 argument, but that's all. 
7 MR. BENNETT: And just so we're clear I have not 
8 spoken to an appropriate sanction. 
9 THE COURT: And that's why I'm saying you could 
10 either do it now or you could wait until after Mr. Baer 
11 concludes his presentation. 
12 MR. BENNETT: I'll do so now if the Court --
13 THE COURT: Very well. 
14 MR. BENNETT: On August 3 0th Mr. Johnson was found in 
15 I violation. That's pending appeal. A brief has been filed. 
16 The State has -- actually it was a non-complying brief. The 
-17 original is fine, but Fedex or Kinkos hadn't made it double 
18 sided so that's only recently been remedied. In fact, Monday 
19 was when it was remedied. The State hasn't responded, but in 
2 0 i any event the revocation and reinstatement of the sanction was 
21 stayed. 
22 At that time Mr. Johnson began to serve the sanction 
23 of 60 days. Prior to the 60 days, he filed a motion to stay 
24 and a probable cause certificate. In those documents he 
25 specifically asked the Court to place him on court probation 
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1 pending the outcome of the appeal. That was granted. The 
2 probable cause certificate -- and I understand this is the 
3 identical argument we made at the evidentiary hearing, but it 
4 just speaks to the degree of willfulness, but the probable 
5 cause certificate signed and issued by this Court states that 
6 he is to report to the Court. 
.7 And the other terms for that matter sound very much 
8 like court probation, so I don't think it's -- and I'm in part 
9 defending my own legal analysis of the situation, much less Mr. 
10 Johnson's or including Mr. Johnson's, but that when you ask for 
11 specific relief and your motion is granted, the probable cause 
12 certificate -- well, it didn't specifically say you no longer 
13 have to report to AP&P, but it did say you are to report to the 
14 Court on a monthly basis. When you combine those two, I think 
15 it's reasonable for Mr. Johnson to think that the relief he 
16 sought was granted and that his probation was then converted to 
17 court probation pending the outcome of the appeal. 
18 Additionally, the other evidence that was introduced 
19 I hope tends to show that when he, Mr. Johnson, is made clear 
2 0 of his duties, such as the requirements or the terms oi nis 
21 federal release, he's compliant. He's been compliant since the 
22 last evidentiary hearing as far as compliance with Mr. Staker 
23 and the Adult Probation and Parole. And.prior to that there 
24 were — I'm not going to hyphen the fact that there were other 
25 orders to show causes filed throughout, but that evidence I 
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1 think tends to show two things. One, he's reasonable in his 
2 analysis as I was reasonable in mine when I gave him counsel 
3 that he had been granted the relief he sought, he was on court 
4 probation, he was to report to the Court. He said he did that 
5 in November. He failed to do that December through April 
.6 J because he was incarcerated apparently. 
7 So what degree of willfulness of the violation is 
8 there? And I think the Court has found that it was willful, 
9 but I think it has to be a minimal amount of willfulness 
10 because he's reasonable in relying on — if you're not 
11 reasonable in relying on the Court's probable cause 
12 certificate, then I don't know what you are reasonable relying 
13 on. So is the violation willful? I think it was minimal, 
14 minimal amount of willfulness that is. So, you know, the Court 
15 I can impose the sanction it wants to. Obviously it merits 
16 something far less than what the State is asking for which is 
17 the original sentence of prison, a term in prison be imposed. 
18 Lastly, your Honor, Mr. Johnson, when it has been 
19 clear to him, I know the State is going to adamantly object to 
2 0 this, but when it's been clear to Jamis, he does more or less 
21 what it is he's been told. Now, he has some certain 
22 disabilities and prior orders to show causes having to do with 
23 restitution amount, he's, you know, been found to be disabled 
24 by the federal government so, you know, there's always --. but 
25 that's really not before the Court, but I recognize the Court 
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1 is going to say well he hasn't always been compliant, that's a 
2 stretch to say just because he complies with the federal terms 
3 of his release, that he's supervisable or amenable to . 
4 supervision. 
5 So I just want to address what I anticipate, and 
6 that's what it comes to restitution, he has some disabilities. 
7 In fact, he's talked to me numerous times about asking the 
8 Court to modify his probation. That isn't before the Court 
9 either, but in general when Jamis is aware what he's required 
10 I to do, at least since August 30th of 2010, he's done so. I 
11 can't speak to prior to that, but since August 30th, 2010, when 
12 it's been clear and he's not relying on something -- reasonably 
13 relying on something else, he's been complying. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bennett. 
15 MR. BENNETT: And in light of that, your Honor, I ask 
16 for a minimal sanction on Mr. Johnson. 
17 THE COURT: Thank .you, Mr. Bennett. Mr. Baer. 
18 MR. BAER: Thank you, your Honor. I'll start right 
19 at the end, your Honor. Counsel brought up the concept of 
2 0 restitution. And as the Court is aware, it can check its own 
21 docket or it can review the State's note in the Information 
22 from the probation officer, the restitution is not to be 
23 considered obviously for a violation here today, but it 
24 certainly can be considered for sanctions. 
2 5 What you have here is an individual who was 
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1 originally ordered to pay $120,000 to his victim. He has been 
2 found guilty of securities fraud for defrauding these victims 
3 in real time. This is all the way back in the early part of 
4 2 000. So here we are seven or eight years later. Not only 
5 I does he owe the $120,000, he owes $136,000 because he hasn't 
6 found the time or the ability in his own mind, because he is 
7 J the one who brought up that he is disabled, to get any kind of 
a reasonable job and make reasonable payments on that 
9 I restitution. I'm sure that carries a lot of weight and a lot 
10 I of water with the victims who are sitting out there out 
11 $120,000. No, $136,000 plus as of the day that we were sitting 
12 here. 
13 With respect to his representation that he can't get 
14 a job, let's look a little bit historically at that. You were 
15 ] not the trial court here, your Honor, but at the trial this 
16 individual indicated that he was so blind that he couldn't 
17 proceed in this case and that he required a motion to consider 
18 striking of the trial and to set it off in the distance because 
19 he couldn't see. 
21 and this is not a complaint, just an observation from the 
22 historical perspective, to get a machine that this individual 
23 could read when he put a piece of paper in and blew it up nice 
24 and large in front of him. Notice there's no such machine here 
25 today. What does that go to? That goes to the credibility of 
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1 this defendant. What else goes to the credibility of this 
2 defendant? This defendant can talk about his understanding 
•3 upon his release whether he has to report a probation officer 
4 or not, but he can't remember that in the indictment for which 
5 I he stood trial in federal court for a week or so in front of a 
6 jury, he can't recall that the conspiracy in the aiding and 
7 abetting periods and certainly the conspiracy periods goes up 
8 until August 2007. He can only remember the point that he's 
9 intended to comply with his officer. 
10 J With respect to whether or not he's complying with . 
11 his federal officer, that information comes from one source and 
12 one source only. It comes from the defendant who' - - again, 
13 whose credibility is suspect, if not entirely debunk at this 
14 time. There is no independent finding that he is complying or 
15 completely complying or being cooperative with that probation 
16 officer. And even if he were, it does not speak to the myriad 
17 of violations both today and historically in this particular 
18 case. 
19 The State's position is pretty clear or should be by 
2 0 now that this case for which there has been a conviction for 
21 nearly four years, into in excess of four years, there has been 
22 no attempt by this defendant, reasonable attempt, keeping it to 
23 a reasonable person's standard of what you would expect of any 
24 probationer, to comply with the conditions of probation. It is 
25 systemic. Whether or not you find a violation on.the federal 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 convictions, it is already established as systemic. A quick 
2 look at the docket will show that this is hardly the first 
3, rodeo for all of us in this regard. He does it time and time 
4 again. • 
5 I Now, with respect to those federal convictions. 
6 While counsel was speaking I did have a chance to look at the 
7 docket. And as I suspected, the original sentencing in this 
8 case was going to be earlier than June. However, on 5/2 '07 
9 James Barber, this defendant's attorney at the time, did file 
10 J the motion to continue sentencing. So the State would ask that 
11 the Court even back up its analysis at least until that point 
12 with respect to the timing of the federal convictions. 
13 But that also raises an important question. One that 
14 obviously none of us have briefed, but, you know, what is the 
15 I responsibility of a defendant in between the time he's 
16 convicted and the time that he's sentenced? Does he get to go 
17 out and rape, and maim? Does he get to go out and commit arson? 
18 Does he get to go out and -- and that has no reflection on the 
19 sentencing or the consideration of this Court when it's brought 
21 to a conviction on those additional charges, the State would 
22 submit that it is relevant just on a totality of the 
23 circumstances consideration, but it certainly is a particularly 
24 relevant matter when you look at the docket and you note that 
2 5 this defendant was the one who delayed his sentencing. And at 
priTTDT" r i n n r p T D T D n T\r\ruTK/rT^-\-Trn 
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1 least a reasonable portion or some portion of the federal 
2 convictions occurred post sentencing or post at least the 
3 motion to continue the sentencing and certainly post the 
4 conviction. 
5 Now, as for the motion to stay, that is a 
6 post-conviction motion which is filed, as the Court knows, in 
7 most, if not all, jury convictions. And the question becomes 
8 what is the likelihood that the defendant would prevail on 
9 appeal. We've had no evidence here today that he would likely 
10 j prevail on appeal. And we would submit that that is a motion 
.11 which is something that the federal government has to consider. 
12 And if or when they consider it in any way, fashion or form 
13 favorable to this defendant, they can bring, the defendant that 
14 is can bring this back to the Court's review. 
15 I However, at this point he stands convicted of a 
16 plethora of federal crimes and he has not shown -- there has 
17 been no showing rather that there's a likelihood that he would 
18 prevail on appeal.' Even putting that aside for a moment and 
19 considering in all views favorable to the defendant that maybe 
20 j he wouiu D6 iiKeiy to prevail on appea±, ne stiix remains in 
21 violation of the conditions of this Court both historically and 
22 on those November allegations and by Reincorporations .1 and 2 
23 of the March allegations which are consistent with the November 
24 ones. 
25 I don't know how the Court wishes to address that. 
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1 It probably is a distinction without much of a difference. 
2 Because of that it is the State's view that this manipulative 
3 process has been going on for a very very long time indeed. It 
4 is time to bring it to an end. And the actual actions of this 
5 I defendant vis-a-vis his lack of restitution, lack of 
6 employment, when you look around the world, your Honor, you see 
7 an awful lot of people who work sitting in wheelchairs, working 
8 without a leg, working without appendages, it's a thin read, 
9 indeed, for which the defendant to rest his laurels in this 
10 court to say that he has some problems getting employment. And 
11 not only is it a thin read, I think it's an insult not only to 
12 this Court, but to all those individuals who do go out there 
13 and do work under some very very trying circumstances. 
14 I know I've mixed and matched a little bit what we 
15 I believe the sanctions s are and findings should be of this 
16 Court, but I think the Court can pars out the parts of the 
17 arguments of each and we'd ask that you impose the original 
18 finding of a further violation here today and the imposing of 
19 the sanctions as previously noted. 
I/^T T-n m m' Thank "ou. 
21 | MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, at this time I would just 
22 impose an objection even if it's ultimately for the sake of 
23 preservation, and that's an objection to relevance to the 
24 State's argument with respect to restitution, well, excuse me, 
25 relevance as well as kind of an objection of proper notice as 
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1 well as the fact that there's no evidence before the Court of 
2 those numbers that were thrown out. That's precisely, having 
3 just skimmed through the State's hearing and sentencing 
4 memorandum, what is set forth there. At the outset of this 
5 I hearing we indicated we objected to the Court's considering of 
6 that memorandum. 
7 J With respect to the comments made to Mr. Johnson at 
8 the time of trial, object as to relevance. Argument made with 
9 respect to employment, again, objection as to relevance. I 
10 J trust and hope that the Court can compartmentalize the parts of 
11 the State's argument that were relevant and set those aside in 
12 determining an appropriate sanction from those that actually 
13 were relevant, but specific objections to arguments set forth 
14 on those three issues; restitution, defendant's behavior at 
15 1 trial, employment, actually as well as prior alleged probation 
16 violations which are not properly before the Court at this time 
17 either. 
18 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bennett. Mr. Baer, do you 
19 want to address his objections? 
u u . \jiis.y j j c L - a u o c x i i L.wO w a y D . m e 
21 first one is that if you take a look at those marked 
22 allegations, it's under page 3, so they are on notice of this 
23 issue, the defendant has a severe employment problem. The 
24 defendant has never held employment during the last three years 
25 of probation. That's part of the March allegation packet 
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1 before the Court, but secondly, and perhaps more dispositively 
2 to this Court, this defendant sat up in that very chair right 
3 there and talked about his inability to be employed. 
4 Now, why else would that be relevant to this Court 
5 I except for the payment of restitution to victims who were 
6 defrauded originally so many years ago in this case? So he has 
7 brought it up himself. He's opened up that door. It's also 
8 part of the PV report and packet that we're addressing today. 
9 And also in the event that the Court feels otherwise, we also 
10 have full confidence the Court can compartmentalize that 
11 information. Again, it was introduced not for violative 
12 purposes, but for purposes of sanctions. . 
13 THE COURT: Thank you. With regard to the objection, 
14 let me just make a finding. For better or for worse this is a 
15 [ case in which a fresh set of eyes has come on the scene after 
16 many years of a prior court dealing with this case and prior 
17 probation violation.allegations. I don't know if that cuts in 
18 favor of one side or the other, but at one point I wondered 
19 myself how much I should try to immerse myself in the history 
2 0 of the case so I could have a sense and feeling of how the case 
21 developed and got to the point it is. 
22 . And the truth is I'm looking only at a probation 
23 violation. I do compartmentalize. I'm looking specifically at 
24 a probation violation. With regard to the objections, I do 
25 find that both the issues regarding restitution payment and 
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1 employment are really to what we're doing. And I do that 
2 specifically because the allegation has been made that 
3 whenever -- whenever the defendant clearly understands what's 
4 expected of him he complies.. Now, that was a statement that I 
5 recall being made, the argument that was made. And I think the 
6 countervailing argument is not with regard to some aspects, not 
7 with regard to employment and restitution. And for that 
8 purpose I think those are relevant. And although it comes 
9 after the fact, I want you to know I will be sustaining or 
10 overruling the objection as to those two and I do rely on those 
11 as part of my thought process. 
12 As to the accommodations at the time of trial, again, 
13 that's probably something that came about before my time and 
14 before anything that I have observed in court. I don't know 
15 ] that it's directly relevant at all to the issues that are 
16 before me, so as to your concerns, Mr. Bennett, I will not 
17 consider behaviors, requests, those kinds of issues as they 
18 come up at the time of trial. Beyond that, I think all of us 
19 understand these are arguments of counsel. I wasn't here. 
2 0 • There's no evidence as to those accommodations, why they were 
21 brought or how they were used or not used. I consider it to be 
22 part of the expression of emotion that comes at the time of 
23 argument and I will not be relying on those. They are not 
2 4 evidence.. 
25 Counsel, I appreciate your arguments and I'm going to 
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1 take the matter under advisement. If you'll wait a few 
2 moments, I'm going to organize my thoughts and I'll be back 
3 out. ' •< 
4 MR. BAER: Thank you, your Honor. 
5 I (Recess taken by the Court.) 
6 THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated. I've had a 
7 chance to'consider the evidence that's been presented, the 
8 argument, the exhibits. With regard to the findings of 
9 violations alleged in the probation officer's March 22 n , 
10 J 2011, affidavit, I find on the first allegation contained in 
11 Paragraph No. 1 that the evidence has failed to establish a 
12 violation that he failed to establish or that he changed his 
I st 
13 residence without permission on.October 21 , 2010. 
14 I do find that he knowingly violated Paragraph No. 2 
15 I by failing to report as directed on October 21 s u, 2010, and 
16 my finding is based on a combination of the prior finding of 
17 the Court that whether he relies on his own understanding or 
18 relies on counsel's representations isn't relevant to me. He 
19 was under probation. He knew he was under probation. It was a 
20 I matter of record. I don't believe his probation was stayed for 
21 the reasons stated in my subsequent ruling. And I think a 
22 failure to respond and report as directed by probation, you do 
23 that at your own risk. If you misunderstand or misinterpret 
24 law, that's a risk you take. 
25 No. 3, I do find a violation of probation for his 
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1 conviction of aiding and abetting or willfully causing another 
2 to commit a crime. I'm referring specifically to the findings 
3 of guilt on Counts 18, 19, 21, 23, 27 and 2 8 of the federal 
4 jury verdict form. 
5 I Item No. 4, I do find that he's in violation of 
6 probation by having a conviction of conspiracy which, again, is 
7 Count 23, could be interrupted for either three or four, No. 3 
8 or 4 allegation of violation. 
9 As to Paragraph No. 5, I find no violation. The 
10 J evidence does not support a finding of violation on No. 5. 
11 On No. 6 I find that the evidence does support a 
12 finding of violation for the conviction of wire fraud. You 
13 specifically refer to Counts 27 and 28. 
14 * There are allegations of other violations and, excuse 
15 I me, there are convictions of other counts through the federal 
16 document. I'm only referring to those counts that I find the 
17 evidence supports because they occurred after the date of • 
18 sentencing in this case, not the ones that occurred before. 
19 It's been suggested that I don't have to rely on the conviction 
2 0 j stancarc oecause ne was toio. not to commit crimes eitrier. 
21 The argument is that clearly he committed these 
22 crimes even if there's not a finding or a conviction of these 
2 3 crimes. And I do not accept that approach that you can 
24 independently find -- I do believe you can, but I don't have 
25 evidence of those crimes independently. There's been no 
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1 showing of any one specific crime that occurred. And I take 
2 very seriously the presumption of innocence and the requirement 
3 that evidence be presented. 
4 In other settings I have had other hearings where 
5 people actually do come in and have a trial within a probation 
• 6 I violation allegation. That didn't happen here so I'm 
7 specifically finding that the violation did occur because there 
8 are convictions of record, not because of the actual commission 
9 of the crimes. 
10 Having found that he has violated his probation both 
11 in the October and -- excuse me, the November 2 010 and the 
12 March 2011 order to show cause matters, I'm now going to turn 
13 to sanctions and I'm going to look first at the general 
14 understanding I have of probation. 
15. I First of all, probation, as we've heard many times 
16 repeated, is a privilege. It's not a sanction. It's an 
17 opportunity to keep yourself from going to prison. The 
18 statutory prison sentence on this case is at least, not less 
19 than, one year and not more than 15 years in prison. And 
2 0 probation is allowed to individuals who are of slight risk or 
21 minimal risk, and it's given for the opportunity of the. person 
22 to meet certain goals with the assistance of their probation 
23 officer. 
24 However, probation is not for everybody. It does 
25 require compliance. It requires strict adherence. It does not 
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1 lend itself well to people who fail to comply, who interpret 
2 things differently than they are told or who choose not to 
3 follow certain aspects of probation because it's difficult or 
4 uncomfortable or they don't want to do it. 
5 1 In this case the defendant has previously been 
6 J convicted, excuse me, has been found to have violated probation 
7 on numerous occasions. I will be remiss because I don't . 
8 remember the numbers, but I do recall that there have been 
9 several. Prior to my taking the Bench, he had been found in 
10 violation in an August hearing and shortly thereafter I was 
11 asked to review the sanction that was issued. He was given a 
12 period of 6 0 days incarceration. 
13 That was stayed primarily because there was no 
14 opposition to the motion to stay. And as I indicated in my 
15 I findings in our earlier hearing, I think to some extent the 
16 State shares some of the responsibility for the Court's 
17 confusion or reasons for entering that stay and creating the 
18 circumstance that may have caused some confusion. 
19 If he had been sanctioned to serve first to the 
2 0 j revocation an& reinstatement or nis proDation nor 3 6 montns ano. 
21' then to serve 60 days in jail and still violated, I would 
22 normally increase the amount of jail time or I would find some 
23 other sanction that would be appropriate. And it would not 
24 surprise me if I had considered 75 or 90 days or community 
25 service or something along those lines as an appropriate 
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1 sanction for his violation for the matter that we discussed 
2 from the November allegations. 
3 I want to make sure that it's clear in everybody's 
4 mind, but specifically in the defendant's mind, that I don't 
5 I consider a violation of probation to be a contempt of court 
6 I question. I'm not offended by a violation of probation. I 
7 simply note that the person does not comply with the terms and 
8 conditions of the probation that were set. As I indicated, 
9 probation is a privilege. It's an opportunity. If it doesn't 
10 j work for them, I note that and we move on to the next step. 
11 This is not a contempt hearing. It's different standards. 
12 It's different sanctions. We approach it differently. I 
13 simply am focusing on his compliance or non-compliance and what 
14 it would take to persuade him to comply. 
15 I With regard to the violations that we have heard 
16 today and that I have found today, I'm considering sanctions 
17 I more severe than what I had indicated would be a step up from 
18 the 60 or so days that he had been ordered prior. It's been 
19 said that when he clearly understands his probation, he 
2 0 [ complies. I don't find that. I'm not persuaded. I'm 
21 persuaded that even though he clearly understands his 
22 probation, he tries to find ways to avoid his obligations. 
23 He claims that he reported to the Court on a monthly 
24 basis. And I appreciate the argument, but it's not persuasive. 
25 I don't believe I ever met with Mr. Johnson. I don't think 
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he's ever provided me any information regarding his housing, 
his employment, his income, his opportunities or his efforts to 
make restitution. If he submits a motion to the Court, I don't 
consider that a report to the Court for probation purposes. I 
also don't believe that he was on court probation, but if he 
understood it that way, he didn't comply. He didn't comply 
with AP&P probation either. 
So the question comes to me do I delay any sanctions 
because we have some factual question as to whether or not his 
convictions are truly convictions. And if I carry that 
argument out, then I would say no, we need to sentence him now 
because we have a conviction on the one hand. On the other 
hand I would say well is that conviction secure? And if it's 
not secure, then perhaps we ought to hold off until his motion 
is ruled on. 
If I take that to the next logical step, well, what 
if he appeals it and it could be overturned on appeal. Should 
I hold off then too? And if it's not overturned on appeal, 
should I then hold off because he's filed a post-conviction 
I C i i C l o_ w ' ^ L t t r KD i- . -L vJ-wii L. JLJ-iiCL L i i v J u C p C i o u a o i V C . JL U i l X i l A . w-^ U U 
ourselves a disservice by going down that road. It presumes 
that he has some invested right to probation which he doesn't. 
When he violates probation, it has multiple 
repercussions. It has taken the time, energy, concern, 
efforts, money of the State, of the probation department, 
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1 probably more the probation department than anybody, but the 
2 probation department, the State, his own defense attorney, 
3 himself, the Court, court staff, and if that happens once or 
4 that happens twice and he learns from it and he changes his 
5 I behavior and we can see progress, then perhaps he's a candidate 
6 for continued reinstatement of probation. 
7 In this case I don't find those to be present. 
8 What's really concerning to me is what I indicated just prior 
9 to argument and that is it appears the defendant was involved 
10 in a continuing, ongoing criminal process that took a number of 
11 years to commit various frauds. In the middle of which he was 
12 convicted in state court for the crime that he was convicted 
13 of. And yet that didn't have an impact on his behavior. Even 
14 though it wasn't brought to light and hasn't been brought to 
15 | this Court's attention until just now, it's apparent now that 
16 he continued for at least one year, if not beyond, in his 
17 criminal activities as has been established by his convictions 
18 I in the federal court. 
19 He didn't cease. He didn't stop. He didn't try to 
2 0 I undue. He took the benefit of and continued to encourage 
21 I others to take the benefit of his criminal activities. Some of 
22 those activities occurred before he was sentenced, some 
23 occurred before he was on probation, some after, but it's clear 
24 that the Court's efforts at this point, at least in 
25 establishing the original probation, did not alter his behavior 
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. 1 or did not stop his criminal behavior. 
2 • My decision is that I'm revoking his probation. I'm 
3 reinstating the statutory sentence. He is ordered to report to 
4 the prison.' I will allow him 30 days to report to prison. 
5 Those 3 0 days before he reports to prison I want him held in 
6 j Millard County in jail, and that's only to allow him time to 
7 put his affairs, including any motions that he wants the Court 
8 to consider or appeals if he wants to take them, to be filed, 
9 and he will need access to his attorney for that purpose and I 
10 don't believe it's appropriate for our public defender to have 
11 to travel up to the prison to address those issues with him. 
12 So I'm going to allow him 3 0 days in the Millard 
13 County Jail unless he waives that and requests that he be 
14 ordered and transported up to jail in which .-- or to prison in 
15 I which case I will accommodate that. Otherwise, he will be in 
16 custody as of today and he will remain in Millard County Jail 
17 for 30 days and then after transported to prison. 
18 Mr. Baer, do you have any questions or are there any 
19 issues that I have not addressed? 
20 j MR. BAER: Only one small matter and this is based 
21 upon experience. In this case with this defendant now ordered 
22 to Utah State Prison, if the Court's record could reflect the 
23 seriousness, I guess, and I want to word this correctly, but 
24 the seriousness of the restitution obligation because the 
25 concern is prison is an indeterminate sentence, as you know, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and in white collar fraud cases for better, for worse, it's 
usually on a low end. And even then there can be good 
behavior. 
And I'm not reflecting upon that. The prison has its 
own jurisdiction obviously and its own considerations as to 
what it may or may not do. However, I want to make it clear 
that hopefully it can be clear in any sentencing order that 
it's a deep concern of this Court that that restitution be an 
obligation of any parole because what historically has happened 
is sometimes notices don't go out, the victims don't hear about 
it, parole doesn't properly consider that obligation and it's 
an important obligation and one that the State believes he 
needs to address when he gets out. I mean, this is an order of 
this Court and these people are left wanting financially so if 
and when he gets out or when he gets out, that that be 
addressed in a proper content. 
THE COURT: Anything further that you'd like me to 
address, Mr. Bennett? 
MR. BENNETT: I believe the State is just asking to 
^3_ ..- *_ ^^^"!^ 4-V>^v ,*>•£ -P 4 r, ^ ,-,-P n v ^ k - , V ,' ^ ^ -.v-,/-"' r ^ _ _ _ _ l _ 1 1 1 J — 
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upon his release and obviously this Court isn't in the position 
to indicate what the terms of parole will be. 
We do, however, and I would call it to the Court's 
attention, the fact that in previous instances where Mr. 
Johnson has been incarcerated he has filed motions to be 
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1 allowed to use certain visual aids during his incarceration. I 
2 believe that's been on more than one occasion that he's 
3 requested that and it's always been granted. 
.4 I don't know if the Court is comfortable ruling on a 
5 motion if I were to make it orally at this point or if the 
6 Court would just indicate that that should be made during his . 
7 3 0 day intern, but we would motion the Court to allow Mr. 
8 Johnson visual aids, exactly.what those visual aids are I'm not 
9 fully aware, but identical motions have been made in previous 
10 instances with this Court and they have always been granted. 
11 It's my understanding that Mr. Johnson has been 
12 afforded those visual aids here in Millard County Jail, 
13 requests have been made to Lieutenant (inaudible) and he'd 
14 approved those as well, that's my understanding, so at this 
15 I time I motion the Court for an order granting him the use of 
16 his visual aids as the Court has done on prior occasions. 
17 .. THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, I have not reviewed those 
18 prior motions and so I can't be specific enough in my order to 
19 simply give a blanket that the Court will do what Mr. Johnson 
20 j asks, iDUt i wiii iDe giao. co review tnose [notions or ii you • a 
21 like, you're welcome to file your own motion and I'll respond 
22 to it as quickly as I can. For the benefit of both counsel, I 
23 I am available until the 10th of June. Should any motions be 
24 filed that I need to consider, I can consider them prior to 
25 that date. After the 10th of June, I will be gone until the 
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2 7 of June and, therefore, any motions that are received on 
the 10th or not fully briefed by the 10th I cannot consider and 
will not address until I.return in July. 
With regard to a motion for accommodations in jail, 
I'm glad to consider that, Mr. Bennett. As you know, my 
calendar takes me to several different cities this week. If 
you would like, you can contact me by FAX with your motions 
and, Mr. Baer, I'm going to ask you to promptly respond to 
those motions. I know that we have rules and you have 
timeframes. I'm just going to ask you to do your best to 
respond as quickly as you can. 
If I don't find anything objectionable to a motion 
and it seems pretty straight forward, I don't mean to cut you 
off from your opportunity to respond, but I may rule on them if 
they are pretty proforma. 
MR. BAER: And not only does the State have no 
objection to that, but to the extent that he requires any sorts 
of aids, there'd be no objection. 
THE COURT: Thank you. The other issue that I wanted 
to address iDiisiiy is cnac cnere was a request DY tne otaus in 
its briefing at one point that I not make this a concurrent 
sentence with anything that might come out of the federal 
court, but that I make it consecutive and I don't believe my 
rules allow me to do that. 
MR. BENNETT: Yeah, I believe whoever sentences the 
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1 second half is going to make decision. 
2 THE COURT: So he is sentenced. Whatever it is 
3 consecutive t'o or concurrent with was determined at the time of 
4 his sentencing and we will leave that as it is. 
5 MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, Mr. Johnson is indicating 
6 J that the visual aids doesn't actually require a motion in order 
7 to (inaudible). Would the Court entertain him --
8 THE COURT: Tell me what the visual aids are. . 
9 MR. BENNETT: I don't know. 
10 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor --
11 MR. BENNETT: Well, hold on. Permission for Mr. 
12 Johnson to address the Court. . 
13 THE COURT: I'd like Mr. Johnson to address me. Mr. 
14 Johnson, what visual aids do you feel you need? 
15 I THE DEFENDANT: They were actually -- when I came 
16 with Judge Eyre, they were already reviewed by the judge '-- by 
17 the sheriff and by the judge. 
18 THE COURT: Can you tell me what they are? 
19 THE DEFENDANT: They consist of a camera, a computer 
2 0 j and an XY table, a little printer device that enlarges and just 
21 their relative cables. 
22 THE COURT: Are these devices that you provide or are 
23 these devices that you're asking the jail to --
24 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, these are the ones that the 
25 state has given me that I have. 
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THE COURT: Then you can have -- I will allow that 
material to be used by you as long as the jail does not have an 
objection to it. And if they do, I would like to hear that 
before the end of the week. 
THE DEFENDANT: The other thing is I wonder if I can 
have some time to collect this stuff. Before I was given a few 
days to report to jail so I can go get this stuff and I've • 
proven very willing to report. I've just got to get some stuff 
and I've got to bring it down with me. Otherwise, I'm without 
the ability to. 
MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, what he's referring to is 
the August 30th revocation reinstatement of probation with a 60 
sanction that at that time Mr. Johnson asked for three or four 
days prior to reporting to Millard County Jail and that was 
granted. He's now indicating to the Court that there should be 
no fear of a flight risk if the Court would entertain and grant 
said motion. On behalf of Mr. Johnson, I motion the Court that 
he be given three or four days to report to Millard County 
Jail. 
from Judge Eyre to report the first time and I faithfully 
reported and I was just found by a federal judge not to be a 
flight risk. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Baer. 
MR. BAER: All right. Judge, I'm not sure exactly 
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1 how to frame this except I think we'd have to enter a general 
2 objection to that. It's just time. It's just time. And I 
3 think that the County has some concerns and certainly the State 
.4 has some concerns. It's just time. It's time to finish the 
5 I matter. This individual; if the Court needs a factual basis, 
6 J certainly has more flight risk justifications at this point 
7 both in facing federal sentencing as well as the sanctions here 
8 today and so we just don't think it's appropriate. 
9 It's been given in the past and we find ourselves 
10 J back here on violations and now find him in violations again, 
11 so I think it's time for him to report and I think the jail has 
12 some concerns with that as well given the far flung 
13 jurisdictions that we're talking about here between Salt Lake 
14 and Millard County. 
.15 MR. BENNETT: Well, it speaks for the fact that he 
16 requested the exact same consideration in August and he 
17 reported promptly. , 
18 THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, my concern as I think it's 
19 not been directly addressed, but my concern is that he now 
2 0 j faces an indeterminate term in prison. He !s never faced that 
21 before that I know of. 
22 MR. BENNETT: Well, in the federal court he obviously 
23 did, and these convictions, at least what the Court is relying 
24 at least in part on for this sanction, he faced it at that 
25 time. He's been released since mid-April (inaudible) on two 
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separate occasions. 
THE COURT: Yes, but he has not yet been sentenced in 
federal court and he has not yet been told by a judge that he's 
going to prison. So I'm weighing that on one side.. To the 
benefit that the federal court did find that he was not a 
flight risk and has in place a number of sanctions and 
provisions, not the least of which I understand would involve 
the forfeiture of his Visa as well as an obligation to report 
to his probation officer on a daily basis. 
Mr. Staker, are you available to speak with Mr. 
Johnson on a daily basis if you were to initiate the call? 
MR. STAKER: Basically what we'd have to do --well, 
except for Friday Saturday and Sunday because we're not open. 
THE COURT: My question more specifically is if I 
allow him to return to his home tonight and order that he 
report here first thing Friday morning, would you be able to 
receive PHONE calls from him at a predetermined time? 
MR. STAKER: Yeah, or we could have him meet any 
morning at 8:00, just what I've always told Mr. Johnson that I 
ivaxiaDie. 
THE COURT: Let's do this then. I will allow Mr.. . 
Johnson to return to his home tonight. He's ordered to report 
to the jail not later than 10:00 a.m. Friday morning. He is to 
report to Mr. Staker in person each morning beginning tomorrow, 
Wednesday and Thursday also, 8:00 a.m? 
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1 MR. STAKER: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: He's to be there by 8:00. If it becomes 
3 8:15 and Mr. Johnson is not there, I will immediately 
4 authorized a warrant for his arrest. 
5 MR, BENNETT: Understood. 
6 J THE COURT: And that is to allow him those two or 
7 three days necessary to do what he needs to do for his 
.8 equipment and any other affairs he has to deal with. After 
9 that, he's to be held in jail for 3 0 days to make him available 
10 I to his attorney and thereafter transferred to the prison. 
11 MR. BENNETT: Thank you, your Honor. 
12 MR. BAER: Judge, if I could address one more issue. 
13 You just mentioned his equipment. I think there's some concern 
14 from the sheriff's office about that equipment, what sorts of 
15 I things are going to be brought into the jail certainly within 
16 his computer. They don't have computer experts here. I don't 
17 know how to address that-quite honestly except to bring it to 
18 the Court. And it doesn't sound like an unreasonable concern, 
19 particularly historically his original violation in this case 
2 0 j was -- in essence he was doing the sorts of, we believe, 
21 financial activities that he was proscribed from and Judge Eyre 
22 found that in the original order to show cause.. 
23 I think it's not unreasonable to be concerned that 
24 that sort of activity might go on given if he's allowed to 
25 bring in his own computer or without some sort of expert to be Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 able to make sure what's on there is clean and addresses --
2 THE COURT: I am anticipating that what he's told me 
3 is computer equipment and some enlargement and printing 
4 equipment. And I think I made my order subject to the approval 
5 I of the jail of the equipment as it comes in. I guess I could 
6 clarify my order that he's not to have internet access on his 
7 computer, no wires or cables that would connect him to a 
8 telephone. 
9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: As you know, there is wireless 
10 I internet. All computers, his laptop. What I would only like, 
11 he has an attorney, if he needs things enlarged, he can bring 
12 his enlarging machine, but he does not need a computer. He can 
13 bring what he needs to see to enlarge things, that's fine, but 
14 I don't see a reason for a computer when he has an attorney. 
15 (He's getting 30 days to be here. We don't give all our clients 
16 computers back there, but if he needs to see something --
17 THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, help me understand why a 
18 computer is necessary for the next 30 days? 
19 MR. BENNETT: Well, Mr. Johnson will have to explain, 
2 0 but I will indicate that according to Mr. Johnson, this was 
21 ordered previously and (inaudible). 
22 THE DEFENDANT: It's the same equipment that was 
23 approved last time and it was used successfully. It's also 
24 equipment that was provided by the State Vocational 
25 Rehabilitation Services. The enlarging equipment can't be run 
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1 without the computer. It enlarges and helps me see. 
2 (Inaudible) under the American Disabilities Act and I believe 
3 (inaudible) as that (inaudible) institution that includes that. 
4 Otherwise, I'm without the ability to see and to use my 
5 I equipment, but, again, it was the same equipment that was 
6 J successfully used last time. 
•7 I THE COURT: Okay. My order is as I've stated it and 
8 my order will be enforced the way I stated it. If the jail 
9 objects to any piece of equipment that you are bringing in, you 
10 I have access to an attorney, who can file a motion who can get it 
11 to me. If there have been prior orders, and I'll tell you I'm 
12 not aware of them, if there have been -- hold on. If there 
13 have been prior orders and they specifically provide for 
14 equipment or other items, I'm speaking now to Mr. Bennett, you 
15 I may want to include those in any motion, but at this point I 
16 have insufficient information for me to feel comfortable to 
17 order that he can have or can't have anything except what the 
18 jail is comfortable that he has. If the jail and he disagree, 
19 then the jail will control and he will file an appropriate 
Z\J j pleading. 
21 MR. BENNETT: Thank you, your Honor. 
2 2 THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Bennett, we need to 
23 address today? 
24 MR. BENNETT: No. Thank you, your Honor. 
2 5 MR. BAER: Nothing from the State. Thank you, your 
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1 Honor. 
2 THE COURT: We're keeping the exhibits, 
3 MR. BAER: I just wanted to ask to withdraw the 
4 exhibits, 
5 1 THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. I didn't have that 
6 J motion, but I don't mind if you want to withdraw the exhibit. 
7 Counsel, these are exhibits and it may be something 
8 where somebody may choose to appeal my decision. If they do, I 
9 need copies of the exhibits. 
10 I MR. BAER: Actually why don't we just leave 
11 (inaudible). 
12 THE COURT: Take copies that you need from the file, 
13 I'd like to keep the exhibits. We're adjourned. Thank you, 
14 gentlemen, for being here today. 
15 I (PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
16 I MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.) 
17 
IS 
19 
2 0 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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1 
2 I REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
3 I STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
4 I County of Utah 
5 I I, Colleen C. Southwick, Registered Professional 
6 J Reporter for the State of Utah, do certify that the foregoing 
7 transcript was taken down by me stenographically from an 
8 electronic recording and thereafter transcribed; 
9 That the same constitutes a true and correct 
10 j transcription.of the said proceedings; 
11 That I am not of kin or otherwise associated with any 
12 of the parties herein or their counsel, and that I am not 
13 I interested in the events thereof. 
14 
15 | WITNESS my hand at Provo, Utah, this 8th day of 
16 I August, 2 011. 
17 
18 
Colleen/C. Sou\hwick, RPR, CSR 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - MILLARD 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMIS M JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES \ P^ 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Case No: 051700056 'FS 
Judge: JAMES BRADY 
Date: May 17, 2011 
PRESENT 
Clerk: sheris 
Prosecutor: MARK W BAER 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): TATE W BENNETT 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: February 14, 1952 
Audio 
Tape Count: 2:09:31 
CHARGES 
1. SECURITIES FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/07/2007 Guilty 
HEARING 
COUNT: 2:09:31 
AP&P Agent Troy Staker is also present. 
The Court indicated that this case has been set for hearing for an 
Evidentiary Hearing on the denials entered on 4/27/11 in regards to 
the Progress Violation Report dated 11/15/10. 
Sanctions from previous OSC hearing regarding Progress Violation 
Report of 10/25/10 and also hearing on Progress Violation Report 
filed on 3/22/11. 
Attorney Bennett entered denials on behalf of the defendant on the 
Progress Violation Report dated 4/27/Al-r--r-•-•-— ~ 
Attorney Bennett addressed the Court and indicated that he only 
received the Statefs sentencing memorandum yesterday and would 
request time to respond. 
The Court has reviewed the file and will proceed with the 
Evidentiary Hearing on Progress Violation Report dated 11/15/10 and 
3/22/11. 
Attorney Baer offered to the Court Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 -
Certified copy of Verdict Form from the Federal Court. Court 
received. State rests. 
Attorney Bennett argued and motioned the Court to dismiss 
allegation #5 from Order to Show Cause Affidavit. State responded. 
Court denies the Motion. 
Attorney Bennett offered Defendant's Exhibit 2 - copy of docket in 
Federal Case. State objects. Court received. 
Attorney Bennett called defendant Jamis Johnson to testify. 
COUNT: 2:55 
Court takes a brief recess to allow Attorney Bennett to confer 
Page 1 ^^^
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Case No: 051700056 Date: May 17, 2011 
with his client. 
TIME: 3:01 PM Court resumes. Court reviewed Exhibit 3 while in 
recess. The Court will accept the argument of counsel in regards 
to the transcript admitted. 
TIME: 3:02 PM Testimony proceeds. Attorney Bennett will examine 
the defendant in regards to the sanctions. Defendant's Exhibit 4 -
Proof of compliance w/Federal probation. Offered and received. 
TIME: 3:14 PM Attorney Baer cross examined. 
TIME: 3:18 PM The Court addressed the parties with his 
interpretation of what issues to have been put before him today. 
TIME: 3:22 PM Attorney Baer gave argument. 
TIME: 3:25 PM Attorney Bennett gave closing argument. Attorney 
Baer responded. Court finds that unpaid restitution and employment 
is relevant to the issues the Court will be addressing today. 
TIME: 3:47 PM Court will take the matter under advisement. 
Court takes a brief recess and return with a decision. 
TIME: 4:10 PM Court resumes and enters sanctions. Court revoked 
probation and imposed the original sentence of an indeterminate 
term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison. 
Defendant is to report to the Millard County Jail no later than 
Friday, May 20 at 10:00 a.m. Defendant to remain in the jail for 
transportation to the Utah State Prison after 30 days. 
The defendant is to report to Mr. Staker, AP&P the next two 
mornings at 8:00 am. The Court indicated to Mr. Staker that if Mr. 
Johnson does not appear by 8:15 the Court will issue an immediate 
warrant for his arrest. 
The Court indicated that for the 30 days Mr. Johnson is awaiting 
transportation to the prison counsel would be more available for 
the preparation of any motions the parties feel the Court may need 
to address. 
The defendantfs probation is revoked. 
The defendant is to serve the sentence as imposed in the original 
Sentence, Judgment and Commitment. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
The defendants probation is terminated unsuccessfully. 
The defendant may bring visual aids equipment when reporting to the 
jail if approved by jail personnel. If there is any objection of 
any type of equipment by jail personnel Mr. Johnson may file a 
motion with the Court. • ,.A, > ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 051700056 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: MARK W BAER 160 E 300 S 5TH FLR POB 140814 SALT LAKE CITY, 
UT 84114-0814 
MAIL: TATE W BENNETT PO BOX 272 FILLMORE DT 846M 
Date •  Ww \% toft ^kpp^rvrMm > 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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COUNTY CLERK & EX-OFFICE CLERK 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
i " • • ' " i 
JUN 1 7 2011 
MILLARD COUNTY 
CLERK 
^ > DFPIITY 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
MILLARD COUNTY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
JAMIS J . JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 051700056 
Date: June 17,2011 
Judge: James Brady 
Having reviewed Defendants pro se expedited motion to amend and extend jail 
term 30 days to allow for stay and probable cause process, and Plaintiffs response 
thereto, the court reviewed the records and recordings of the May 17, 2011 hearing. 
Based on that review the court enters the following findings: 
The May 17, 2001 hearing was to consider allegation of probation violations by 
Defendant as a result of criminal convictions in a separate federal case. It was also to 
determine appropriate sanctions for findings of probation violations determined on April 
21, 2011 as well as sanctions, if any arising out of the alleged violations based on the 
federal convictions. 
With regards to only the violations related to the federal violations, after review 
the court now makes the following findings: 
1. The court made a clear and unambiguous determination that Defendant could not 
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be found in violation of probation for actions he took prior to being placed on 
probation. 
2. Although two of the counts in the Federal trial were alleged to have occurred on 
dates following Defendant being placed on probation by this court, upon 
further argument and examination of the document, at the May 7, 2001 
hearing, the court concluded that counts 10 and 22 of the federal indictment 
were dismissed by the United States Attorney, and did not result in a 
conviction. This court ruled that these two counts would not be considered a 
violation of Defendants probation. 
3. This court explicitly ruled that it would not consider as evidence of a violation of 
probation, any convictions in the federal case for actions taken before the 
date of sentencing in this case. 
4. On May 17, 2011, when considering the States allegations of convictions on 
counts 18, 19, 21, 23, 27, 28 and others, contained in the federal indictment, 
this court came to the conclusion that Defendant was engaged in wrong 
doings including conspiracy and aiding and abetting others to commit mail 
fraud and wire fraud after being placed on probation. This conclusion was 
made in error. Upon review it is clear that the dates of these offenses predate 
Defendants sentencing in the present case. 
5. At the time of determining an appropriate sanction for defendants violation of his 
2897 
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probation, this court considered defendants perceived continuing criminal 
activities a significant violation, sufficient to justify the revocation of probation, 
and the imposition of the statutory sentence. 
In that the court erred in believing that defendants criminal conduct continued 
after being placed on probation, it is appropriate for the court to review and 
correct the sanction it issued at the hearing on May 17, 2011. 
The evidence at the hearing was clear and convincing that defendant violated 
probation when he failed to report to his probation officer. 
a. Defendant does not dispute that he failed to report to his probation officer, 
despite knowledge that the probation officer attempted to contact him 
several times. Defendant claims he was relieved from his obligations to 
contact his probation officer either because of an implication contained in 
an order of this court, or because his probation period had lapsed. 
b. This court did not order the termination of Defendants probation, nor his 
obligation to report to his probation officer. 
c. Although Defendant claims his obligation was changed from reporting to 
his probation officer to an obligation to report to the court on a monthly 
basis, this interpretation is only partially correct. The order did not 
terminate Defendants probation, but did order him to report monthly to the 
court. 
289 
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d. As to his argument that reporting to the court supplanted his obligations to 
1
 the probation officer, it did not. It should also be noted that even if it did 
Defendant also did not report to the court. 
e. As previously determined by this court, Defendants probation period did 
not lapse before the order to show cause was issued in October 2011 for 
Defendants various probation violations. 
8. This court previously found that Defendant violated his probation by failing to 
inform the probation department of his then current residence, or by changing 
his residence without notification to his probation officer, and for his failure to 
report to his probation officer on October 21, 2011. 
9. Previously Defendant had been found in violation of his probation agreement and 
was sentenced to 60 days in jail. That matter is on appeal at this time. 
10. Based on the courts review of its findings and the order issued May 17, 2011, the 
court finds it is appropriate to amend its order. 
11. Defendants probation is revoked and reinstated for 36 months. Defendant is 
ordered to serve 120 days in the Millard County jail. Defendant shall come 
ueiore tt i« court ior review ue»ore MES reiesse irorn jail. 
/// 
/// 
/// 
2333 
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.t/L 
Dated this jj_ day of June, 2011. 
BY THE COURT: 
JAMES BRADY fK 
DISTRICT COURT J U D G ^ 
By JtAJtrx p ^ o t j ? 
STAMP USED AT DISCRETION OF JUDGE 
A „ _/ --J -i/ 
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BRETT L. TOLMAN, United States Attorney (No. 8891) 
SCOTT J. THORLEY, Assistant United States Attorney (No. 3248) 
Attorneys for the United States of America 
185 South State Street, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)524-5682 
Email: Scott.Thorley@usdoj.gov 
FILED 
U.S. DISTRICT COIRT 
•tmm is P 3 23 
DISTRICT CF UTAH 
BV:__ 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
RONALD WILLIAM HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY SMITH, and 
JAMIS MEL WOOD JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
I N D I C T M E N T 
Vio. 18 U.S.C. §1341 (Mail Fraud); 
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Wire Fraud); 18 
U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(l)(A)(i) (Money 
Laundering); 18 U.S.C. §1349 
(Conspiracy); 38 U.S.C. §§ 2(a) and 
2(b)(Aiding and Abetting; Willfully 
Causing Another to Commit a Crime) 
Case:2:09-cr-00133 
Assigned T o : Benson, Dee 
Assign. Date; 3/18/2009 
Description: USA v 
The Grand Jury Charges: 
BACKGROUND 
At all times relevant to this Indictment: 
Scheme Participants 
1. Defendant RONALD WILLIAM HAYCOCK, SR. was a resident of Davis 
County, Utah. Defendant HAYCOCK formed and controlled the following four business entities 
(collectively, the "Haycock Entities"): 
2858 
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a. Lawrence Skinner and Associates ("Lawrence Skinner") - Defendant 
HAYCOCK was a managerial accountant doing accounting work for 
Lawrence Skinner; 
b. Paramount Strategies f "Paramount") - Paramount a subsidiary company 
of Lawrence Skinner, conducted real estate transactions and handled real 
estate investments; 
c. Lavton Davis Financial ("Layton Davis") - Lavton Davis managed 
mortgages and properties on behalf of Paramount; and 
d. Ireland West LLC ("Ireland West") • Ireland West was a joint venture that 
conducted real estate transactions and handled the proceeds of those 
transactions. 
2. Defendant LYLE CLAY SMITH was a resident of Davis County, Utah. 
Defendant SMITH was vice president of Lawrence Skinner, identified properties to be purchased 
through Lawrence Skinner, and processed and completed loan transactions on behalf of 
Lawrence Skinner. Defendant SMITH also managed Layton Davis. 
3. Defendant JAMIS MELWOOD JOHNSON was a resident of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, Defendant JOHNSON engaged in activities related to Lawrence Skinner, Paramount, and 
Layton Davis real estate transactions, including issuing verifications of deposit ("VODs") and 
verifications of assets ("VOAs") to facilitate the closing of some of the loan transactions 
identified in this Indictment. Defendant JOHNSON did not have a license to practice law in 
Utah but was licensed to practice in New York. 
4. Various "straw buyers" participated in the loan transactions identified in this 
Indictment. Tnese straw buyers were recruited to sign and submit real estate purchase 
agreements and loan documentation (collectively, "purchase and loan documents*') to lenders 
using their favorable personal credit rating. At times, and as described below, the purchase and 
loan documents contained false and misleading financial information about the straw buyers and 
2 
. 2853 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case 2:09-cr-0u , 33-CW Document 1 Filed 03/18/0b Page 3 of 20 
concealed from the lender material information concerning the funding of the transaction and use 
of loan proceeds. 
Scheme Victims: The Mortgage Lenders 
5. America's Wholesale Lender ("AWL"), Countiywide Home Loans ("CHL"), 
Countrywide Bank ("CWB"), Argent Mortgage ("AM"), Paragon Home Lending ("PHL"), 
Shoreline Lending ("SL"), and Mountain States Mortgage ("MSM"), were mortgage lenders 
with national business operations that included offices or lending functions in Utah. As 
described in detail below, these mortgage lenders approved and funded loans primarily based 
upon borrowers providing true and accurate information, along with adequate documentation, 
which met their respective mortgage underwriting standards. 
The Mortgage Loan Application, Approval, and Funding Process 
6. As part of the mortgage application process, mortgage lenders AWL, CHL, CWB 
AM, PHL, SL, and MSM (collectively, the "Mortgage Lenders") required a loan application, 
along with supporting documentation, which accurately reflected a borrower's financial 
condition, assets, income, liabilities, and ability to repay and retire the mortgage, as well as 
information concerning the condition of the property serving as security for the loan. The loan 
application was required to be signed by the borrower under oath. The Mortgage Lenders 
required the foregoing information, attested to under oath, in order to make knowledgeable and 
informed lending decisions. This phase of loan verification during which an assessment of the 
risk of granting a loan against the possibility of a borrower default is called "underwriting." 
7. Prior to closing the transaction, the Mortgage Lenders also required submission of 
an appraisal report accurately reflecting the fair market value of the property and market 
conditions surrounding the property. The Mortgage Lenders used the appraisal report in their 
underwriting and lending decisions. 
3 
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8. At the loan closing, the closing agent was required to prepare a Settlement 
Statement ("Form HUD 1") which accurately reflected the receipt and disbursement of 
transaction frmds. The Form HUD lalso showed, among other things, the down payment paid 
by the borrower and funds due to the seller. Based on the closing instructions, the closing agent 
was charged with verifying the legitimate source of the down payment, collecting the indicated 
funds from the borrower and, following execution by the borrower and seller of appropriate legal 
documents, disbursing the loan proceeds for the benefit of the seller. 
THE SCHEME AND ARTIFICE TO DEFRAUD 
9. Beginning sometime prior to mid-2005 to around August 2007, in the Central 
Division of the District of Utah, and elsewhere, 
RONALD WILLIAM HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY SMITH, and 
JAMIS MELWOOD JOHNSON, 
defendants herein, devised and intended to devise, and did aid and abet each other therein, a 
scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain money and property by means of false and 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises and omissions of material facts by obtaining 
real estate loans from one or more of the Mortgage Lenders, as detailed below. In executing and 
attempting to execute the scheme and artifice to defraud, the defendants: 
a. knowingly transmitted and caused to be transmitted, by means of 
wire communications in interstate commerce, writings, signs, 
signals, pictures, and sounds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 
(Wire Fraud); 
b. knowingly deposited and caused to be deposited in an authorized 
depository for mail a matter or thing to be sent and delivered by 
the United States Postal Service or by any private or commercial 
interstate carrier, according to the directions thereon, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Mail Fraud); and 
c. caused financial transactions to be conducted with proceeds of the 
specified unlawful activities (i.e., mail fraud and wire fraud) with 
4 
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the intent to promote the carrying on of such activities, in violation 
ofl8U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i). 
OBJECT OF THE SCHEME AND ARTIFICE TO DEFRAUD 
10. It was the object of the scheme and artifice to defraud for the defendants to obtain 
money fraudulently by inducing the Mortgage Lenders, through false statements, 
misrepresentations, deception, and omissions of material facts, to loan money to straw 
borrowers. 
MANNER AND MEANS OF THE OF THE SCHEME AND ARTIFICE TO DEFRAUD 
11. It was a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that defendant HAYCOCK 
caused defendant SMITH and others associated with the Haycock Entities to search for and 
identify residences that could be placed under contract for purchase in Davis, Salt Lake, and 
Utah Counties. These residential properties often were in financial distress that had either 
remained unsold for an extended period of time on the market or for which the owner or builder 
had a need to sell. 
12. It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that defendant 
HAYCOCK caused purchases and sales of residential properties including, among others, the 
following properties in Davis County, Salt Lake County and Utah County, Utah (collectively, the 
"Haycock Properties"): 
a. II897 Harvest Moon Lane, Highland, Utah; 
b. 354 East Pheasant View Drive, Draper, Utah; 
c. 1408 Military Way, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
d. 15023 South Pastoral Way, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
e. 14788 South Shadow Grove Court, Draper, Utah; 
f. 10094 South Wasatch Boulevard, Sandy, Utah; 
•
5
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g. 19 East Windsong Drive, Pleasant Grove, Utah; 
h. 891 East Osmond Lane, Provo, Utah; 
i. 533 East Mountainville, Alpine, Utah; 
j . 13595 Royal Chase Circle, Draper, Utah; 
k. 62 West Roberts Circle, Farmington, Utah; and 
1. 214 North Morningside Drive, Farmington, Utah. 
. 1 3 . It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that defendant 
HAYCOCK: 
a. induced the owners/sellers of the Haycock Properties to sell their homes at 
a fixed price to an entity or a straw buyer controlled by defendants 
HAYCOCK and SMITH; 
b. required each owner/seller of the Haycock Properties to enter into a joint 
venture agreement with Paramount or Ireland West (the "Joint Venture''); 
and 
c. promised owners/sellers, under the Joint Venture agreement, a portion of 
the profits stemming from the sale of their residence. 
14. It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that defendants 
HAYCOCK and SMITH: 
a. recruited straw buyers to participate in the purchases of the Haycock 
Properties. These straw buyers were often referred to by the defendants as 
"FICO buyers;" 
b. induced straw buyers to participate in the purchases of the Haycock 
Properties by making, or causing to be made, one or more of the following 
false and fraudulent representations: 
(1) the straw buyer would not have to make a down payment or invest 
any money of their own to buy the home; 
(2) the straw buyer would be paid a substantial fee for signing the loan 
papers; 
(3) the straw buyer would have no financial risk and would have no 
obligation to make loan payments on the home; 
6 
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(4) one of the Haycock Entities would make the loan payments for the 
Haycock Properties; 
(5) the straw buyer need not occupy the home; and 
(6) the home would be resold in short order, thus relieving the straw 
buyer of any liability for the loan; 
c. required and instructed straw buyers to form a limited liability company, 
or "LLC," to qualify for the loan and to receive a portion of the 
transaction proceeds as a fee for their participation; 
d. concealed from the Mortgage Lenders, as summarized in paragraphs 14.b. 
and 14.c. above, material information concerning the funding of the 
transaction and use of loan proceeds; 
e. caused material false statements to be made in purchase and loan 
documents submitted to the Mortgage Lenders concerning the straw 
buyer's income, assets, plans to occupy the residence, down payment, and 
plans to make loan payments; and 
f. caused the straw buyers to sign purchase and loan documents to purchase 
one or more of the Haycock Properties. 
15. It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that defendants 
HAYCOCK and SMITH caused the creation and submission to the Mortgage Lenders appraisals 
supporting straw buyer purchase and loan documents on the Haycock Properties, These 
appraisals reflected a value equivalent to a sales price established by the defendants rather than 
the price agreed to by the owner/seller. To obtain the inflated appraisals necessary to approval 
of the loans, the defendants supplied the appraisers with the straw buyer sales contract price, and 
rejected appraisals that failed to reflect that inflated value. 
16. It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that defendants 
HAYCOCK, SMITH, and JOHNSON caused the straw buyer loans to be closed under false and 
fraudulent pretenses by concealing from the Mortgage Lenders one or more of the following 
deceptive aspects of the loan transactions: 
a. that the buyer was a "straw buyer;" 
7 
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b. that the straw buyer had neither made a down payment nor invested any of 
his own funds, resulting in virtually all of the financial risk in the purchase 
and loan transaction being transferred to the Mortgage Lender; 
c. that the straw buyer was being paid a kickback or fee from the loan 
proceeds as an inducement to apply for the loan from the Mortgage 
Lender; 
d. that the straw buyer had no intention to occupy the home or to make 
payments on the loan; 
e. that the straw buyer had a materially smaller income stream and materially 
fewer assets than represented on his loan application, thereby lacking the 
financial wherewithal to qualify for the loan or to make the monthly 
payments on the loan after closing; 
h, that the loan closing documentation created the false appearance that the 
straw buyer had made a down payment to purchase the property; 
i. that material portions of the loan proceeds were not being paid to the 
seller, but to entities controlled by the defendants pursuant to false second 
mortgages or other fictitious liens or obligations against the property that 
appeared at the closing; and 
j . that loan funds paid out to the joint venture entities controlled by the 
defendants were being deposited into a general account and were used to 
make loan payments and related payments for the Haycock Properties in 
the place of the straw buyers and used to pay the costs related to planning 
and funding future straw purchase transactions, 
17. It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that defendants 
HAYCOCK and SMITH, for a period of time, caused one of the Haycock Entities, instead of the 
straw buyers, to make payments on the straw purchase loans for the Haycock Properties in order 
to give the Mortgage Lenders the false impression that the loans were normal transactions and 
were performing appropriately. The defendants often referred to the account from which excess 
loan funds were drawn as the "slush fund." 
18. It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that defendants 
HAYCOCK, JOHNSON and SMITH caused ftinds from the "slush fund" to be diverted to make 
8 
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down payments, earnest money payments, or monthly loan payments on other straw purchase 
loans and other transactions related to the Haycock Properties. 
19. It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that after defendants 
HAYCOCK and SMITH created the false appearance that the loans were performing, they 
caused one of the Haycock Entities to cease making payments on the loans, leaving the straw 
buyers with mortgages that they had no ability to repay, and Mortgage Lenders with non-
performing loans secured by the properties worth far less than the outstanding loan balances. 
COUNTS 1 through 10 
18 U.S.G § 1341 
(Mail Fraud)
 r 
18. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 17 of this Indictment are 
incorporated herein by reference as though fully set forth herein. 
19. On or about the dates enumerated in each count below, in the Central Division of 
the District of Utah, and elsewhere, for the purpose of executing and in furtherance of the 
scheme and artifice to defraud more particularly described in paragraphs 1 through 17 of this 
Indictment, and for obtaining money and property of the Mortgage Lenders by means of false 
and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, and omissions of material facts, and 
attempting to do so, the defendants named below did knowingly deposit and cause to be 
deposited in any post office or authorized depository for mail the matter or thing listed below to 
be sent and delivered by the United States Postal Service or any private or commercial interstate 
carrier, and did cause such matter or thing to be delivered according to the directions thereon as 
more particularly described for each count below, and did aid and abet, counsel, command, 
induce, procure, and cause said mailing: 
9 
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COUNT 
1 
2 
3 
4 
DATE 
(On or 
1 About) 
3/24/06 
4/12/06 
4/21/06 
5/9/06 
DEFENDANTS 
| RONALD 
WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
1 LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MELWOOD 
RONALD 
WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MELWOOD 
JOHNSON, 
RONALD 
WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MELWOOD 
JOHNSON, 
RONALD 
WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MELWOOD 
PROPERTY 
ADDRESS 
11897 Harvest 
Moon Lane, 
Highland, Utah 
354 East Pheasant 
View Drive, Draper, 
Utah 
1408 Military Way, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
15023 South 
Pastoral Way, Salt 
Lake City, Utah j 
DESCRIPTION OF 
MAILING 
Transfer of V.P. signed loan 
closing document package 
from Westland Title office 
(Salt Lake City, Utah) to the 
office of Shoreline Lending 
(Mission Viejo, California) 
via overnight common 
courier 
Transfer of S.P. signed loan 
closing document package 
from Westland Title office 
(Salt Lake City, Utah) to the 
office of Argent Mortgage 
(Irvine, California) via 
overnight common courier 
(FedEx) 
Transfer of R.F. signed loan 
closing document package 
from Deer Creek Title office 
(Park City, Utah) to the 
office of Countrywide Bank 
(Jacksonville, Florida) via 
overnight common courier 
Transfer of R.F. signed loan 1 
closing document package | 
from Westland Title office 
(Salt Lake City, Utah) to the 
office of Shoreline Lending 
(Laguna Hills, California) via 
overnight common courier 
(FedEx) 
10 
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COUNT 
5 
6 
7 
I 8 i 
___J 
DATE 
(On or 
About) 
6/8/06 
7/26/06 
10/6/06 
10/20/06 ; 
_ J 
DEFENDANTS 
JOHNSON, 
RONALD 
WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY 
1
 SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MELWOOD 
JOHNSON, 
RONALD 
WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MELWOOD 
JOHNSON, 
RONALD 
WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MELWOOD 
JOHNSON, 
RONALD 
WILLIAM 
LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MELWOOD j 
PROPERTY 
ADDRESS 
14788 South 
1 Shadow Grove 
Court, Draper, Utah 
891 East Osmond 
Lane, Provo, Utah 
533 East 
Mountainville, 
Alpine, Utah 
13595 Royal Chase 
Circle, Draper, Utah 
DESCRIPTION OF 
MAILING 
Transfer of CM. signed loan 
closing document package 
from Brighton Title office 
(Midvale, Utah) to the office ; 
of Shoreline Lending 
(Laguna Hills, California) via 1 
overnight common courier 
(FedEx) 1 
Transfer of G.S. signed loan I 
closing document package 
from Surety Title office 
(Midvale, Utah) to the office 
of America's Wholesale 
Lender (Jacksonville, 
Florida) via overnight 
common courier (FedEx) j 
Transfer of R.S. signed loan 
closing document package 
from Surety Title office i 
(Midvale, Utah) to the office ; 
of Contrywide Bank ! 
(Jacksonville, Florida) via 
overnight common courier j 
(FedEx) | 
Transfer of J.N. signed loan 
closing document package 
from Surety Title office 
(Midvale, Utah) to the office 
of America's Wholesale 
Lender (Jacksonville, 
Florida) via overnight j 
common courier (FedEx) j 
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COUNT 
9 
10 
DATE 
(On or 
1 About) 
| 10/27/06 
6/22/07 
DEFENDANTS 
JOHNSON, 
1 RONALD 
! WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLECTAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MEL WOOD 
JOHNSON, 
RONALD 
WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MELWOOD 
JOHNSON, 
PROPERTY 
ADDRESS 
62 West Roberts 
Circle, Farmington, 
Utah 
214 North 
Morningside Drive, \ 
Farmington, Utah 
DESCRIPTION OF 
! MAILING 
! Transfer of S.P. signed loan 
closing document package 
from Surety Title office 
(Midvale, Utah) to the office 
of America's Wholesale 
Lender (Anaheim, 
California) via overnight 
common courier (FedEx) i 
Transfer of T.R. signed loan 1 
closing document package 
from Surety Title office 
(Midvale, Utah) to the office 
of Paragon Home Lending 
(Brookfield, Wisconsin) via 
overnight common courier 
(FedEx) 
all in violation of Title 18,United States Code, Sections 1341, 2(a), and 2(b). 
COUNTS 11 through 22 
18U.S.C§1343 
(Wire Fraud) 
20. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 17 of this Indictment are 
incorporated herein by reference as though fully set forth herein. 
21. On or about the dates enumerated as to each count, in the Central Division of the 
District of Utah, and elsewhere, for the purpose of executing and in furtherance of the scheme 
and artifice to defraud more particularly described in paragraphs 1 through 17 of this 
12 
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Indictment, and for obtaining money and property of the Mortgage Lenders as described below 
by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, and omissions of 
material facts, and attempting to do so, the defendants named below did knowingly transmit and 
cause to be transmitted, by means of wire communications in interstate commerce, the writings, 
signs, signals, pictures, and sounds as more particularly described for each count below, and did 
aid and abet, counsel, command, induce, procure, and cause said wire transmission: 
COUNT 
11 
12 
13 : 
DATE 
(On or 
About) 
3/29/06 
1/18/06 
4/25/06 
DEFENDANTS 
RONALD 
WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MELWOOD 
JOHNSON. 
RONALD 
WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MELWOOD 
JOHNSON. 
RONALD 
WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
PROPERTY 
ADDRESS 
11897 Harvest 
Moon Lane, 
Highland, Utah 
354 East Pheasant 
View Drive, Draper, 
Utah 
1408 Military Way, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
DESCRIPTION OF WIRE 
COMMUNICATION 
1
 Wiring of approximately 
$389,468.93 in Shoreline 
Lending loan proceeds 
related to mortgage loan 
number 2006-198093 from a 
bank outside the State of 
Utah on behalf of Shoreline 
Lending (Mission Viejo, 
California) to the account of 
Westiand Title at Zions Bank 
(Salt Lake City, Utah) 
Wiring of approximately 
$541,500.64 in Argent 
Mortgage loan proceeds 
related to mortgage loan 
number 0096464474 from a 
bank outside the State of 
Utah on behalf of Argent 
Mortgage (Irvine, California) 
to the account of Westiand 
Title at Zions Bank (Salt 
Lake Citv, Utah) 
Wiring of approximately 
$1,680,807.68 in 
Countrywide Bank loan 
proceeds related to mortgage 
loan number 134995050 
from a bank outside the State 
13 
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COUNT 
14 
15 
1 16 1 
17 
DATE 
(On or 
About) 
5/15/06 
6/12/06 
7/10/06 
7/21/06 
DEFENDANTS 
JAMIS 
MELWOOD 
JOHNSON. 
1 RONALD 
WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MELWOOD 
j JOHNSON. 
RONALD 
WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MELWOOD 
JOHNSON. 
RONALD 
WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS | 
MELWOOD 
JOHNSON. 
RONALD 
WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
1 PROPERTY 
ADDRESS 
15023 South 
1 Pastoral Way, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 
14788 South 
Shadow Grove 
Court, Draper, Utah 
10094 South 
Wasatch Boulevard, 
Sandy Utah 
19 East Windsong 
Drive, Pleasant 
Grove, Utah 
DESCRIPTION OF WIRE 
COMMUNICATION 
of Utah on behalf of CWB 
(Jacksonville, Florida) to the 
account of Deer Creek Title 
j at Zions Bank (Salt Lake 
1 Citv. Utah) 
1
 Wiring of approximately 
$549,592.22 in Shoreline 
Lending loan proceeds i 
related to mortgage loan 
number 2006-198327 from a 
bank outside the State of 
Utah on behalf of Shoreline 
Lending (Laguna Hills, 
California) to the account of 
Westland Title at Zions 
Bank (Salt Lake City, Utah) 
Wiring of approximately 
$528,751.4.3 in Shoreline 
Lending loan proceeds 
related to mortgage loan 
number 2006-198420 from a 
bank outside the State of 
Utah on behalf of Shoreline 
Lending (Laguna Hills, 
California) to the account of 
Brighton Title at Zions Bank 
(Salt Lake Citv. Utah) 
Wiring of approximately 
$615,101.29 in Mountain 
States Mortgage loan 
proceeds related to mortgage 
loan number 06060127 from 
a bank outside the State of 
Utah on behalf of Mountain | 
States Mortgage (Salt Lake 
City, Utah) to the account of 
Brighton Title at Zions Bank 
(Salt Lake Citv, Utah) 
Wiring of approximately 
$155,505.46 in Mountain 
States Mortgage loan 
proceeds related to mortgage | 
14 
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COUNT 
18 
19 
20 
DATE 
(On or 
About) 
7/25/06 
10/11/06 : 
10/20/06 
DEFENDANTS 
LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MEL WOOD 
JOHNSON. 
RONALD 
WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MELWOOD 
JOHNSON. 
RONALD 
WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MELWOOD 
JOHNSON. j 
RONALD 
WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
PROPERTY 
ADDRESS 
891 East Osmond 
Lane, Provo, Utah 
533 East 
Mountainville, 
Alpine, Utah 
13595 Royal Chase 
Circle, Draper, Utah 
DESCRIPTION OF WIRE 
COMMUNICATION 
!
 loan file number 94607 from 
a bank outside the State of 
Utah on behalf of Mountain 
States Mortgage (Salt Lake 
City, Utah) to the account of 
Surety Title at Bank of Utah 
(Sandy, Utah) ; 
Wiring of approximately 
$1,011,118.59 in America's 
Wholesale Lender loan j 
proceeds related to mortgage 
loan number 139219829 from 
a bank outside the State of ; 
Utah on behalf of America' s 
Wholesale Lender 
(Jacksonville, Florida) to the 
account of Surety Title at 
Bank of Utah (Ogden, Utah) j 
Wiring of approximately 
$642,692.92 in Countrywide .; 
Bank loan proceeds related to 
mortgage loan number 
151040337 from a bank 
outside the State of Utah on 
behalf of Countrywide Bank 
{jQr\r<zrin\n\\f* Flnrirjc*} try t k g 
account of Surety Title at 
Bank of Utah (Ogden, Utah) 
Wiring of approximately 
$1,101,802.27 in America's 
Wholesale Lender loan 
proceeds related to mortgage 
15 
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COUNT 
21 
22 
1 DATE 
(On or 
About) 
1 10/30/06 
6/25/07 
' 1 
DEFENDANTS 
LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MELWOOD 
JOHNSON. 
1 RONALD 
[ WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MELWOOD 
JOHNSON. 
RONALD 
WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY 
SMITH, and 
JAMIS 
MELWOOD 
JOHNSON, 
PROPERTY 
ADDRESS 
| 62 West Roberts 
Circle, Farmington, 
Utah 
214 North 
Mornings ide Drive, 
Farmington, Utah 
DESCRIPTION OF WIRE 
1 COMMUNICATION 
1 loan number 151644724 from 
a bank outside the State of 
Utah on behalf of America's 
Wholesale Lender j 
(Jacksonville, Florida) to the 
account of Surety Title at 
Bank of Utah (Osden, Utah) 
Wiring of approximately | 
$327,964.34 in Countrywide 
Home Loans loan proceeds 
related to mortgage loan 
number 153051527 from a 
bank outside the State of 
Utah on behalf of 
| Countrywide Home Loans 
(Jacksonville, Florida) to the 
account of Surety Title at 
Bank of Utah (Oeden, Utah) 
Wiring of approximately 1 
$302,495.34 in Paragon 
Home Lending loan proceeds 
related to mortgage loan 
number 119149PE from a 
bank outside the State of 
Utah on behalf of Paragon 
Home Lending (Brookfield, 
Wisconsin) to the account of 
Surety Title at Bank of Utah 
(Ogden, Utah) 
all in violation of Title 18,United States Code, Sections, 1343, 2(a) and 2(b). 
COUNT 23 
18 U.S.C. § 1349 
(Conspiracy) 
16 
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22. Beginning in or about mid 2005 to around August 2007, in the Central Division of the 
District of Utah, and elsewhere, 
RONALD WILLIAM HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY SMITH, and 
JAMIS MEL WOOD JOHNSON, 
defendants herein, and others known and unknown to the Grand
 wTury, did knowingly and willfully 
combine, conspire, confederate, and agree to commit offenses against the United States of America, 
that is; mail fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, § 1341; and wire fraud, in violation of 
Title 18, United States Code, §1343. 
23. The object and the manner and means used to further the conspiracy are set forth in 
paragraphs 1 through 17 of this Indictment, and by this reference are fully incorporated in this Count of 
the Indictment. 
24. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof, at least one of the 
conspirators committed at least one overt act in the District of Utah. The events set forth in each Count 
of Counts 1 through 17 each and individually constitute an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, 
and each overt act is incorporated in this Count of the Indictment as if fully set forth herein; 
all in violation of Title 18,United States Code, Section 1349. 
COUNTS 24 THROUGH 37 
(Money Laundering, §18 U.S.C. I956(a)(i)(A)(i), and §2) 
25. Between on or about January 2006 and January 2007, the defendants did unlawfully 
and knowingly conduct and attempt to conduct approximately sixty-five (65) financial transactions 
totaling more than approximately Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000) in excess loan proceeds 
17 
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generated by the mail fraud and wire fraud described in Counts 1 through 22 above. 
26. On or about the dates set forth below, in the Central Division of the District of Utah and 
elsewhere, the defendants, 
RONALD WILLIAM HAYCOCK, SR., 
LYLE CLAY SMITH, and 
JAMIS MEL WOOD JOHNSON, 
did unlawfully and knowingly conduct and attempt to conduct financial transactions affecting interstate 
commerce, that is, causing excess loan proceeds generated by the mail fraud and wire fraud described 
in paragraphs 1 through 23 above, and Counts 1 through 22 above, to be placed in the "slush fund" and 
from there used to make down payments, earnest money payments or monthly loan payments in order 
to promote other unrelated fraudulent loan transactions for the benefit of the defendants, knowing that 
the property involved in these transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, 
and which transactions in fact involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, that is, mail fraud 
and wire fraud in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1341 and 1343 as described above, 
with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, to-wit: 
Count 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
j Date 
10/27/2006 
10/27/2006 
10/27/2006 
10/02/2006 
10/02/2006 
05/18/2006 
05/18/2006 
06/19/2006 
Loan Generated Proceeds 
13595 South Royal Chase 
Circle 
13595 South Royal Chase 
Circle 
13595 South Royal Chase 
Circle 
533 E. Mountainville 
533 E. Mountainville 
15023 Pastoral Way 
15023 Pastoral Way 
14788 S. Shadow Grove Court 
Amount 
$2,543.68 
$20,278.33 
$25,000.00 
$4,557.05 
$4,688.41 
$57522.68 
$5,676.24 
$35,015.00 
Description of Financial Transaction 
Monthly payment on 850 W 600 N, West Bountiful, 
UT 84087 
Monthly payment on 12091 S Draper Farm Cove, 
Draper, UT* 84020 
Transfer of funds to nominee buyer's account for a 
Verification of Deposit fVOD). 
Monthly payment on 19 East Windsong, Pleasant 
Grove, UT 84062 
Monthly payment on 10094 Wasatch Blvd., Sandy, 
UT, 84092" 
Monthly payment on 14728 S. Pristine Way, Draper, 
UT 84020 * 1 
Monthly payment on 1767 East Springdale Way, 
Draper, UT, 84020 
Transfer of funds to nominee buyer's account for a 
Verification of Deposit (VOD). \ 
18 
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32 
33 
34 
3 5 
I 36 
!
 3 ? 
38 
1
 06/19/2006 
08/10/2006 
08/14/2006 
04/19/2006 
04/19/2006 
04/03/2006 
04/03/2006 
14788 S. Shadow Grove Court 
19 E. Windsong Drive 
19 E, Windsong Drive 
354 E. Pheasant View Drive 
354 E. Pheasant View Drive 
11897 Harvest Moon Lane 
11897 Harvest Moon Lane 
$5,522.68. 
$14,407.45 
$11,655.11 
$5,676.24 
vfonthly payment on 14728 S. Pristine Way, 
Draper.UT 84020 
Monthly payment on 1408 E Military Way, Salt 
Lake City. UT 84103 
Monthly payment on 1334 N Canyon Oaks 
Way, Salt Lake City, UT 8410 
vfonthly payment on 1767 E. Springdale Way, 
Draper. UT 84020 
CM iftA« Monthly payment on 1334 N Canyon Oaks Way, 
5 1 Um
'
5
* bait Lake City. UT 84109 
£4 061 40 Montkty payment on 1769 E Burning Oak Dr., 
Draper. UT 84020 
£.
 n/.n q< Monthly payment on 14702 S. Pristine Way, Draper, 
•'•""—''lUT 84020 * 
All in violation of TitJe 18, United States Code, §1956(a)(l)(A)(i), and §2. 
NOTICE OF INTENTION TO SEEK CRIMINAL FORFEITURE 
(18U.S.C. Section 981(a)(1)(C); 28 U.S.C. Section 2461) 
As a result of committing the felony offenses alleged in Counts 1 through 15 of the Indictment, 
each of which is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, defendants RONALD WILLIAM 
HAYCOCK, SR., LYLE CLAY SMITH, JAMIS MEL WOOD JOHNSON, shall forfeit to the United 
States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 981(a)(1)(C); 28 U.S.C. Section 2461 any and all property 
constituting or derived from any proceeds said defendants obtained directly or indirectly as a result of 
the said felony charges alleged in the Counts listed in this Notice, and any property traceable thereto, 
including but not limited to the following: 
PROCEEDS (MONEY JUDGMENT) 
As to RONALD WILLIAM HAYCOCK, SR., LYLE CLAY SMITH, JAMIS MEL WOOD 
JOHNSON: The approximate aggregate sum of Two Million Eight-Hundred Sixty-Five Thousand 
Dollars ($2,865,000) in United States currency received and diverted by RONALD W. HAYCOCK, 
SR., LYLE SMITH, JAMIS MEL WOOD JOHNSON, in connection with the above-referenced 
offenses. 
If more than one defendant is convicted of an offense, the defendants so convicted are jointly 
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and severally liable for the amount involved in such offense. 
SUBSTITUTE ASSETS 
If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any act or omission of the 
defendants, 
(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; 
(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third person; 
(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the Court; 
(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or 
(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without difficulty; 
it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2461(c) and 21 U.S.C. Section 
853 (p), to seek forfeiture of any property of said defendants up to the value of the above-forfeitable 
property, 
* A TRUE BILL: 
FOREPERSON OF THE GRAND JURY 
BRETT L. TOLMAN 
United States Attorney 
/• I L . . . 
S£6TT J. THORLEY 
Assistant United States Attorney 
! \ 
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FILED IN UNITED STW€& DISTRICT 
COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH 
MAR 18 2011 
p. MARK J O ^ C L E R K 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, | 
Plaintiff, : V E R D I C T 
» 
v. ; 
JAMIS MELWOOD JOHNSON, \ 2:09-CR-OO133 CW 
Defendant. 
We, the jury duly impaneled in the above-entitled case, find the defendant JAMIS 
MELWOOD JOHNSON: 
Si GUILTY • NOT GUILTY as to Count 1 of the Indictment. 
H GUILTY • NOT GUILTY as to Count 2 of the Indictment. 
$ GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 4 of the Indictment 
IS GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 5 of the Indictment 
S GUILTY • NOT GUILTY as to Count 6 of the Indictment. 
a GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 7 of the Indictment 
B GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 9 of the Indictment. 
$ GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 11 of the Indictment. 
3 GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 12 of the Indictment. 
PL GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 13 of the Indictment. 
tf GUILTY • NOT GUILTY as to Count 14 of the Indictment. 
•fa GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 15 of the Indictment 
feu? t * 
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3 GUILTY • NOT GUILTY as to Count 16 of the Indictment. 
JSL GUILTY • NOT GUILTY as to Count 18 of the Indictment 
0 GUILTY • NOT GUILTY as to Count 19 of the Indictment. 
)B GUILTY • NOT GUILTY as to Count 21 of the Indictment. 
& GUILTY 3 NOT GUILTY as to Count 23 of the Indictment. 
l^t GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 27 of the Indictment. 
P GUILTY G NOT GUILTY as to Count 28 of the Indictment 
» GUILTY 3 NOT GUILTY as to Count 29 of the Indictment, 
yj GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 30 of the Indictment 
Q GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 31 of the Indictment 
3 GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 32 of the Indictment. 
P GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 33 of the Indictment. 
IS GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 35 of the Indictment 
^ GUILTY • NOT GUILTY as to Count 37 of the Indictment. 
^ GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 38 of the Indictment 
DATED this Q day of fYWm ,2011. 
K) 5*. 
FOREPERSON e 
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